Abstract
When Wittgenstein complained about this “old problem” in 1915 (NB 49)1, he was in the middle of the conceptual turmoil from which were to emerge the characteristic theses of his logical atomism. He was also later to bemoan as a cardinal error his mishandling of this matter in his early work. What is the problem, and what is his solution to it? An answer must take us through many of the central issues of the Tractatus. The central importance of the problem can be seen from the extent of the passages in the Notebooks in which Wittgenstein wrestles with the issue, and its more modest appearance at what are still crucial junctures in the Tractatus. I shall argue that once we understand the problem, we shall need to adjust several commonly-held opinions about key theses of the Tractatus. For one, the analysis of which Wittgenstein speaks cannot be that of Russell’s theory of descriptions. In fact there is not one concept of analysis, but two, and Wittgenstein never clearly distinguished them. Secondly, the Sachverhalte of the Tractatus are best seen not as atomic facts, but as atomic complexes. Before moving to these points it is worth seeing where Wittgenstein got the problem from, and what it was.
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References
References to Wittgenstein’s works are given mainly in the text in this chapter. The Tractatus is referred to by paragraph (in one case page) number alone. Other works referred to are abbreviated as follows: NB = Notebooks 1914–1916 (Wittgenstein 1979). PI = Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 1967). PR = Philosophical Remarks (Wittgenstein 1975). PG = Philosophical Grammar (Wittgenstein 1974). BB = The Blue Book,in The Blue and Brown Books (Wittgenstein 1969). LO = Letters to C.K.Ogden (Wittgenstein 1973). LRKM = Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore (Wittgenstein 1977).
Cf. Meinong 1899, in Meinong 1971, 389.
Russell 1904 reprinted in Russell 1973, 21–76. Cf. esp. 27 f.
Moore 1899, 180. Cf. Russell 1973, 23.
If a complex exists, then its parts are related, but not every case of relatedness gives rise to a complex. Cf. Findlay 1963, 140 ff.
Russell 1903, 466. Cf. 137: “for the comprehension of analysis, it is necessary to investigate the notion of whole and part”.
We know that Wittgenstein read and admired the Principles,and we may well expect him to have taken an interest in the later sections where Russell deals with dynamics: Wittgenstein was after all an engineering student, and admirer of Hertz. The passage comes from §439, which treats of matter and the unity of the complex. Unmistakable similarities between ideas in the Tractatus and those of the immediately surrounding sections, §438 and §440, have been shown by Visser 1981.
Cf. the more tentative notational experiments reproduced in facsimile at NB 133–4, and the remarks at NB 6. The simple form (A) cannot always be applicable, otherwise Wittgenstein would not be in doubt as to how the analysis goes in particular cases (NB 101). The predicate `4’ will not always simply distribute to the constituents. The general form of analysis for a bipartite complex will be cases: e.g. if `¢’ is E!’ then all three will be, since this reduces to (EP). In a fully resolved proposition (see below) all monadic predicates will disappear.
PG,199–201; PR,301–303.
Cf. the excellent account in J. Griffin 1964, Ch. VI.
This is the judgement of Griffin, op. cit.,41–42, and I am not inclined to dissent.
Müller 1967, 30; Fogelin 1976, 11–12.
Müller, op. cit., 31–32; Dietrich 1973, 20–25.
The point that Wittgenstein says `possible Sachverhalt (Sachlage)’ but not `possible fact’ seems to me to offer little evidence either way.
Cf. Müller, op. cit., 38.
If we follow Wittgenstein’s letter to Russell and 2.06, there are no mixed facts. But it we follow the letter, there are no negative facts either. Müller, op. cit.,23 accepts mixed facts. But he draws the line at disjunctive facts. I think the issue is not clearly decidable. If a fact is anything that is the case, there certainly are disjunctive facts. If however facts only correspond to complexes, only conjunctive facts are admissible.
It is possible that Wittgenstein had no copy of the Tractatus with him at Monte Cassino when he wrote the letter to Russell. Cf. von Wright 1971, 11. This would not account for his acceptance of the translation, however.
Another possibility would be to call the facts I call `atomic’ instead `ionic facts’, reserving `atomic’ for the positive ones.
Kenny 1974, 11. Kenny’s lesson is that Wittgenstein must always be treated with circumspection as a commentator on his own work. He seems later to have forgotten about Sachverhalte altogether; this may itself have been a symptom of the complex/fact confusion.
n the two-sidedness of independence, cf. Simons 1981a.
The only contingent non-relational propositions concerning a given complex appear to concern the question whether or not certain of its simple parts are related in some way which is not part of the description of the complex in question, for example given the complex [aRb],where a and b are simple, it is a further question whether, say, aSb. If aSb then [aRb] is part of a larger complex, which we may call `[aRb] + [aSb]’. If ti aSb,then we might look for a way of saying that [aRb] is not part of such a larger complex. The natural way is of course simply to assert the existence of one complex and non-existence of the other: a mixed fact, which is just equivalent to `aRb. ~ aSb’. If we simply assert `aRb’ then we leave the further question open. Since it is essential to (is an internal property of) any complex which subcomplexes it has, but never essential to any complex that it be part of some supercomplex, Wittgenstein’s remark, “to say that one thing is part of another is always a tautology ” (NB 62) is flatly wrong. It is never a tautology, since the smaller may always exist without the larger.
It follows, pace Wittgenstein, that there are no purely qualitative “copulae”, since they have nothing else to which they could “glue” their subjects.
Cf. Simons 1981b.
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Simons, P. (1992). The Old Problem of Complex and Fact. In: Philosophy and Logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 45. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8094-6_13
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