Abstract
According to the legal normative model of judicial application of law, the court ought to justify its decision by valid legal rules, which constitute the normative basis for the decision and determine the legal consequences of the proven facts of the case. A theoretical analysis demonstrates that the legal rule is used by the court either in the form of a legal provision formulated in a legal text, or after this provision has been interpreted and/or subjected to addition of any extra-legal rules referred to in its content, so that the applied rule is transformed into a “rule of decision” (Ch X.5).
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Notes
M. Jori, 1971, pp. 309–325; H. Kelsen, 1928, par. 36; 1949, Ch X C; 1979, Ch 59(I); A. Peczenik, 1983, Ch 1.4.6–1.4.12; 1989, Ch 5.8.4; U. Scarpelli, 1965, Ch VII; J. Vernengo, 1976, Ch 9.2; G. Winkler 1990, Ch IV.1; J. Wróblewski, 1955, p. 174ff.
Cf., note (I)2.
J. Wróblewslki, 1980b, pp. 10–17; 1883b, pp. 319–322; 1986e.
J. Wróblewski, 1986e, from different positions, J. W. Harris, 1979, Ch 15.
W. Lang, 1962, p. 112ff, 304.
A. Aarnio, 1983, Ch 7; 1987, Ch II.3; A. G. Conte, 1974, 1988, E. Garcia Maynez, 1948; J. W. Harris, 1979, Ch 14–17; L. Nowak, 1965, 1967; J. Wróblewski, 1982a, 1982c.
The conception of systemic validity presented in the text (cf., J. Wróblewski, 1986f) has as its corollaries “legal validity” (G. H. von Wright, 1963, Ch X.5, 6), “intrasystemic validity” (U. Scarpelli, 1965, p. 6 8ff), “constitutional validity” (R. Schreiber, 1966, Ch III.2) and “formal conception of validity” (L. Nowak, 1965, p. 97ff). The term “systemic validity” is used in J. Raz, 1979, p. 150ff; for systemic validity one can apply the notion of self-reference cf., N. Luhmann, 1985, p. 285; on Kelsen’s ideas cf., T. Mazzarese, 1989, Ch 3.
The construction of the models presented in the text was formulated in J. Wróblewski, 1982d, 1983b, 1986e.
E. Waśkowski, 1936, Ch III.
Z. Ziembiński, 1970; J. L. Gardies, 1985; J. Kalinowski, 1972; U. Klug, 1958; J. Brkic, 1985; H. Schreiner, 1985; A. Soeteman, 1989, Ch I, IX; I. Tammelo, 1978, I. Tammelo and H. Schreiner, 1974–1976; J. Horowitz, 1972; O. Weinberger, 1970; Ch. and O. Weinberger, 1970.
J. Wróblewski, 1982d, 1986f.
This concept has as its correlates “faktische Geltung” (R. Schreiber, 1966, Ch III), “S-validity” (L. Nowak, 1967, p. 58ff) and can be treated as a kind of “predictive validity”, A. Ross, 1958, par. 9, 13–15. Cf., E. Pattaro, 1978, Ch II. 9; 1985, Ch VIII. 4–7.
A. Aarnio accepting the trichotomy of validity treats factual validity as “efficacy”, A. Aarnio, 1983, p. 154ff; 1987, Ch II.3.3.
A. Ross, 1929, Ch XVI, par. 3–6.
A. Ross, 1946, Ch III; H. Kelsen, 1949, pp. 119, 122, 173.
Cf., “ideelle Geltung” in R. Schreiber, 1966, Ch III.3; the axiological conception is explicitly accepted by E. Garcia Maynez, 1948, Ch II-IV; F. Bydlinski accepts the axiological validity in extreme situations when legal provisions appear as a “krasses Verstoss” to the idea of law (F. Bydlinski, 1982, p. 566).
A. Aarnio, 1981, pp. 33ff, 37; 1983, p. 160ff; 1987, Ch IV.2; the author has in here mind “rational acceptability”.
J. Wróblewski, 1978c.
This type of problem does not appear in judicial practice when the courts apply only statutes and their validity usually is not problematic. This situation in Poland is changing because of the new institution of the Constitutional Tribunal controlling inter alia constitutionality of statutes. There are also problems of the validity of the substatutory level rules e.g., SAC 25.02.1983 II SA 1904/82 OSPIKA 1983 AA 271.
J. Wróblewski, 1978c.
J. Wróblewski, 1070a, J. Nowacki, 1959.
E. Bulygin introduced the concept of internal and external time for solving these types of problems, E. Bulygin, 1982.
Cf., H. Scheerbarth, 1961. SC 14.05.1982 IV CR 170/82 OSPIKA 1983 C 28.
The practical problem in Poland were the so-called “self-standing resolutions of the Council of Ministers based on general competence but without a special normative basis in statutory rules”, SC 01.06.1982 III PZP 14/82 OSPIKA 1983 P 174 with the comment of T. Zielinski; H. Rot, J. Grzegorczyk, 1984, Ch VIII.
SAC 17.11.1982 II SA 1474/82 OSPIKA 1983 AA 142.
J. Hall, 1973, pp. 15 4–15 7; H. Lasswell, 1971, p. 9 9ff ; R. Pound, 1910; 1959, vol. IV. pp. 14–17; R. S. Summers, 1982, pp. 112–115, 143–277.
J. Wróblewski, 1978a, p. 13.
On the meaning of the term “source of law”, cf., F. Geny, 1932; A. Ross, 1958, Ch 3, p. 75ff, 103ff; 1946, Ch V; 1929, Ch XII; A. Peczenik, 1983, Ch 2.2.; 1989, Ch 6.1.4. J. Wróblewski, 1974e, ZTP, Ch VI. 5; Z. Ziembiński, 1980, Ch 5.1; 5.2.
J. Wróblewski, 1984b, p. 263ff. I am simplifying the typology used by A. Peczenik, 1983, Ch 2.2.2; 2.2.3; 1989, Ch 6.2.
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Wróblewski, J. (1992). Validity of Law and Decision of Validity. In: Bańkowski, Z., MacCormick, N. (eds) The Judicial Application of Law. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8050-2_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8050-2_6
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