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Rationality and the Correctness of a Decision of the Application of Law

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The Judicial Application of Law

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 15))

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Abstract

The problem of rationality is implied in the theoretical analysis of the judicial application of law. Justification of a judicial decision is the one way of demonstrating the rationality of the decision and at the same time acting as a control on that rationality. Rationality analysed through the justification of decisions is based on the existence of rules of justificatory reasoning. These show the form of the decision by defining the way of inferring the conclusion from its premisses (par 2 below). Controversies about the legal syllogism are linked in part to the simplified conception of this reasoning as a syllogism of subsumption (Ch IX.1.1) and in part to divergent opinions about the role of particular kinds of logic in legal reasoning (par 3 below).

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Notes

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  42. Cf., decisions of the Supreme Court cited in J. Nowacki, 1969, p. 28.

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  56. Cf., The use of argumentum a maiori in the first instance court and of analogy in the supreme Court SC 31.12.1962 II CR 1006/62 OSPIKA 1964 C 91. Commenting on this (SC 13.02.1968 VI KZP 17/67 OSPIKA 1969 K 261) M. Cieślak, in approving of the decision, accepts the use of argumentum ad minus but stresses that the use of analogy would result in a different decision.

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  57. Cf., note (IX) 3 5.

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  70. Cf., note (II)4, 9.

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  71. The syllogistic approach was primarily linked with the mechanistic idea of the application of law anticipated by Abelard (A. Giuliani, 1966, Ch IV) and treating the controversy decided by the court as a theoretical problem resolved by reference to a system of norms (A. Giuliani, 1968, p. 237ff). My approach is not linked to these historical ideas.

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  75. This is why O. Brusiin was right when he said that the legal syllogism “... ist eine überaus starke Vereinfachung” (O. Brusiin, 1957, p. 106).

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  78. In civil cases justification of the regional courts decisions are “... are of average or below average quality, and in 5% are contradictory with art. 328, para 2 code of civil procedure” which formulates the criteria of proper justification. Sprawnosc postgpowania sa̧dowego 1974, p. 121.

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  79. Cf., notes 133, 134 below.

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  80. Cf., notes 136, 137 below.

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  92. Cf., postulates of L. Petrażycki. 1960. vol. 2. par 39: H. Kelsen. 1960, n. 239.

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  93. A reduction of the theory of law to a theory of sources of law in a moderate version of the free law school F. Geny, 1932; a positivistic approach A. Ross, 1922, Ch XII–XVI; a kind of realistic approach to the sources of law A. Peczenik, 1989, Ch 6; singling out the main meanings of the term “source of law”, J. Wróblewski, 1974e.

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  98. Cf., the enumeration of several functions by S. Wiodyka in his comment to SC 25.09.1967 III CZP 117/66 OSPIKA 1968 C 195.

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  99. Cf., an approval of the decision with a rejection of its justification in comments by: A. Ohanowicz to SC 24.04.1964 II CR 176/64 OSPIKA 1965 C 229; by A. Szpunar to SC 28.08.1968 II CR 318/68 OSPIKA 1969 C 201; commenting on SC 13.12.1962 II CR 1006/62 OSPIKA 1964 C 91, A. Szpunar and S. Grzybowski have different opinions concerning its proper justification.

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  100. W. Siedlecki, 1969, p. 372 discusses complex problems of justification in the case of “extraordinary revision”.

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  102. The stability of judicial decisions is related to the “principle of inertia” Ch. Perelman, 1979b, p. 131; 198z, pp. 28, 159, 169ff.

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  103. SC 25.02.1969 KRN 182/68 OSN-kar 10, 1969; SC 10.10.1968 IV KR 106/68 OSN-kar 7–8, 1969.

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  104. Legal language uses the term “legal basis”, e.g., art 372 para lc.c.p., “factual basis” and “legal basis” art 328 para 2 c.c.proc; cf., A. Zieliski, 1984.

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  105. J. Wróblewski, 1969a, 1971b, a reference to a valid rule is treated as a “doctrine of legalistic justification” by D. Lyons, 1984, p. 178; from a psychological standpoint A. W. Simpson, 1961, p. 162.

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  106. J. Wróblewski, 1971b, my rule of decision is not the same as the Entscheidungsnorm according to E. Ehrlich, 1913, p. 140ff.

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  107. SC 03.10.1966 III CZP 17/66 OSPIKA 1968 C 28; SC 03.05.1966 III CO 12/66 OSPIKA 1967 C 2; SC 27.06.1969 III CZP 34/67 OSPIKA 1970 C 94.

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  108. The problem of retroactivity in SC 07.03.1966 III CO 72/65 OSPIKA 1966 C 273; SC 14.05.1965 III TR 2028/64 OSPIKA U 90 1967.

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  109. SC 18.06.1966 VI KZP 10/66 OSPIKA 1969 K 74.

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  110. E.g., the application of art 44 crim.c. (1932) at two levels and the rejection of its applicability by the Supreme Court SC 26.08.1967 V KRN 756/67 OSPIKA 1968 K 39; applicability of rules more favourable to the accused SC 14.01.1970 III KR 185/69 OSPIKA 1970 K 163; cf., P. A. Coté, 1982, part 1, Ch 2.

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  111. SC 10.05.1968 VI KZP 2/67 OSPIKA 1969 K 68.

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  112. J. Wróblewski, 1964, p. 11ff.

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  113. SC 16.03.1967 VI KZP 56/66 OSPIKA 1967 K 100.

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  114. SC 10.05.1967 III CZP 95/66 OSPIKA 1968 C 51.

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  115. Decisions of Social Insurance Tribunal: 01.03.1966 III TR 1600/65 OSPIKA 1967 U 279; 12.05.1966 I TR 2377/65 OSPIKA 1968 U 74.

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  116. SC 03.11.1964 I PR 326/64 OSPIKA 1967 C 27.

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  117. SC 19.02.1968 III CZP 40/76 OSPIKA 1968 C 197.

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  118. SC 13.12.1965 II KR 372/65 OSPIKA 1967 K 266 and the comment by Z. Papierkowski; SC 09.02.1967 V KRN 684/66 OSPIKA 1967 K 241 with the comment by A. Kubec.

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  119. In detail J. Wróblewski, 1961c.

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  120. SC 05.04.1967 IV KR 269/66 OSPIKA 1968 K 66 qualified as praeter legem in the comment by K. Lojewski; SC 30.05.1966 III PR 15/66 OSPIKA 1967 C 112 qualified as contra legem in the comment by W. Siedlecki; an analogous comment on SC 03.02.1966 I PR 66/65 OSPIKA 1967 C 176 by J. Lapierre; SC 26.09.1968 III CRN 209/68 OSPIKA 1969 C 125 by A. Dobrzanski. Commenting on SC 04.09.1967 I PR 23/67 OSPIKA 1969 C 5 Z Z. Radwanski, talks of the lack of any possibility of finding any legal justification. SC shows the inadmissibility of contra legem interpretation SC 21.12.1965 III CR 314/65 OSPIKA 1967 C 231.

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  121. S. Włodyka, 1971, 1984b, 1984c.

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  122. S. Wiodyka, 1984b, pp. 208–243, cf., note (VII)46.

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  123. SC 21.03.1964 III CR 322/63 OSPIKA 1965 C 87.

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  124. Z. Resich, 1984; S. Wiodyka, 1984b, pp. 243–274; 1984c, pp. 291–311.

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  125. J. Wróblewski, 1974e, pp. 56–59.

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  126. SC 25.08.1981 IV CR 269/81 OSPIKA 1983 C 86; SC 17.11.1982 III CZP 12/81 OSPIKA 1983 C 244; SC 30.08.1983 IV KR 153/83 OSPIKA 1984 K 97; SC 02.12.1982 IV CR 484/82 OSPIKA 1984 C 4 notices that the view of the Supreme Court “... has been approved of... in some scientific opinions”.

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  127. Sometimes this type of argument is used in SAC decisions, e.g., SAC 21.10.1983 II SA 1644/839 OSPIKA 1984 AA 48; SAC 05.05.1983 SA§Wr 182/83 OSPIKA 1984 AA 76. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal extensively uses scientific opinions and professors of law are invited as experts in quaestiones iuris. Cf., J. Wróblewski, 1989e, p. 16ff.

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  128. SC 26.02.1968 III CZP 101/67 OSPIKA 1969 C 29.

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  129. Cf., note (VII)68.

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  130. J. Wróblewski, 1963b, pp. 13–16.

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  131. Cf., notes (VII) 68, 84, 88, 105, 106; (VIII)24, 25; WDS, Ch IX.3; The SC says that the principles in questions ought always to be taken into account and not only when the applied rules refer to them SC 13.01.1966 III CR 306/63 OSPIKA 1967 C 108.

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  132. Cf., notes (VII)22, 84, 85, 87, 105–109; (VIII)21, 24, 29, 30, 118; (IX)8, 9, 24, 25.

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  133. Rules of sport as criteria of illicit action SC 08.07.1968 II CR 216/68 OSPIKA 1969 C 163 with the comment by B. Lewaszkiewicz-Petrykowska.

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  134. Cf., note 36 above.

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  135. Because of that, the LSPP has evaluative character J. Wróblewski, 1982d, pp. 225–229; 1983b, p. 328ff; 1986e, p. 18ff. The LSPP conception in R. Dworkin’s version gives no possibility of any demarcation of law and non-law and this is linked with elimination of judicial discretion (J. Raz, 1984) but is favourable to judicial legislation (J. Mackie, 1984, p. 169).

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  136. Z. Niesiołowski and J. Rodziewicz, 1984.

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  137. I have left out the case when the principle of legal system influences formulation of the rule of decision, because this situation has mixed features.

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  138. J. C. Hutcheson Jr 1938; scepticism concerning legal certainty, cf., J. Frank, 1949, pp. 73ff, 106, 159, 316, 321, 324 and a criticism, G. Gottlieb 1968. p. 23ff.

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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Łódz, Poland

    Jerzy Wróblewski

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Zenon Bańkowski Neil MacCormick

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Wróblewski, J. (1992). Rationality and the Correctness of a Decision of the Application of Law. In: Bańkowski, Z., MacCormick, N. (eds) The Judicial Application of Law. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8050-2_10

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