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Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 15))

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Abstract

The term “judicial application of law”, similarly to the term “application of law”, is one which lacks any precisely fixed meaning either in legal language, in which enacted rules are formulated, or in other languages associated with law. Legal practice and legal science use the terms with various meanings, this variability resulting from the pressures to which the functioning of law and analytical studies of law are subject, as well as from the pressures of judicial ideology.

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Notes

  1. For a wide concept of the application of law cf. E. Garcia Maynez, 1960, p. 322; P. E. Nedbajło, 1960, p. 11; A. Troller, 1965, p. 107; for a narrow concept cf., S. S. Aleksjejew, 1973, vol. 2. p. 202, 209; F. A. Lukaszewa, 1973, Ch XII; ZIP, Ch VIII.l.

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  2. The terms “norm”, “provision”, “rule”, “directive” etc are used in many ways (cf., R. Guastini, 1985, part I, Ch 1; K. Opałek, 1986; A. Peczenik, 1989, Ch 5.6.1; G. Tarello, 1968). In the analytical theory of law “directive” (A. Ross, 1968), or “rule” (H. L. A. Hart, 1961) or “norm” (N. Bobbio, 1970; H. Kelsen, 1960) are used as basic terms, cf., description in J. Wróblewski, 1986d. The use of the term “norm” is historically changing (R. Orestano, 1983). I use “rule” as referring to legal provisions and their formal and interpretative consequences accepted in legal practice and/or in legal science. A legal rule is, thus, a meaningful expression formulated in legal language. “Norm” is used in the present book as a semantic and/or pragmatic category as opposed to non-relativized evaluative statements and propositions in the logical meaning of this term. Cf., C. E. Alchourron, E. Bulygin, 1981; M. A. Barrere, 1990, Ch VI; R. Hernandez Marin, 1989, Ch 3; K. Opałek, 1986, Ch IV; A. Ross, 1968, Ch II-IV; G. Tarello, 1968, Ch III; J. Wróblewski, 1981d; ZTW, Ch I, par. 2; M. Zirk-Sadowski, 1979; there is also a non-linguistic conception of norm cf., J. Wolenski, 1980, Ch III; K. Opałek, 1986, Ch VII) and a multi-dimensional conception of norm (e.g. S. Ehrlich, 1988; J. Kowalski, 1972, 1973; J. Wróblewski, 1969c). Concerning the unity of “Sein und Sprache”, J. M. Broekman, 1979, p. 144, who stresses the central place of the text in law (J. M. Broekman 1987a, p. 210ff).

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  3. Here law in force defines who is the judge and what agency is the court. For theoretical definitions of the judge, cf., N. MacCormick, 1978, p. 55ff, and of the “jural-like conflict resolution”, M. P. Golding, 1975, Ch 6. and a similar construction in J. Wróblewski, 1981. Historically on the courts cf., L. M. Friedmann, 1983; B. Yngves-son, L.Mather, 1983.

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  4. J.Borkowski, 1982.

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  5. ZTP Ch VIII. 1.1.

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  6. ZTP p. 299ff ; H. Kelsen, 1960, p. 15ff, 248, 251.

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  7. E. G. J. Frank, 1949; L. T. Uljanowa, 1959.

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  8. S.N.Bratus, 1975.

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  9. R. David, 1969, part III; C. K. Allen, 1958, Ch III, IV, VI; J. Gottheil, 1960; W. Friedmann, 1960, Ch 2.

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  10. N. Bobbio, 1970, p. 14–30; J. Wróblewski, 1962, p. 4–15, 19, 1978; ZTP, Ch 1.1.2.

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  11. ZTW, pp. 181–187.

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  12. A. G. Conte, 1962, Ch 2.2.1.1; 2.2.1.3–2.2.1.6; J. L. Gardies, 1979b; E. Pattaro, 1986, Ch IV.5; M. Van de Kerchove, F. Ost, 1988, pp. 87–89. For a rather wide concept of a closed system seen as separated from other social systems L. M. Friedmann, 1977, pp. 81.

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  13. P. Stein, 1984, par 1.

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  14. P. Stein, 1984, Ch 7; F. Bydlinski, 1982, book 3, part IV, Ch I, II.

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  15. N. MacCormick, 1978 passim; R. A. Wasserstrom, 1961, pp. 8, 130.

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Zenon Bańkowski Neil MacCormick

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© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Wróblewski, J. (1992). Introduction. In: Bańkowski, Z., MacCormick, N. (eds) The Judicial Application of Law. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8050-2_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8050-2_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4113-5

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