Abstract
This paper has a dual aim. On the one hand, it is a part of a larger attempt to understand the nature of Kant’s ideas of transcendental method and transcendental knowledge and their implications, for instance, the question as to what the objects of transcendental knowledge are. On the other hand, I am outlining once again what I take to be the true argumentative structure of Kant’s doctrines of the mathematical method, space, time, and the forms of inner and outer sense. The link between the two is that on my interpretation Kant’s theory of mathematics offers an excellent example of the applications of his transcendental method. Moreover, after having recently defended my construal of Kant’s views on mathematical reasoning and their foundation on historical and textual grounds, it may be in order to try to vindicate it in another way, to wit, by relating it to the overall nature of Kant’s philosophy, including his idea of transcendental knowledge. I suspect that this may be a better way of convincing my colleagues than nitty-gritty analyses of Kantian texts. At the same time, this approach offers me a chance of indicating some of the consequences of my results concerning Kant’s theory of mathematics for the rest of his philosophy. It turns out that the observations we can make in pursuing this line of thought have also interesting consequences for our contemporary thought in the philosophy of logic and mathematics.
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Notes
See Carl Christian Erhard Schmid, Wörterbuch zum leichteren Gebrauch der Kantischen Schriften,vierte Ausgabe, 1798, reprinted by Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1980, p. 525.
See the essays on Kant reprinted in my books, Logic Language-Games, and Information,Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973, and Knowledge and the Known,D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1974, as well as ‘Kant’s Theory of Mathematics Revisited’, in J. N. Mohanty and R. W. Shehan (eds.), Essays on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason,U. of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma, 1982, pp. 201–215 (reprinted from Philosophical Topics 12 No. 2 (1982)).
See Esa Saarinen (ed.), Game-Theoretical Semantics, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979; Jaakko Hintikka, ‘The Game-Theoretical Semantics: Insights and Prospects’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (1982), 219–241; Jaakko Hintikka, The Game of Language, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1983.
See here Jaakko Hintikka, ‘Transcendental Arguments Revived’, in A. Mercier and M. Svilar (eds.), Philosophers on Their Own Works, Vol. 9, Peter Lang, Bem, 1982, pp. 115–166.
See Kurt Gödel, Über eine bisher noch nicht benützte Erweiterung des finiten Standpunktes’, in Logica: Studio Paul Bernays dedicata (no editor given), Editions du Griffon, Neuchatel, 1959, translated as ‘On a Hitherto Unexploited Extension of the Finitary Standpoint’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (1980), 133–142, and cf. Jaakko Hintikka, ‘Game-Theoretical Semantics: Insights and Prospects’ (Note 3 above). Further reference to the literature is given in both these places.
See Veikko Rantala, Aspects of Definability (Acta Philosophica Fennica, Vol. 29, Nos. 2–3, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1977); Jaakko Hintikka, ‘Impossible Possible Worlds Vindicated’, in Saarinen (ed.) (Note 3 above).
On the subject of individuation and identification, see Jaakko Hintikka and Merrill B. Hintikka, ‘Towards a General Theory of Individuation and Identification’, in W. Leinfellner, E. Kraemer, and J. Schank (eds.), Language and Ontology: Proceedings of the 1981 International Wittgenstein Symposium, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna, 1982, pp. 137–150.
Jill Vance Buroker, Space and Incongruence, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981.
Charles Parsons, ‘Kant’s Philosophy of Arithmetic’, in this volume pages 43–79; orginally in Sidney Morgenbesser et al. (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, St. Martin’s Press, N. Y., 1969, pp. 588–594.
Some critics of my earlier work have thought that I interpret any representative which for conceptual reasons stands for only one entity as an intuition. No, of course not. An intuition according to Kant represents its object qua particular, i.e., without the help of general concepts. Hence, e.g., the Vorstellung that goes together with a definite description is not an intuition for Kant, even though it can stand for only one object.
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© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Hintikka, J. (1992). Kant’s Transcendental Method and His Theory of Mathematics. In: Posy, C.J. (eds) Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Synthese Library, vol 219. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8046-5_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8046-5_14
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