Advertisement

Trees of Life pp 211-239 | Cite as

Ontogeny and Phylogeny; a Case of Metarecapitulation?

  • Susan Oyama
Part of the Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science book series (AUST, volume 11)

Abstract

For some time I have been occupied with the nature-nurture opposition (genes-environment, innate-acquired, etc.)1 Over this period I have become sensitised, not only to the various guises in which this dichotomy appears, but also to structurally similar ones in other fields. (Fig. 1) In epistemology, one of the sources of the nature-nurture dichotomy in science, the classical question has concerned the origin of knowledge. The disputes between rationalists, who insisted upon innate knowledge, and empiricists, who credited the senses, did much to set the framework for more recent disputes. Similar oppositions are found in other fields.

Keywords

Natural Selection Evolutionary Theory Transformational Model Developmental System Central Dogma 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. 1.
    Oyama (1981) ‘What Does the Phenocopy Copy?’ Psychological Reports XLVIII, pp. 571–581;Google Scholar
  2. 1a.
    Oyama (1982) ‘A Reformulation of the Idea of Maturation’, Perspectives in Ethology 5, P.P.G. Bateson & RH. Klopfer (eds.), Plenum;Google Scholar
  3. 1b.
    Oyama (1985) The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental Systems and Evolution, Cambridge University Press;Google Scholar
  4. 1c.
    Oyama (1989) Innate Selfishness, Innate Sociality’, Behavioural a ndBrain Sciences XII, pp. 717–718;CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 1d.
    Oyama (1989) ‘Ontogeny and the Central Dogma: Do We Need the Concept of Genetic Programming in Order to Have an Evolutionary Perspective?7, ‘Systems and Development7. The Minnesota Symposia on Child Psychology,. 22, M.R. Gunnar and E. Thelen (eds.), Erlbaum Associates.Google Scholar
  6. 2.
    What is especially interesting here is that culture is treated as an external factor in the first case and a conservative, internal one in the second. On culture vs. geography see R.M. Netting (1978) Cultural Ecology, Cummings;Google Scholar
  7. 2a.
    Oyama (1981) ‘What Does the Phenocopy Copy?’ Psychological Reports XLVIIIGoogle Scholar
  8. 2b.
    Oyama (1981) ‘What Does the Phenocopy Copy?’ Psychological Reports XLVIII p. 174.Google Scholar
  9. 3.
    R.D. Gray (1989) ‘Oppositions in Panbiogeography: Can the Conflicts between Selection, Constraint, Ecology, and History be Resolved?7, New Zealand Journal of Zoology XVI, pp.787–806. For discussions of origin of life and other biological oppositions, see papers in MW. Ho and W.W. Fox (eds.) (1988) Evolutionary Processes and Metaphors, Wiley. The embryological example is distinctive in that developmental regulation, while traditionally implying responsiveness of developing tissue to its immediate environment, involves the restoration of typical outcomes, not the production of variant ones.Google Scholar
  10. 4.
    Or, more globally, “the environment”. To realise just how global most references to the environment are, consider the fact that “the environment” usually means “everything in the universe except the genes77, and that in carving creation into these two segments one must conceptually excise the DNA from the multitude of cells in which it resides. See S. Oyama (1990), ‘Commentary. The Idea of Innateness: Effects on Language and Communication Research’, Developmental Psychobiology XXIII, pp.271–277.Google Scholar
  11. 5.
    Three of these are sketched out in Oyama (in press) Is Phylogeny Recapitulating Ontogeny?’, Understanding Origin: Contemporary Ideas on the Genesis of Life, Mind and Society, F. Varela and J.-P Dupuy (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers. See also the much more extensive treatments in R.D. Gray (1987) ‘Beyond Labels and Binary Oppositions: What Can be Learnt from the Nature/Nurture Dispute?’, Rivista di Biologia/Biology Forum LXXX, pp. 192–196;Google Scholar
  12. 5a.
    F. Varela and J.-P Dupuy (1988) ‘Metaphors and Methods: Behavioural Ecology, Panbiogeography and the Evolving Synthesis’, Evolutionary Processes and Metaphors, MW. Ho and W.W. Fox (eds.), Wiley;Google Scholar
  13. 5b.
    R.D. Gray (1989) ‘Oppositions in Panbiogeography: Can the Conflicts between Selection, Constraint, Ecology, and History be Resolved?7, New Zealand Journal of Zoology XVI, pp.787–806.Google Scholar
  14. 6.
    R.C. Lewontin (1982) ‘Organism and Environment’ Learning, Development, and Culture, H.C Plotkin (ed.), Wiley: (1983) ‘Darwin’s Revolution’, New York Review of Books, XXX, 10, June 16, pp. 2127;Google Scholar
  15. 6a.
    Elliott Sober (1984) The Nature of Selection, Bradford/MIT Press;Google Scholar
  16. 6b.
    F. Varela and J.-P Dupuy (1985) ‘Darwin on Natural Selection: A Philosophical Perspective’, The Darwinian Heritage, D. Kohn (ed.), Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  17. 6c.
    R. Levins and R. Lewontin (1985) The Dialectical Biologist, Harvard University Press; andGoogle Scholar
  18. 6d.
    S. Oyama (1988) ‘Stasis, Development and Heredity’, Evolutionary Process and Metaphors, MW. Ho and W.W. Fox (eds.), Wiley.Google Scholar
  19. 7.
    Oyama (1981) ‘What Does the Phenocopy Copy?’ Psychological Reports XLVIII, pp. 571–581; (Note 1, ‘Maturation’). Though the transformational model is formulated to explain change in a collection of entities, the focus here is, of course, on change in an individual organism. One could think of organismic development in terms of transformational change at the level of organs or tissues, but this would involve attributing the higher-level development to a heterogeneous assemblage of subsystems, and tissues exert a great deal of influence on each other. The organisation among the subsystems would then present additional problems for a straightforward transformational account.Google Scholar
  20. 8.
    By this I mean only statistical typicality; no essential species nature is required for such probabilistic generalisations to be made. See discussion of programmed development in op. cit. (Note 1, Ontogeny of Information and ‘Central Dogma’).Google Scholar
  21. 9.
    J. Morss, this volume; (1990) The Biologising of Childhood: Developmental Psychology and the Darwinian Myth, Erlbaum Associates. In op. cit. (Note 6, ‘Darwin’), in fact, Sober refers to the model of internally driven change as “developmental” rather than “transformational”.Google Scholar
  22. 10.
    See B.F. Skinner (1981) ‘Selection by Consequence’, Science, CCXIII, pp.501–504; on neural selection seeG.M. Edelman and V.B. Mountcastle (1978) The Mindful Brain, Bradford Books/MIT Press;CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. 10a.
    on the immune system see N.K. Jerne (1967) ‘Antibodies and Learning: Selection versus Instruction’, The Neurosciences: A Study Programme, 1, G. Quarton, T. Melnechuk and F.O. Schmitt (eds.), Rockefeller University Press; on language,Google Scholar
  24. 10a.
    see K. Wexler and P. Culicover (1980) Formal Principles of Language Acquisiton, MIT Press; and for a sweeping view of selectionist explanation, as well as many references, see Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (1989) ‘Evolution, Selection and Cognition: From “Learning” to Parameter Setting in Biology and in the Study of Language’, Cognition, XXXI, pp. 144. It should be noted that there is a difference between selection from an actual array of objects or responses (organisms, neurons, operants) and selection as parameter setting, a difference that tends to be ignored when selectional models from neurobiology or immunology are mustered as support for the nativist project in the cognitive sciences.Google Scholar
  25. 11.
    This has the qualities of a good origin myth; the story is more complex. For more appreciative views of Lamarck, see MW. Ho and P.T. Saunders (1982) ‘Adaptation and Natural Selection: Mechanism and Teleology’ Towards a Liberatory Biology, S. Rose (ed.), Allison and Busby;Google Scholar
  26. 11a.
    and P.J. Taylor (1987) ‘Historical versus Selectionist Explanations in Evolutionary Biology’, Cladistics, III, pp. 113. For more historical detail,Google Scholar
  27. 11b.
    see H.E. Gruber (1981) Darwin on Man: A Psychological Study of Scientific Creativity, 2nd ed., University of Chicago Press;Google Scholar
  28. 11c.
    and L.J. Jordanova (1984) Lamarck, Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  29. 12.
    But see J.R. Grehan and R. Ainsworth (1985) ‘Orthogenesis and Evolution’, Systematic Zoology, XXXIV, pp.174 – 192.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. 13.
    J. Maynard Smith, R. Burian, S. Kauffman, P. Alberch, J. Campbell, B. Goodwin, R. Lande, D. Raup and L. Wolpert (1985) ‘Developmental Constraints and Evolution’, Quarterly Review of Biology, LX, pp. 265 – 287.Google Scholar
  31. 14.
    Behaviourists have explicitly compared operant shaping with biological evolution; See op. cit. (Note 10, ‘Selection by Consequence’); RJ. Herrnstein (1989) ‘Darwinism and Behaviourism: Parallels and Intersections’, Evolution and its Influence, A. Grafen (ed.), Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  32. 15.
    S.J. Shettleworth (1972) ‘Constraints on Learning’, Advances in the Study of Behaviour, IV, pp. 168, Academic Press;Google Scholar
  33. 15a.
    R.A. Hinde and J. Stevenson-Hinde (eds.) (1973) Constraints on Learning, Academic Press; on genes and society, seeE.O. Wilson (1978) On Human Nature, Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  34. 16.
    Or “ahistorical universals”,S.A. Kauffman (1985) ‘Self Organisation, Selective Adaptation, and Its Limits: A New Pattern of Inference in Evolution and Development’, Evolution at a Crossroads: The New Biology and the New Philosophy of Science, D.J. Depew and B.H. Weber (eds.), Bradford Books/MIT Press, p.171. Similarly, Ho and Saunders declare that a “a scientific study should consist in the delimitation of the necessities which underlie the process of evolution, without recourse to contingencies” (p.590, emphasis in original),Google Scholar
  35. 16a.
    M.W. Ho and P.T. Saunders (1979), ‘Beyond neoDarwinism An Epigenetic Approach to Evolution’, Journal of Theoretical Biology, LXXVIII, pp. 573 – 591. See also B.C. Goodwin (1982) ‘Biology without Darwinian Spectacles’, Biologist, XXIX, pp. 108 – 112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. 17.
    J. Maynard Smith, R. Burian, S. Kauffman, P. Alberch, J. Campbell, B. Goodwin, R. Lande, D. Raup and L. Wolpert 1985) ‘Developmental Constraints and Evolution’, Quarterly Review of Biology, LX,Google Scholar
  37. 18.
    R.C. Lewontin (1982) ‘Organism and Environment’ Learning, Development, and Culture, H.C Plotkin (ed.), Wiley, ‘Stasis’).Google Scholar
  38. 19.
    P. Alberch (1980) ‘Ontogenesis and Morphological Diversification’, American Zoologist, XX, pp. 653 – 667;Google Scholar
  39. 19a.
    S.J. Gould (1989) ‘A Developmental Constraint in Cerion, with Comments on the Definition and Interpretation of Constraint in Evolution’, Evolution, XLIII, pp. 516 – 539;CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. 19b.
    J. Maynard Smith, R. Burian, S. Kauffman, P. Alberch, J. Campbell, B. Goodwin, R. Lande, D. Raup and L. Wolpert (1985) ‘Developmental Constraints and Evolution’, Quarterly Review of Biology, LX, pp. 265 – 287. The subtitle of the Hinde and Steven-sonHinde volume on constraints on learning is “Limitations and Predispositions”,Google Scholar
  41. 19c.
    S.J. Shettleworth (1972) ‘Constraints on Learning’, Advances in the Study of Behaviour, IV, pp. 168, Academic Press;Google Scholar
  42. 19d.
    R.A. Hinde and J. Stevenson-Hinde (eds.) (1973) Constraints on Learning, Academic Press; on genes and society, seeE.O. Wilson (1978) On Human Nature, Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  43. 20.
    S.C. Stearns (1986) ‘Natural Selection and Fitness, Adaptation and Constraint’, Pattern and Process in the History of Life, D.M. Raup and D. Jablonski (eds.), Springer-Verlag; ibid., ‘Developmental Constraint in Cerion’, p. 516.Google Scholar
  44. 21.
    But see J.R. Grehan and R. Ainsworth (1985) ‘Orthogenesis and Evolution’, Systematic Zoology, XXXIV, pp.174 – 192.Google Scholar
  45. 21a.
    See also op. cit. (Note 16, ‘Biology without Spectacles’) p. 112; similarly, Ho and Saunders “place more emphasis on the physiological and developmental potential (or internal factors) of the organisms as opposed to the ‘external’ factors of random mutation and natural selection”, op. cit. (Note 16) pp. 589 – 590.Google Scholar
  46. 22.
    The relation between artist and materials is being re-thought, even in the popular press. Of a recent exhibit of Japanese sculpture a newsmagazine reports: “the exhibition rightly contends that its artists (or any artists, if you think about it) don’t transform their materials so much as redirect them. They don’t make everlasting objects out of inert and characterless stuff… Instead, they highlight a few inherent qualities of their materials for a relatively brief moment in time.” P. Plagens (1990) Talms and Circumstance’, Newsweek, August 20, p. 64.Google Scholar
  47. 23.
    S. Oyama (in press) ‘Bodies and Minds’, Journal of Social Issues, special issue on evolution, M. Brewer and L. Caporael (guest eds.).Google Scholar
  48. 24.
    K.M. Noonan (1987) ‘Evolution: A Primer for Psychologists’; and R. Thornhill and N. M. Thornhill (1987) liuman Rape: The Strengths of the Evolutionary Perspective’, both in Sociobiology and Psychology, C. Crawford, M. Smith and D. Krebs (eds.), Erlbaum Associates.Google Scholar
  49. 25.
    See op. cit. (Note 1, Ontogeny of Information and ‘Central Dogma’).Google Scholar
  50. 26.
    For a classic critiques of nature-nurture dichotomising, see D.S. Lehrman (1953) ‘A Critique of Konrad Lorenz’s Theory of Instinctive Behaviour’, Quarterly Review of Biology, XXVIII, pp. 237 – 363; (1970) ‘Semantic and Conceptual Issues in the Nature-Nurture Problem’, Development and Evolution of Behaviour, L.R. Aronson, E. Tobach, D.S. Lehrman, and J.S. Rosenblatt (eds.), Freeman. The distinction between genetic and environmental information is associated with K. Lorenz (1965) Evolution and Modification of Behaviour, University of Chicago Press. For critiques of this partitioning of information see op. cit. (Note 1, Ontogeny of Information) and T.D. Johnston (1987) The Persistence of Dichotomies in the Study of Behavioural Development’, Developmental Review, VII, pp. 149 – 182.Google Scholar
  51. 27.
    R. Lewontin (1974) The Analysis of Variance and the Analysis of Causes’, American Journal of Human Genetics, XXVI, pp. 400 – 411.Google Scholar
  52. 28.
    See Oyama (1981) ‘What Does the Phenocopy Copy?’ Psychological Reports XLVIII, pp. 571–581 (Note 1, ‘Central Dogma’). See also op. cit. (Note 3, ‘Oppositions’) p. 803, where Gray says that constraints are considered primary; though he and I read the literature differently, neither of us likes the insistence on designating one cause as dominant.Google Scholar
  53. 29.
    See E.F. Keller (1985) Reflections on Gender and Science, Yale University Press, on the language of domination in science;Google Scholar
  54. 29a.
    and J. Sapp (1987) Beyond the Gene: Cytoplasmic Inheritance and the Struggle for Authority in Genetics, Oxford University Press, on the battles over the relative importance of the nucleus and the cytoplasm in development. The combatants in the nucleus-cytoplasm conflict deployed some of the same rhetorical strategies I describe here; there are insides and outsides even within the cell membrane. Sapp offers interesting comments on the relationship between geneticists’ descriptions of nuclear processes and their conceptions of themselves. Though my comments here can be judged within the orthodox frameworks of developmental and evolutionary theories, they arise from a somewhat different one. It is possible to argue for an alternative framework without lapsing into rank relativism. To do so, however, involves some rather serious thinking about science: See Helen Long-ino’s (1990) Science as Social Knowledge, Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  55. 30.
    P. Alberch (1982) The Generative and Regulatory Roles of Development in Evolution’, Environmental Adaptation and Evolution, D. Mos-sakowski and G. Roth (eds.), Gustav Fischer characterises the developmental generation of new bauplane as proceeding “autonomously from external environmental factors” (p. 23), and declares that “the evolution of developmental systems is characterised more by the internal structure of the developmental programme than by the external evolution of the environment” (p.25). (See Note 45.) See also op. cit. (Note 10); Stearns asks about the relative importance of internal and external factors.Google Scholar
  56. 31.
    K. Thomson (1985) ‘Essay Review: The Relationship Between Development and Evolution’, Oxford Surveys in Evolutionary Biology, II, pp. 220 – 233. See Stearns op. cit. (Note 20) on attributing variance to constraints and to selection; for discussion and references see op. cit. (Note 3, ‘Oppositions’).Google Scholar
  57. 32.
    E. Sober (1988), ‘Apportioning Causal Responsibility’, Journal of Philosophy, LXXXV, pp. 303 – 318. See also op. cit. (Note 26).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  58. 33.
    E. Sober (1987) ‘What is Adaptationism?’, The Latest on the Best, J. Dupre (ed.) MIT Press (p. 115). Interestingly enough, Stearns asserts that selection and constraint are involved in all evolution, but that the problem is to determine their relative influence, see op. cit. (Note 20). Behavioural scientists justify their continued pursuit of genetic and environmental “components” in precisely the same way. Sober refers to the “power of mutation”. “Mutation” can refer both to alterations in DNA sequences and to the phenotypic consequences of such alterations. Restrictions on the range of phenotypic results of genetic mutations are surely a matter, not just of constraints on DNA changes, but of the rest of the developmental systems in which they occur. A particular DNA change may have no effect in some systems, and a variety of effects in others. The outcome will depend both on the alteration and on the rest of the system. It might thus be more apposite to speak, as I have in this essay, not of the power of natural selection or of mutation, but of the possibilities for variation in developmental systems. Whether any particular phenotypic variation will occur is a function of the system dynamics, and it is the dependence of such variation on this interactive complex that is indexed (but not captured) by the notion of mutational power. It might be wondered (and has been wondered, by Kim Sterelny, in personal communication, 1990) whether this is just another version of the imperialistic move. The short answer is no. A slightly longer one is: Sort of, but not really: Genetic imperialism seeks to decontextualise gene action by collapsing all possible ontogenetic outcomes into some notion of “genetic information”, while the developmental systems formulation makes contextual dependence explicit by stressing joint determination of outcome by the system and by its perturbation. The real imperialistic move for a developmental systems theorist would be to claim that a system “determines” all of its possible changes prior to specification of the particular perturbation. (Something like this move is documented in the next note; notice, however, that development is autonomous and internal in those theories,not interactive). Any outcome of a multiplicative function is specified by one factor, given the other one(s). Genetic imperialism gives the genes the power to specify all outcomes given only themselves; this is like saying that 2 “specifies” the products of all multiplications in which it might possibly be a multiplier, and that it does so before the fact; the multiplicand simply selects from this prior array. This is a most peculiar claim; read for its rhetorical function, it is seen to be a ploy to make certain causes recede into the background. Provided they are understood amply enough, developmental systems block this move for either “internal” or “external” factors by including them both. If arbitrary causal domination is abolished within a system’s boundaries, is it still an empire?Google Scholar
  59. 34.
    G. Webster and B.C. Goodwin (1982) The Origin of Species: a Structuralist Approach’, Journal of Social and Biological Structures, V, pp. 15 – 47;CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  60. 34a16.
    Or “ahistorical universals”,S.A. Kauffman (1985) ‘Self Organisation, Selective Adaptation, and Its Limits: A New Pattern of Inference in Evolution and Development’, Evolution at a Crossroads: The New Biology and the New Philosophy of Science, D.J. Depew and B.H. Weber (eds.), Bradford Books/MIT Press, p.171. Similarly, Ho and Saunders declare that a “a scientific study should consist in the delimitation of the necessities which underlie the process of evolution, without recourse to contingencies” (p.590, emphasis in original), (Note 16, ‘Biology without Spectacles’). See also op. cit. (Note 19, ‘Ontogenesis’) p. 664. Alberch says that development is “crucial” in that “it defines the realm of the possible”. Significantly, in describing macroevolution as an interaction between “production of morphological novelties (epigenetically determined) and differential extinction (environmentally determined)” (p. 664), he maintains the classic internal-external dichotomy, in which epigenesis is an internal process, independent of the environment, and selection, an external one, independent of development.Google Scholar
  61. 35.
    C. Dyke and D. Depew (1988) ‘Should Natural Selection be an Explanation of Last Resort? Well, Maybe not the Last Resort, but…….’, Rivista di Biologia, Biology Forum, LXXXI, pp. 115 – 129 (p. 117).Google Scholar
  62. 36.
    J. T. Bonner (1974) On Development, Harvard University Press. Bonner emphasised the importance of other constituents of the germ cell, maintaining that focus on nuclear DNA was too narrow. I agree, but find no warrant for stopping at the cell wall.Google Scholar
  63. 37.
    S. Oyama (in press) Transmission and Construction: Levels and the Problem of Heredity’, Critical Analyses of Evolutionary Theories of Social Behaviour: Genetics and Levels. Monograph I of the T.C. Schneirla Conference Series, G. Greenberg and E. Tobach (eds.), Shapolsky Publishers; see also Oyama (1981) ‘What Does the Phenocopy Copy?’ Psychological Reports XLVIII, pp. 571–581 (Note 1, ‘Central Dogma’).Google Scholar
  64. 38.
    See op. cit. (Note 3, ‘Oppositions’). See also P. Bateson (1983) ‘Genes, Environment and the Development of Behaviour’, Animal Behaviour, 3, Genes, Development, and Learning, T.R. Halliday and P.J.B. Slater (eds.), Blackwell; see also op. cit. (Note 26).Google Scholar
  65. 39.
    Though the distinction can be made without any specific assumptions about the dynamics of developmental processes, it seldom is; in fact, it is typically treated as a statement about developmental mechanism.Google Scholar
  66. 40.
    S. Oyama (in press) Transmission and Construction: Levels and the Problem of Heredity’, Critical Analyses of Evolutionary Theories of Social Behaviour: Genetics and Levels. Monograph I of the T.C. Schneirla Conference Series, G. Greenberg and E. Tobach (eds.), Shapolsky Publishers (Note 37).Google Scholar
  67. 41.
    See op. cit. (Note 5, ‘Metaphors’ and Thylogeny Recapitulating Ontogeny’: Note 6, Dialectical Biologist and ‘Stasis’).Google Scholar
  68. 42.
    See J. Cohen (1979) ‘Maternal Constraints on Development’, Maternal Effects in Development, D.R. Newth and M. Balls (eds.), Cambridge; see also op. cit. (Note 1, ‘Maturation’, Ontogeny of Information).Google Scholar
  69. 43.
    R.C. Lewontin, S. Rose and LJ. Kamin (1984) Not in Our Genes, Pantheon, speak of “codevelopment of the organism and its environ- ment” (p. 275);Google Scholar
  70. 43a.
    see also op. cit. (Note 6, Dialectical Biologist).Google Scholar
  71. 44.
    Oyama op. cit. (Note 6).Google Scholar
  72. 45.
    They must therefore be distinguished from other uses of the phrase, such as Alberch’s decidedly internalist “developmental programmes” op. cit. (Note 19; see also Note 30) and his “developmental systems” (1982) ‘Developmental Constraints in Evolutionary Processes’, Evolu tion and Development, J.T. Bonner (ed.), SpringerVerlag, as well as from other less extended conceptions of ontogeny. Similarly, the definition of heredity presented here is significantly broader than the “hereditary apparatus” of MaeWan Ho (1984) ‘Environment and Heredity in Development and Evolution’, Beyond neo Darwinism: An Introduction to the New Evolutionary Paradigm, MW. Ho and P.T. Saunders (eds.), Academic Press. Consisting of the nucleus and cytoplasm, this “apparatus” is considerably more restricted than the formulations in her later papers, where she appears to argue for the inheritance of something like my developmental system: for example (1988) ‘On Not Holding Nature Still’, Evolutionary Processes and Metaphors, MW. Ho and S.W. Fox (eds.), Wiley. T.D. Johnston and M.T. Turvey (1980) ‘A Sketch of an Ecological Metatheory for Theories of Learning’, The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 14, G.H. Bower (ed.), Academic Press, capture the same interactive complex when they speak of the “co-implicative” relationship between organisms and their surrounds (p. 152), as does R.D. Gray with his “reciprocally constrained construction”, in (1987) Taith and Foraging: A Critique of the Paradigm Argument from Design’, Foraging Behaviour, A.C. Kamil, J.R. Krebs and H.R. Pulliam (eds.), Plenum Press. B.C. Patten’s “environs” may also refer to the same sort of inclusive complex: (1982) ‘Environs: Relativistic Elementary Particles for Ecology’, American Naturalist, CXIX, pp. 179 – 219. Whether these authors focus on development or on function (as in this last group of works), what they have in common is an interest in reducing the conceptual distance between organisms and their surroundings. See op. cit. (Note 11, ‘Historical versus Selectionist Explanations’; Note 43).Google Scholar
  73. 46.
    P.D. Dwyer (1984) Tunctionalism and Structuralism: Two Programmes for Evolutionary Biologists’, American Naturalist, CXXIV, pp. 745 – 750;Google Scholar
  74. 46a.
    Gray (1984) Tunctionalism and Structuralism: Two Programmes for Evolutionary Biologists’, American Naturalist, CXXIV, pp. 745 – 750;Google Scholar
  75. 46b.
    and op. cit. (Note 3, Note 5 ‘Beyond Labels’ and ‘Metaphors’;‘Environs’; op. cit. (Note 11, fiistorical versus Selectionist Explanations’).Google Scholar
  76. 46d.
    R.C. Lewontin, S. Rose and LJ. Kamin (1984) Not in Our Genes, Pantheon, speak of “codevelopment of the organism and its environ- ment” (p. 275);Google Scholar
  77. 47.
    S. Oyama (in press) Transmission and Construction: Levels and the Problem of Heredity’, Critical Analyses of Evolutionary Theories of Social Behaviour: Genetics and Levels. Monograph I of the T.C. Schneirla Conference Series, G. Greenberg and E. Tobach (eds.), Shapolsky Publishers, Innate Selfishness’; and Note 23). Herrnstein asserts, “Nature versus nurture in regard to behaviour is the last great evolutionary controversy” op. cit. (Note 14) p. 40.Google Scholar
  78. 48.
    N. Tinbergen (1963) ‘On aims and methods in ethology’, Zeitschrift fuer Tierpsychologie, XX, pp. 410 – 433.Google Scholar
  79. 49.
    The continuity of the germ line, that is, is achieved by repeated reconstruction of DNA strands, and the continuity of other developmental interactants may also involve reconstruction rather than simple persistence.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Susan Oyama
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PsychologyCity University of New YorkUSA

Personalised recommendations