Abstract
Suppose a player in a bargaining game is replaced by a more risk averse player. Intuitively, in many situations one would expect this to be advantageous for the other players. Also, one might expect the more risk averse player to envy his (less risk averse) predecessor, because that player would probably get more out of the bargaining process. It is nevertheless surprising that bargaining solutions almost generically seem to confirm this intuition.
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Reference
Kannai (1977) already observed that the two-person Nash bargaining solution is risk sensitive.
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© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Peters, H.J.M. (1992). Risk properties. In: Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8022-9_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8022-9_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4178-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-8022-9
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