Abstract
Fact and law are two concepts that are habitually opposed to each other. Thus, the judge deals with questions of fact and questions of law separately; the administrator with legality and then with advisability, the scientist with what ought to happen or what actually does. This opposition is sometimes presented as a logical distinction, sometimes as an ontological distinction between Sein and Sollen.
Text of a paper read at the European University Institute, Florence, in December 1986.
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References
Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, Vienna, Manzsche Verlags-und Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1979, pp. 4–6, 24–33, 46–48, (from now on cited as ATN).
Norberto Bobbio, Teoria della scienza giuridica, Turin, 1950; see Vittorio Villa, Teorie della scienza giuridica e teorie delle scienze naturali, Milan, Giuffrè, 1984: The opposition between fact and law in law itself is qualified by modem doctrine; see Jerzy Wroblewski, Meaning and Truth in Judicial Decision, edited by Aulis Aamio, Helsinki, Juridica, 1979; Patrick Nerhot, “Le fait du droit”, In Archives de Philosophie du droit, vol. 13, “Le système”, pp. 261–280.
See e.g. General Theory of Law and State, New York, 1945, p. 29 f. (GTL); Théorie Pure du Droit, 2nd ed. trans. by Ch. Eisenmann, Paris, Dalloz, 1962, p. 6 f. (TP) and ATN p 2 f.
See Michel Troper, “Le positivisme juridique” in Revue de synthèse, no. 118–119, “Philosophie et épistémologie juridiques” April-Sept. 1955, pp. 187–204.
TP, p. 102, ATN p. 120 f. See Roberto Vemengo, “Kelsen’s Rechtssätze as Detached Statements” in Richard Tur and William Twining (ed.), Essays on Kelsen, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 99 f.
See Mauro Barberis, “La norma senza qualità” in Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, Dec. 1981, p. 405.
Ibid. p. 452 f. In reality the idea that interpretation might consist in establishing “the meaning of the norms” is hard to reconcile with the definition of the norm as meaning, since it is hard to conceive a meaning having a meaning. It must therefore be considered that interpretation consists in determining the meaning not of norms, but of the texts to be applied; sec Michel Troper, “Kelsen, la théorie de l’interprétation et la structure de l’ordre juridique” in Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 1981, pp. 518–529.
The problem is fully discussed by Renato Treves, Sociologia del diritto, Turin, Einaudi, 1987 and “Flans Kclscn et la sociologic du droit” in Droit et société no. 1, August 1985, p. 15 f.
Alf Ross, “Validity and the conflict between Legal Positivism and Natural Law” in Revissa Juridica de Buenos Aires, 1961-IV, pp. 46–90.
E.g. p. 265: “The validity of this Constitution, its character as a binding norm, must be supposed, accepted as hypothesis, if one wishes it to be possible to interpret acts set up in conformity with its provisions as the creation or application of general valid legal norms, and the acts done in application of these general legal norms as the creation or application of valid individual norms”, and especially “The Function of a Constitution” in Richard Tur and William Twining, op. cit. pp. 109–122 and ATP, pp. 203 f. See Ian Stewart, “The Basic Norm as Fiction” in The Juridical Review, 1980, part 2, pp. 199–224.
TP p. 261. For a more developed criticism of Kelsen’s thesis that the legal order is essentially dynamic, see M. Troper, “Système juridique et Etat” in Archives de Philosophie du Droit, tome 31, 1986, pp. 29–44.
A. Passerin d’Entrèves, La notion d’Etat, Paris, Sirey, 1969, p. 123.
R. Metall, Hans Kelsen, Sein Leben und Werk, Vienna 1969, p. 30.
On the functions of the theory of interpretation, sec M. Troper “L’idéologie juridique” in Analyse de l’idéologie, collective work edited by G. Duprat, Paris, Galilée, 1980, pp. 221–234; “La motivation des décisions constitutionnelles”, in La motivation des décisions de justice, Travaux du Centre National dc Recherche de Logique, edited by Ch. Perelman and Ch. Foriers, Brussels, 1978, pp. 287–302.
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Troper, M. (1990). The Fact and the Law. In: Nerhot, P. (eds) Law, Interpretation and Reality. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7875-2_3
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