Normative Coherence and Epistemological Presuppositions of Justification

Abstract

In this paper I shall, taking particularly the coherence criterion into account, survey three of the most significant and controversial contemporary theories of legal argumentation: that is, Aarnio’s, MacCormick’s and Dworkin’s theories. The comparative analysis of these theories will later be used as a point of departure for making further observations on the epistemological framework presupposed — explicitly or implicitly — by the three legal philosophers. With the help of this kind of analysis I will be able, I hope, to single out not only some significant “surface” resemblances at the level of legal argumentation theory, but, above all, certain basic differences (between Dworkin and the other two scholars) at epistemological level. The resemblances concern, in particular, the role played by the coherence criterion in legal argumentation; the differences, on the contrary, have to do with the placing of the argumentative discourses inside the “system” of cognitive activities (here the problem is that of the relationship between “argumentation” and “strong” scientific knowledge). I will argue, lastly, that this kind of epistemological disagreement can be fruitfully set inside the contemporary meta-scientific debate on fundamental issues such as realism, objectivity and value freedom.