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Part of the book series: Studies in Public Choice ((SIPC,volume 5))

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Abstract

Rent seeking has, to a considerable extent, developed as a separate subdiscipline, with relatively little direct connection to the regular microeconomics of markets. No criticism is intended here, since its field of study is largely nonmarket activities or market activities normally thought to be undesirable. In general, rent-seeking arguments have reinforced the normative arguments against monopoly and other special privileges which the regular economists deduced earlier and on different grounds. Nevertheless, it is somewhat desirable to link the two fields directly.

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Notes

  1. Toward a theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock (eds.) ( College Station: Texas AM University Press, 1980 ), pp. 97112.

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  2. This note was a reply to some comments on the original article. The whole exchange will be found in: The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking, Charles K. Rowley, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock (eds.) ( Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988 ), pp. 91–146.

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  3. It is possible that there are some normal market activities subject to diseconomies of scale from the first unit on. I know of none, but at least in theory there is no reason they could not exist. Artistic production would be the place would should look if we wanted to search out examples.

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  4. Rowley, Tollison, and Tullock (1988, p. 102).

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  5. Government Controls and the Free Market: The U.S. Economy in the 1970s, Svetozar Pejovich (ed.) ( College Station: Texas AM University Press, 1976 ), pp. 141–159.

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© 1989 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Tullock, G. (1989). Rent Seeking and the Market. In: The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent Seeking. Studies in Public Choice, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7813-4_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7813-4_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5779-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-7813-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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