Inductive Analogy by Similarity and Proximity
Modern inductive logic, conceived as a theory of inductive probabilities, is intended to be a useful instrument for learning from experience not only in objective contexts, where there is some underlying objective probability process, but also in other, non-objective contexts. However, for designing inductive systems, objective applications form the primary challenge, for they provide the objective, but unknown, goal which has to be approached in a rational way on the basis of increasing experimental evidence. Hence, in the following we will presuppose an underlying probability process, except when otherwise stated.
KeywordsMarkov Chain Prior Belief Inductive System Objective Probability Inductive Logic
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