Abstract
In the cost allocation problem which confronted the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), two major types of joint project investment cost were distinguished: “direct” costs which are traceable to particular purposes (these costs may be in the nature of marginal costs) and the remaining joint costs.
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© 1988 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Driessen, T. (1988). A Game Theoretic Approach to the Cost Allocation Problem by Means of the τ-Value, the Nucleolus and the Shapley Value. In: Cooperative Games, Solutions and Applications. Theory and Decision Library, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7787-8_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7787-8_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-8451-4
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