Abstract
There are at least two competing approaches to the problem of the analysis of identity statements in intensional languages. One is based on Russell’s theory of descriptions and denies that definite descriptions can always be treated as names. The other claims that they are indeed names, but names, not of the ordinary things they appear to be names of, but names of intensional objects. My aim in this chapter is to chew that a neo-Russellian approach provides more adequate analysis than the intensional objects approach.
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© 1988 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Cresswell, M.J. (1988). Identity and Intensional Objects. In: Semantical Essays. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, vol 36. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7778-6_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7778-6_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-8241-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-7778-6
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