Abstract
A new descriptive theory for 3-person characteristic function game experiments is introduced. It is based on the idea that players form aspiration levels on minimum amounts they want to get if they enter a coalition. These aspirations are formed by looking at equal shares of coalition values and of increments to such values due to the entry of a player. The reasoning takes into account the order of strength of the players.
Using the method introduced in the companion paper by SELTEN and KRISCHKER, several theories are compared with respect to their predictive success for a body of three person game experiments taken from the literature. The new theory of equal division payoff bounds turns out to be more success than equal share analysis and AUMANN-MASCHLER bargaining set theory with and without power transformation.
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References
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© 1988 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Selten, R. (1988). Equal Division Payoff Bounds for 3-Person Characteristic Function Experiments. In: Models of Strategic Rationality. Theory and Decision Library C, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7774-8_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7774-8_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-8446-0
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