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Art and Science

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Part of the Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library book series (MNPL, volume 27)

Abstract

We must now turn to the second analogue of my first analogy: artistic creativity. I shall try to show why and how artistic creativity is both similar to and different from scientific creativity within Peirce’s architectonic. In the end, the difference will hinge on the opposed final looks each takes; that is, whereas scientific creativity, in depending on analogy, ends as discovery, artistic creativity, in being self-representative like an iconic metaphor, ends as creation. Initially, however, I must suggest why I think Peirce’s system allows the analogy at all. In other words, I must justify making the turn to artistic creativity which Peirce himself did not make outright. To do this, I shall begin with an examination of the categoriology and then a brief analysis of esthetics as a normative science.

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Notes

  1. [1]
    C.M. Smith, “The Aesthetics of Charles S. Peirce,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 31 (1972), p.28.Google Scholar
  2. [2]
    Of course, this relation itself is a difficult issue.Google Scholar
  3. [3]
    See Thomas Curley, “The Relation of the Normative Sciences to Peirce’s Theory of Inquiry,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 5 (1969), pp. 90–106.Google Scholar
  4. [4]
    Smith, p. 22.Google Scholar
  5. [5]
    Kent, p. 265.Google Scholar
  6. [6]
    Kent, p. 265.Google Scholar
  7. [7]
    Cf. Murphey, pp. 361–362.Google Scholar
  8. [8]
    Kent, p. 265.Google Scholar
  9. [9]
    This is one of the themes of the latter half of Apel’s book.Google Scholar
  10. [10]
    In the sense that feeling is “thought about” art too involves the use of ideas. Nevertheless, the distinction holds insofar as we are dealing with the central content of the thought itself. See MS. 774, p. 13. Here Peirce argued that rhetoric itself can be divided “according to the special nature of the idea to be conveyed.”Google Scholar
  11. [11]
    Eliot, Four Quartets (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1949), p. 5.Google Scholar
  12. [12]
    The four mentioned in note 3 of Chapter 1 have dealt with this issue: Kaelin, Kent, Smith, and Hocutt.Google Scholar
  13. [13]
    Hocutt, p. 158.Google Scholar
  14. [14]
    Smith, p.26.Google Scholar
  15. [15]
    See J. Martin and R. Harre, “Metaphor in Science,” in Metaphor: Problems and Perspectives, ed. David Miall (New York: Humanities Press, 1982), pp. 94–96.Google Scholar
  16. [16]
    Smith, p. 26.Google Scholar
  17. [17]
    Ransdell, “The Epistemic Function of Iconicity in Perception,” Peirce Studies, 1 (1979), p. 55.Google Scholar
  18. [18]
    Smith, p. 26.Google Scholar
  19. [19]
    Smith, p.27.Google Scholar
  20. [20]
    Ransdell, p. 56.Google Scholar
  21. [21]
    Smith, p. 26.Google Scholar
  22. [22]
    This view coincides with the interaction theory of metaphor as developed by Max Black, “Metaphor,” in Models and Metaphors (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1962).Google Scholar
  23. [23]
    This again suggests the creative aspect of the interaction theory.Google Scholar
  24. [24]
    The idea of a referent of a creative metaphor is borrowed wholly from Carl Hausman, “Metaphors, Referents, and Individuality,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 1985.Google Scholar
  25. [25]
    Smith’s examples, as we saw, suggest this point.Google Scholar
  26. [26]
    Zeman, “The Esthetic Sign,” Semiotica, 19 (1977), pp. 241–258.Google Scholar
  27. [27]
    Of course a work of art might have a dynamical object as well, as in the case of any representational work.Google Scholar
  28. [28]
    Cf. Smith, p. 27 and Kaelin, p. 148.Google Scholar
  29. [29]
    See Hocutt, p. 163, Kaelin, p. 152, and Zeman, p. 247.Google Scholar
  30. [30]
    Zeman’s argument throughout his article that works of art are sui generis suggests this point.Google Scholar
  31. [31]
    Nevertheless, as contemporary physics suggests, testing is not always an easy process for science either.Google Scholar
  32. [32]
    Kent is right in pointing out that these two versions of esthetic goodness are directed specifically toward art and toward expressing the idea of a “quality which is fine in its immediate presence.” Kent, p. 270.Google Scholar
  33. [33]
    Hausman outlines this problem in “Value and the Peircean Categories,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, (1979).Google Scholar
  34. [34]
    Cf. Hocutt, p. 160.Google Scholar
  35. [35]
    Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1958), pp.58–105.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Wittenberg UniversityGermany

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