Abstract
In the latter part of the previous chapter we looked at a Schopenhauerian justification of morality: according to the doctrine of transcendental solipsism we all, really, share in each other’s sufferings so that to suppose one could live a happy life at the expense of the misery of others is but “a beggar’s dream in which he is king but from which he must awake” (WR I p.353).
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Notes
It is perhaps worth observing Schopenhauer’s predilection for repres- enting life in terms of circular or spherical metaphors (cf. the representation of time as a revolving sphere on p.101 above). There is more than a hint of the Nietzschean theme of “eternal recurrence” in Schopenhauer. The predilection is a not surprising one, for the metaphor of a circle is the natural expression of the lack of an ultimate point to, or progress in life.
It might be objected that while the saintly ascetic could perhaps be regarded as a practical hero, he cannot be regarded as a moral one since the moral life is something he has abandoned. Indeed, it might be said, from the moral point of view he is actually to be condemned since in choosing to pursue personal salvation while abandoning the rest of us to our sufferings, he has ceased to take into account the interests of others, acting purely for the sake of his own. But, of course, this is not how the saint or Schopenhauer sees it. For, from the standpoint of transcendental solipsism, the distinction between one’s own interests and those of others disappears. From that standpoint, if altruistic action really is impotent to alleviate suffering then, from our as well as my point of view, pursuing my own salvation is the best thing I can do. The saint may transcend the life of virtuous action but he does not, in the Schopenhauerian scheme of things, become immoral.
The Savage God p.72.
History of Western Philosophy p.785.
‘Reflections on Schopenhauer’s Pessimism’ in Schopenhauer: His Philosophical Achievement.
Cf. “the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language ... against the walls of our cage ...”. Wittgenstein’s “Lecture on Ethics” p.12.
My access to such scholarship is through R.S. Elwood’s Mysticism and Religious Experience and the articles on mysticism in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol 5 by N. Smart and R.W. Hepburn.
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Young, J. (1987). The Denial of the Will. In: Willing and Unwilling: A Study in the Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 33. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7756-4_9
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