Abstract
Epistemological relativism has been defended by a variety of thinkers stretching back at least as far as Protagoras. For just as long, however, others have thought the doctrine to be incoherent because selfrefuting. This is perhaps the most fundamental challenge faced by the relativist. The present investigation begins, therefore, by considering the status of the incoherence charge.
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Notes
Plato, Theaetetus, 152a.
Ibid. , 160c.
Ibid., 166d–167d.
Ibid., 170a.
Much of what follows in this chapter is concerned with the status of this relativizing phrase.
Thus I will not be considering the entire range of Socrates’ arguments against Protagoras. For a fuller discussion cf. M.F. Burnyeat, ‘Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Plato’s Theaetetus’, and Burnyeat, ‘Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Later Greek Philosophy’. Of particular note is Burnyeat’s “triple-sequence” analysis of the Socratic response to Protagoras.
Theaetetus, 162a.
Ibid. , 169d–171c. Socrates raises an additional problem for Protagoras here in his pointing out an apparent inconsistency between Protagoras holding both that some are wiser than others and that no one thinks falsely. (Cf. esp. 169d, with reference to 167b—c.) But I shall forego consideration of this problem, since the Protagorean relativist could relinguish the former claim. The problem therefore does not count against the Protagorean relativist as such.
Ibid., 170e–171a.
Ibid., 171a. Here begins a famous difficulty for the Socratic argument. Socrates deletes the relativizing phrase ‘for . . .’ after ‘true’, thus unfairly characterizing Protagoras’ position. This opens the door to the charge that Socrates has begged the question against Protagoras by assuming an ‘absolute’ conception of truth, according to which a claim’s truth is independent of a person’s belief in its truth, which the relativist rejects. The Protagorean counter-argument, which denies the intelligibility or rightness of the absolute conception and offers instead a relative conception of truth, as well as the questionbegging charge, will be considered in detail in the following sections.
Ibid., 171b. Cf. also 179b.
Ibid., 171c.
Socrates also objects to the Protagorean doctrine on the grounds that the truth values of certain propositions, e.g. those which make assertions about the future, are independent of opinions held prior to the future event or state-of-affairs. If A believes that it will rain in Katmandu on January 1, 2990, and B believes the contrary, their opinions are not both true, as Protagorean relativism holds, but one of them is false; furthermore, their truth value depends not on the beliefs but on the weather in that place at that time. In such cases, at least, man is not the measure of all things. While this argument does seem to show that the truth values of at least some propositions are independent of persons’ beliefs — and so, that Protagorean relativism is false — it does not make any claims regarding the incoherence of that doctrine, and so will not be considered further here.
The following discussion borrows heavily from my “Epistemological Relativism in its Latest Form”; and my “Relativism Refuted.”
In addition to the papers cited in note 14, cf. also Chapter 3, below, regarding Kuhnian relativism; and my ‘Rationality, Talking Dogs, and Forms of Life’ regarding Wittgensteinian relativism.
This follows only if we interpret truth absolutely, so that the consequent of this conditional reads: “then, if ER is absolutely true, (at least according to that set of standards s 1 , . . . s n ) ER is false.” This of course will not be accepted by the Protagorean relativist who denies the viability of the notion of absolute truth, and who consequently accuses the absolutist (Socrates) of begging the question. This move is considered in some detail below. I thank Ed Erwin, Bill Sewell and Catherine Elgin for their comments on this point.
A very similar point is made by Edward Beach in his “The Paradox of Cognitive Relativism Revisited”, esp. p. 15. As should be clear from the text, this argument does not show that ER is itself self-contradictory or incoherent. It could be true that claims admit only of relative evaluation. What is incoherent is the effort to defend ER, i.e. the conjunction of ER and the thesis that ER is rationally justifiable. (For rational defense requires appeal to non-relative reasons.) Thus I am not claiming, with my reconstruction of Socrates’ argument, that ER is itself incoherent or necessarily false. Rather, as will become clear below, I am claiming that relativism is impotent in the sense that defense of it necessarily involves self-contradiction. I am grateful to Ed Erwin for discussion of this point. In fact some “defenders” of relativism do seek to defend relativism only relativistically, and claim that so doing does not trivialize their doctrine. I consider this claim below.
Harold I. Brown, “For a Modest Historicism”, pp. 549–550.
Ibid., p. 541.
Ibid., p. 550.
It is perhaps worth noting that Brown’s confusion in the article presently under consideration carries over into some of his other writings. In his recent book Perception, Theory and Commitment: The New Philosophy of Science, Brown encounters similar difficulties in his analyses of knowledge, fallibilism, relativism, truth, and certainty. Cf. Chapter 5, below.
Jack W. Meiland, ‘Is Protagorean Relativism Self-Refuting?’; Meiland, ‘Concepts of Relative Truth’; Meiland, ‘On the Paradox of Cognitive Relativism’; and Meiland, ‘Cognitive Relativism: Popper and the Argument From Language’. Cf. also Jack W. Meiland and Michael Krausz, eds., Relativism: Cognitive and Moral.
Meiland, ‘On the Paradox of Cognitive Relativism’, p. 121, emphasis in original. Cf. in this regard James N. Jordan, ‘Protagoras and Relativism: Criticisms Bad and Good’.
And in any case this is a move which is contrary to the spirit of relativism, and makes that doctrine less challenging and interesting — as Meiland notes, “On the Paradox of Cognitive Relativism”, p. 119.
‘Concepts of Relative Truth’, p. 571. Note that it is possible to develop a coherent concept of relative truth that is not independent of the concept of absolute truth — much as it is possible to define relative space in terms of absolute space. The point here is not that the concept of relative truth is necessarily incoherent if it relies on the concept of absolute truth; it is rather that such a concept could not be used in an effort to establish relativism, which denies the legitimacy of the concept of absolute truth. For the relativist cannot rely on the concept of absolute truth in order to deny the legitimacy of that concept. So it is not that a concept of relative truth which relies on the concept of absolute truth is automatically, because of that reliance, incoherent; it is rather that such a concept cannot do the work the relativist wants it to do. I am grateful here to discussions with Ted Lockhart and Donald Provence.
Meiland, ‘Concepts of Relative Truth’, p. 571, emphasis in original.
Ibid., p. 571.
Ibid., pp. 571–572.
Ibid., p. 574.
Actually this is not quite right. The metaphysical relativist must deny that there is a way the world is, independent of statements and W’s; the epistemological relativist must deny only that one can know the way the world is, independent of statements and of W’s. This distinction between metaphysical and epistemological relativism is an important one that deserves more attention that I can give it here. I am grateful to Bruce Suttle, Bill Sewell, and Harold I. Brown for pointing out to me its relevance in the present context. I should like to note, however, that it does not affect the issue being treated in the text. The argument that Meiland’s three-term relation collapses into a two-term relation still goes through.
Cf. Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking. Goodman’s unique brand of relativism is considered in Chapter 7, below.
Meiland, “Concepts of Relative Truth”, p. 571.
Ibid. , p. 574.
Ibid.
Recall that W is not just a letter here; it is a placeholder for persons, world-views, situations, etc.
To paraphrase Meiland, Ibid. , p. 574.
Meiland recognizes this point is another context when he writes: “’Relative truth’ is a form of truth; the expression ‘relative truth’ is not a name for something bearing little relation to our ordinary conception of truth.” ‘Introduction’, in Meiland and Krausz, eds., Relativism, p. 4.
As Passmore writes, taking ‘p is true for X’ as ‘X thinks p is true’ “at once raises the question whether it is true.” John Passmore, Philosophical Reasoning, p. 67.
Meiland’s discussion focuses on the charge as it is developed by Roger Trigg, Reason and Commitment. The discussion occurs in ‘Concepts of Relative Truth’, pp. 577–580. Many other writers have considered this charge as well. For further discussion cf., e.g., Chris Swoyer, ‘True For’, pp. 85 and 94; and Burnyeat, ‘Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Plato’s Theaetetus’, p. 174.
‘Concepts of Relative Truth’, p. 578, emphasis in original. It is worth pointing out that Plato raises this objection as well. Cf. Theaetetus, 183b.
‘Concepts of Relative Truth’, p. 579, emphasis in original.
‘Introduction’, in Meiland and Krausz, eds., Relativism, p. 4. Cf. also p. 82. But see Meiland’s opposite reading of the Measure Doctrine, ‘Is Protagorean Relativism SelfRefuting?’, p. 58.
‘Concepts of Relative Truth’, p. 579.
Ibid., p. 580, emphasis in original.
Ibid.
Another recent discussion of relative truth is that of Chris Swoyer (‘True For’, in Meiland and Krausz, eds., Relativism, pp. 88–108). While space forbids detailed consideration of Swoyer’s excellent and provocative paper here, some comment is necessary. Swoyer offers what he takes to be “a serviceable sketch of the notion of relative truth” (p. 98), according to which p‘s truth is relative to the world as conceived by a framework, so that if p corresponds to the facts as constituted in a framework F, then p is true relative to F, or true for a user of F. Swoyer’s sketch is useful, but it fails in the end to advance the relativist’s case, for two reasons. First, in relativizing truth to frameworks, and in holding that the world is itself framework-relative, p‘s relative truth amounts simply to p’s being accepted by that framework. While Swoyer argues that his account avoids trivializing the notion of relative truth by reducing it to mere belief, and so that “it saves such obvious phenomena as the fact that someone’s believing something is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for its being true ...” (p. 98), an analogous problem arises for Swoyer’s account. For while Jones’ belief that p is not sufficient to establish the relative truth of p in F (since Jones might be mistaken that p corresponds to the facts as construed by F), so that p’s truth for Jones does not amount simply to Jones’ belief that p, nevertheless on Swoyer’s account p‘s relative truth is guaranteed by the appropriate judgment from F. If p corresponds to the world as constituted by F, then p is true for users of F. There is no room on Swoyer’s account for F to be mistaken, nor is there any way to assess or criticize F’s construal of the world. Consequently, “F holds that p corresponds to the facts” is analogous to “Jones believes that p” — F’s verdict is sufficient to establish p’s relative truth. Thus Swoyer’s account does not save “such obvious phenomena” as the fact that a framework’s judging p to be true is also, like an individual’s belief, “neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for its being true.” Swoyer’s account merely substitutes the idiosyncracy and arbitrariness of judgments or verdicts by a framework for that of beliefs by an individual or group. Relative truth comes simply to “what a framework holds.” Second, Swoyer argues that his analysis comes down against the possibility of truth being relative in a strong sense, i.e. , that there could be things which are true in one framework but false in another (though he holds that his analysis “is compatible with the view that truth might be relative in a weak sense, that is, there could be things that were true in one framework which were not expressible and a fortiori not true in another” (p. 105). Thus Swoyer’s analysis does not, by his own account, support a strong relativism of the sort defended by Meiland or Protagoras. While I welcome this latter conclusion of Swoyer’s, I believe that it leads to an inconsistency in Swoyer’s overall account. The same reasons Swoyer appeals to in rejection of a strong relativism — which focus on the inadequacies of radical incommensurability — also demand a rejection of the framework-relativity of worlds which is an essential component of his account of relative truth. Thus Swoyer’s account of relative truth not only does not support a Meilandean or Protagorean relativism; as it stands it does not support any sort of relativism, for the inconsistency just noted renders the sketch of relative truth he offers untenable. The framework-relativity of worlds and the uncriticizability of frameworks are both more problematic than Swoyer realizes; they are also incompatible with the notion of a framework-independent world which Swoyer acknowledges “must be postulated if the relativist’s picture is to avoid the slide into subjective idealism” (p. 97).
Below I argue that a coherent concept of relative truth fails to avoid the NSBF argument for relativism’s incoherence as well.
I ignore here the troublesome (for the relativist) point that even this notion of registering a belief as a belief seems to demand a rejection of relativism. Is it, after all, only relatively true that (for example) Reagan believes in the legitimacy of prayer in the public school? Is this not true even for those who do not believe that Reagan believes this?
Here we see why Brown is mistaken in claiming that relativism “affirms my right to reject competing sets of presuppositions as false.” (Cf. text accompanying footnote 20 above.) All relativism affirms is the right to regard competing sets of pressuppositions as relatively false. And since the relativist cannot claim that her own presuppositions are, in being true-for-her (and so, relatively true), cognitively or epistemically superior or more worthy of belief than competing sets of presuppositions which are false-for-her but true-for-someone-else (and so also relatively true), relativism does not affirm the right Brown claims. Here again is the penalty exacted by relativism’s impotence.
Maurice Mandelbaum, ‘Subjective, Objective, and Conceptual Relativisms’, p. 403, emphasis in original. Mandelbaum’s thesis of the self-limitation of relativism is weaker than the thesis of self-refutation (although Meiland regards them as equivalent), but his case is powerfully made, and his argument that relativism is self-limiting because the evidence adduced to support relativism must be regarded non-relativistically in order to be properly regarded as evidence offers additional reason for taking relativism to be incoherent. It is related to, or is a version of, the argument advanced above that relativism must be defended non-relativistically, and that a “relative defense” is no defense at all.
This passage is taken from the editor’s introduction to Mandelbaum’s article, in Meiland and Krausz, eds. , Relativism, p. 32. I am grateful to Roy Mash for calling the passage to my attention. Cf. also ‘On the Paradox of Cognitive Relativism’, pp. 125–126, and ‘Is Protagorean Relativism Self-Refuting?’, p. 68.
‘Concepts of Relative Truth’, p. 580.
‘On the Paradox of Cognitive Relativism’, p. 126, emphasis added. I take the word “show” in these passages to be tantamount to “rationally establish.”
‘Is Protagorean Relativism Self-Refuting?’, p. 68.
‘Is Protagorean Relativism Self-Refuting?’, p. 54.
Swoyer, ‘True For’, p. 95.
Jordan, ‘Protagoras and Relativism: Criticisms Bad and Good’, pp. 10–11. Cf. also pp. 14 and 15. It should be noted that Jordan ultimately argues for relativism’s incoherence, but on grounds he regards as different from Socrates’.
Burnyeat, “Protagoras and Self-Reffitation in Plato’s Theaetetus”, pp. 174–175 and throughout. Burnyeat cites several other critics of Socrates’ dropping of the qualifier “for . . .”, esp. Vlastos, in these pages and in his footnote 4, on p. 174. But it must be pointed out that Burnyeat offers an analysis of the Socratic response to Protagoras which does not conclude that Socrates begs the question, but rather that Protagorean relativism is indeed incoherent, and that Socrates’ arguments are ultimately grounded appropriately: No amount of maneuvering with his relativizing qualifiers will extricate Protagoras from the commitment to truth absolute which is bound up with the very act of assertion. To assert is to assert that p — as Passmore puts it, that something is the case — and ifp, indeed if and only ifp, then p is true (period). This principle, which relativism attempts to circumvent, must be acknowledged by any speaker. How clearly Plato saw that, I hesitate to say. But at some level it is surely what he is reacting to (p. 195). This suggestion, that the very act of assertion of relativism commits the relativist to absolute truth, is a familiar one, and is related to the argument advanced earlier that relativism cannot be defended relativistically. In addition to Burnyeat’s discussion, cf. that of Passmore, referred to by Burnyeat, and Jordan, ‘Protagoras and Relativism: Criticisms Bad and Good’.
Cf. Burnyeat’s compelling analysis, the conclusion of which is cited in footnote 58 above. But note Meiland’s rebuttal, in ‘Is Protagorean Relativism Self-Refuting?’ , pp. 56–63.
It is perhaps worth noting that Meiland finds Burnyeat’s interpretation of Plato ‘very persuasive as an interpretation of what Plato actually meant. (Is Protagorean Relativism Self-Refuting?’, footnote 13, pp. 56–57.)
Thus the NSBF argument, as well as the UVNR argument, gives rise to the difficulty the relativist faces regarding the defense of relativism.
And in any case it must be recognized that the charge of question-begging has only been leveled at (Socrates’ version of) the NSBF argument; the UVNR argument is entirely unscathed by this charge. The relativist could try to extend the charge to the latter argument by claiming that that argument assumes a notion of ‘absolute rightness’, but the charge is forceful only if the relativist, in making the charge, assumes the very same thing (that is, that it is right (absolutely or simpliciter) that the absolutist makes the assumption in question).
Hartry Field, ‘Realism and Relativism’.
Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History. Putnam’s discussion of relativism occurs at pp. 119–124; cf. also pp. 157 and 161–162. Putnam also criticizes relativism in his second Howison Lecture, “Why Reason Can’t be Naturalized”, pp. 3–23. Cf. pp. 7–14. As several writers have pointed out, it is not clear that the positive view of internal realism Putnam defends is not itself relativistic, and thus inconsistent with his rejection of relativism. (Cf. in this regard Field, ‘Realism and Relativism’, p. 563, note 12; also Eric Matthews’ review of Reason, Truth and History, esp. pp. 115–116). I believe that this is indeed a serious difficulty for Putnam, but space forbids detailed consideration of the point here.
Field, ‘Realism and Relativism’, p. 562.
Ibid. , p. 562. Field argues that this distinguishes his version of relativism from Protagoras’, which Field agrees is incoherent.
Ibid., p. 563.
Ibid., emphasis in original. Note that this version of epistemological relativism neatly matches the characterization, ER, given earlier in this chapter, at least with respect to justification.
Ibid., p. 564, emphasis in original.
Field of course accepts this distinction and utilizes it throughout his argument for relativism.
Ibid., p. 564, emphasis added.
And Field explicitly denies that they can, Ibid., p. 566.
This, incidentally, is all that the absolutist need maintain — not, as Field intimates, that there must be a true evidential system (Ibid., p. 563). Cf. Chapter 8, below.
Personal Communication.
I note in passing that judgments regarding the reliability of alternative E’s will inevitably be relative, however factual a property reliability is. I am grateful here to conversation with Ed Erwin.
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Siegel, H. (1987). The Incoherence Argument and the Notion of Relative Truth. In: Relativism Refuted. Synthese Library, vol 189. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7746-5_1
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