Abstract
Boethius’s two commentaries on Aristotle’s De interpretatione contain an account of the metaphysical foundations of contingency in their discussions of Chapter 9.1 For the countless medieval discussions of future contingents only De interpretatione 9 itself is of greater historical importance than Boethius’s discussions of it. In this chapter, however, my concern is with. the content of Boethius’s theory of contingency and not with its historical sources or influences. In order to give his theory the kind of consideration I think it deserves, I need to extract it from the other material in the commentaries and expound it in its own right; I also want to examine some of its consequences. Because those tasks are the only ones I can undertake in this paper, I am not now concerned with what the later medievals thought about Boethius or with what Boethius thought about Aristotle or with what Aristotle thought about contingency, but only (or as nearly as possible only) with what Boethius thought about contingency in his two commentaries on De interpretatione.2
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Notes
The Latin texts of the commentaries are published in Migne’s Patrologia Latina, Vol. 64, cols. 329–342 and 487–518; and in the critical edition by C. Meiser, Boetii Commentarii in Librum Aristotelis II EPI EPMHNIA ∑, Léipzig: Teubner, 1877— 1880 (2 vols.), Vol. I, pp. 103–126, and Vol. II, pp. 185–250. All my references to and quotations from Boethius’s commentaries in the notes will be taken from Meiser’s edition.
For the definitive edition of Boethius’s translation of Aristotle see L. MinioPaluello (ed.), Aristoteles Latinus II 1–2: De Interpretatione vel Periermenias, Desclée de Brouwer, Bruges 1965.
See also Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy in Boethius. The Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy, H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (eds), Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass 1968, Bk V, esp. Prose 1 and 2;
Boethius, In Ciceronis Topica in Ciceronis Opera, J. C. Orelli and G. Baiterus (eds), Zurich 1833, Bk V, chs. 15.60— 17.64. I owe the latter reference to Eleonore Stump.
Boethius and later medieval philosophers use ‘propositio’ in a way that is closer to `sentence’ than to ‘proposition’ in contemporary philosophical usage; my use of ‘proposition’ in this paper mirrors Boethius’s use of ‘propositio’.
There is, of course, much more to be said about logical determinism than need be said here. For a very good discussion of logical determinism in De interpretatione 9 and in recent literature on it, see Gail Fine, ‘Truth and Necessity in De interpretatione 9’ (forthcoming). See also my ‘Boethius and the (Indefinite) Truth About Tomorrow’s Sea Battle’ (forthcoming), a companion-piece to this essay.
“hoc si est in omnibus adfirmationibus atque negationibus, ut una definite falsa sit, altera vera definite, quidquid vera dicit eventurum necesse est evenire, quidquid non eventurum non evenire necesse est.” I, 109.9 –13 .
Although Boethius’s examples always involve indexicals rather than temporally definite expressions, it is clear that he takes them to be temporally definite. See the passage quoted on p. 40 above (and in n. 69), where he expressly says of propositions involving ‘tomorrow’ that they “define the time”.
Without the insertion of this phrase it might appear that Boethius associates the contingency of propositions with mere epistemic indeterminacy. As we shall see — e.g., on p. 27 above — he expressly denies such an association. The appropriateness of the wording of the inserted phrase will become clear in the light of further passages quoted from Boethius in this paper.
The Latin word ‘res’ means not only thing, but also event or state of affairs. I will sometimes append those other meanings in parentheses after ‘thing’ in my translations, as here.
“contingentia autem sunt (ut supra iam diximus) quaecumque vel ad esse vel ad non esse aequaliter sese habent, et sicut ipsa indefinitum habent esse et non esse, ita quoque de his adfirmationes < et negations > indefinitam habent veritatem vel falsitatem, cum una semper vera sit, semper altera falsa, sed quae vera quaeve falsa sit, nondum in contingentibus notum est. nam sicut quae sunt necessaria esse, in his esse definitum est, quae autem sunt inpossibilia esse, in his non esse definitum est, ita quae et possunt esse et possunt non esse, in his neque esse neque non esse est definitum, sed veritas et falsitas ex eo quod est esse rei et ex eo quod est non esse rei sumitur. nam si sit quod dicitur, verum est, si non sit quod dicitur, falsum est. igitur in contingentibus et futuris sicut ipsum esse et non esse instabile est, esse tamen aut non esse necesse est, ita quoque in adfirmationibus < et negationibus > contingentia ipsa prodentibus veritas quidem vel falsitas in incerto est (quae enim vera sit, quae falsa secundum ipsarum propositionum naturam ignoratur), necesse est tarmen unam veram esse, alteram falsam.” II, 200.11— 201.2. For an interpretation of Boethius’s theory of indefinite truth and falsity, see my forthcoming paper cited in n.4 above.
“licet necesse sit, quisquis de re aliqua vera praedixerit, rem quam ante praenuntiaverit evenire, non tamen idcirco rerum necessitas ex praedictionis veritate pendet, sed divinandi veritas ex rerum potius necessitate perpenditur. non enim idcirco esse necesse est, quoniam verum aliquid praedictum est, sed quoniam necessario erat futurum, idcirco de ea re potuit aliquid vere praedici. quod si ita est, eveniendi rei vel non eveniendi non est causa is qui praedicit futuram esse vel negat. non enim adfirmationem et negationem esse necesse est, sed idcirco ea esse necesse est quae futura sunt, quoniam in natura propria quandam habent necessitatem, in quam si quis incurrerit, verum est quod praedicit. … non enim propter dicentem vel negantem in rebus necessitas est, sed propter rerum necessitatem veritas in praenuntiatione vel falsitas invenitur.” II, 228.3— 16; 20–23.
Fire: II, 187.29–188.2; 236.8–15; 237.12–13; 239.3–8; 243.13–16; snow: 236.5— 8; man: I, 122.14–15; II, 187.27–29.
Bodies, II, 195.15–17; water: 238.14–21.
“…” solem nunc esse in sagittario et post paucos dies in aquarium transgredi … necesse sit. II, 234.4–6. For the complete passage, see p. 30 above and n. 33 below. See also I, 105.25–26; II, 200.1–9; 241.3–7; 244.22–245.3. As Carol Kaske pointed out to me, Capricorn occurs between Sagittarius and Aquarius. Either Boethius’s knowledge of the zodiac is sketchy, as mine is, or he intends ‘post paucos dies’ to be interpreted very generously.
“nec si letale signum in aegrotantis facie medicina deprehendit, ut aliud esse non possit nisi ille moriatur, nobis autem ignotum sit propter artis inperitiam, idcirco ilium aegrum esse moriturum utrumlibet et contingentis naturae esse iudicandum est, sed illa sola tanta sine dubio esse putanda sunt, quaecumque idcirco nobis ignota sunt, quod per propriam naturam qualem habeant eventum sciri non possunt …” II, 193.10–18.
See his approving remarks regarding Alexander’s view on this point, II, 219.29— 220.8; see also II, 244.25–245.3.
“hoc enim in natura fuit antea, sed nobis hoc rei ipsius patefecit eventus. quare si omnia quaecumque evenerunt sunt et ea quae sunt futura esse praedici potuerunt, necesse est omnia quae dicuntur aut definite vera esse aut definite falsa, quoniam definitum eorum eventus secundum praesens tempus est.” II, 210.2–8.
“nam etiam si in his non sit manifesta veritatis natura, nil tamen prohibet fixam esse necessitatis in natura constantiam. . .” II, 187.9–11.
“et hoc per suam naturam, non ad nostram ignorantiam atque notitiam.” II, 208.17— 18. See also II. 193.6–8: 245.24–28.
“hoc autem non quod audientes de futuro nesciamus, sed quod eadem res et esse possit et non esse” II, 245.19–21. See also II, 187.20–24; 192.5–9; 193.6–21; 194.17— 195.2; 245.10–12.
There are passages that read as if he takes every singular future-tense proposition to be contingent — e.g., I, 106.5–8; 107.22; 108.24–25; II, 189.23–190.1 — but the many passages in which he expressly recognizes non-contingent, naturally necessary propositions of that form show that these must simply be imprecisely expressed.
“ergo qui dicit, quoniam erit aliquid eorum quae contingenter eveniunt, in eo quod futurum esse dicit id quod contingenter evenit fortasse mentitur; vel si contigerit res illa quam praedicit, ille tamen mentitus est; non enim eventus falsus est, sed modus praedictionis, namque ita oportuit dicere: cras bellum navale contingenter eveniet, hoc est dicere: ita evenit, si evenerit, ut potuerit non evenire. qui ita dicit verum dicit, eventum enim contingenter praedixit. qui autem ita infit: cras bellum erit navale, quasi necesse sit, ita pronuntiat.” II, 212.8–18. For a further discussion of the significance of this passage in Boethius’s response to logical determinism, see my forthcoming paper cited in n. 4 above.
“sin vero res contingenter venientes atque abeuntes, quae illas prodit contingens propositio nuncupatur.” II, 188.25–27.
“haec enim ita constituta in rebus putat, ut non de his ulla opus sit demonstratione, sed inpossibilis ratio iudicetur, quaecumque vel possibile vel casum vel id quod in nobis est conatur evertere.” II, 219.5 —9.
“non exponat nunc, quid sit casus quidve possibile quidve in nobis. . .” II, 2 18. 27–28.
I, 110.24–27; 111.21–22; II, 190.1–6; 192.27–193.1; 203.2–13; 203.17–20; 204.6–7; 204.11; 204.19–21; 207.17–18; 209.2–4; 211.20–26; 217.14–15; 218.25— 219.9; 220.17–19; 229.16–18; 240.4–5; 240.6–7; 240.21–22.
“contingens autem secundum Aristotelicam sententiam est, quoctcumque aut casum fert aut ex libero cuiuslibet arbitrio et propria voluntate venit aut facilitate naturae in utramque partem redire possibile est, ut fiat scilicet et non fiat.” II, 190.1–6.
“tres supra modos proposuimus contingentis. . .” II, 190.12–13.
“inpossibile quiddam ex hac positione continget. eveniet namque omnia quaecumque sunt vel fiunt ex necessitate fieri et nihil a casu nihilque esse possibile quod sit et non esse possibile. nihil etiam in liberi arbitrii moderamine relinqueretur. ..” I, 110.23–27.
“sed illae sunt proprie contingentes, quae neque in natura sunt neque in necessitate, sed aut in casu aut in libero arbitrio aut in possibilitate naturae. . .” II, 203.2–5.
Sometimes Boethius associates the entire division into three modes with utrumlibet rather than with contingency — e.g., II, 192.27–193.4; 204.17–22; 211.17–21; 240.6— 7. ‘Utrumlibet’ is the word Boethius uses in his translation of De interpretatione 9 for Aristotle’s “hopoter’ etuchen” (e.g., at 18b6, 7, 8–9); William of Moerbeke uses ‘quodcumque contingit’ in his thirteenth-century translation (see Minio-Paluello, 1965 [n. 1 above] , p. 47). When Boethius uses ‘utrumlibet’ broadly, as his word for whatever is contingent, he seems careful to associate that usage with Aristotle particularly, even claiming at one point that Aristotle explained “what the nature of the contingent is when he explained what is utrumlibet” (“Exponit enim quae sit contingentis natura, cum quid sit utrumlibet exposuit.” I, 112.22–23). It is only proper for Boethius the conscientious commentator to speak of utrumlibet rather than of contingency when expounding Aristotle directly; after all, Boethius found no place in his translation of Chapter 9 at which to use the Latin words ‘contingentia’ or ‘contingens’. But it strikes me as peculiar that he should present Aristotle as dividing utrumlibet into possibility, free choice, and chance. Aristotle does not mention free choice explicitly in the chapter at all, and at 18b5–6 and 15–16 he speaks of utrumlibet and chance in ways that suggest he was not thinking of chance as a mode of utrumlibet. My reason for pointing out that Boethius has a bioad use for utrumlibet’ which he associates with Aristotle is that I think he uses ‘utrumlibet’ more narrowly in his own theory of contingency, as the next three quoted passages will show.
“et hanc eveniendi vel non eveniendi possibilitatem utrumlibet vocamus. in huiusmodi enim rebus utrumlibet contingit, … quare haec huiusmodi eveniendi et non eveniendi potentia utrumlibet vocatur, quod in his utrumlibet … evenire conceditur.” I, 106. 13–15; 20–23.
“Casus namque et id quod est utrumlibet exstinguitur, libera etiam voluntas adimitur, si omnia quaecumque fient ex necessitate futura sunt.” I, 112.9–11. In this passage, however, he is echoing Aristotle at 18b5–6, which he translates as “Nihil igitur neque est neque fit nec a casu nec utrumlibet …”. The explicit inclusion of free will is his own contribution.
“aliter enim dicitur possibile me esse ambulare cum sedeam, aliter solem nunc esse in sagittario et post paucos dies in aquarium transgredi. ita enim possibile est ut etiam necesse sit.” II, 234.3–6.
“sed quamquam quod necessarium est possibile sit, est tamen alia quaedam extrinsecus possibilitatis natura, quae et ab inpossibili et a necessitate seiuncta sit.” II, 236. 1–4.
“alioquin divinis corporibus nihil omnino est potestate, sed omne actu: ut soli numquam est lumen potestate, cui quidem nulla obscuritas, vel toto caelo nulla quies.” II, 238.22–25.
This use of `intrinsic’ is merely a terminological suggestion on my part, based on Boethius’s use of “quaedam extrinsecus possibilitatis natura” (n. 34 above). I have not seen Boethius using the parallel adverb ‘intrinsecus’ in this connection.
See the discussion at II, 236.5–238.1.
“fit quidem frequentius ut canescat, non tamen interclusum est, ut non canescat.” II, 188.12–14. This is Boethius’s paradigm of Aristotle’s for-the-most-part contingencies. Leaving aside Aristotle’s understanding of such cases, Boethius’s presentation of them suggests that he may have been uncertain of their status. From my own point of view he puts the case best at I, 121.5 —6 :“turning grey [happens] in more sixty-year-old men than not turning grey” (canescere in pluribus sexagenariis quam non canescere). But he is also capable of putting it in this misleading way :“whoever would say that a man turns grey in old age and claim that this is of necessity would say what is false, for he can also not turn grey” (quicumque dixerit hominem in senecta canescere et hoc ex necessitate esse protulerit mentietur, potest enim et non canescere); II, 248.20–22. See also II, 192.19–21; 240.17–21.
“lignum hoc potest quidem secari, sed nihil tamen minus habet ad contraria cognationem, potest enim non secari …” II, 236.22–24. Boethius discusses Aristotle’s similar example of the cloak at II, 237.21–238.1 and at II, 190.24–191.2, where it serves as the paradigm of utrumlibet possibility.
“ut hunc calamum frangi quidem possible est, < sed > etiam non frangi, et hoc non ad nostram possibilitatem referunt, sed ad ipsius rei naturam.” II. 197.20–23.
“facilitate naturae in utramque partem redire possibile est, ut fiat scilicet et non fiat.” II, 190.4–6. See also II, 233.26–234.1: “possibile esse dicitur quod in utramque partem facile naturae suae ratione vertatur, ut et cum non sit possibile sit esse nec cum sit ut non sit res ulla prohibeat.”
Reading ‘potestate’ for `possibilitate’.
“alia quidem potestate sunt, alia actu: ut aqua calida quidem est possibilitate, potest enim fieri calida, frigida vero actu est, est enim frigida. hoc autem actu et potestate ex materia venit. nam cum sit materia contrarietatis susceptrix et ipsa in se utriusque contrarietatis habeat cognationem, si ipsa per se cogitetur, nihil eorum habet quae in se suscipit et ipsa quidem nihil actu est, omnia tarnen potestate. … ergo quod potestate est in rebus ex materia venit.” II, 238.6–13; 21–22. Boethius’s recognition of permanently unactualized real potentialities seems clear in his discussions of the examples of the wood, the reed, and the cloak; and it may be brought out even more clearly in some of his examples of free choice as at II, 207.20–23; 235.22–26.
“ita sese ergo habent ex materia, ut omnia ipsa essent potestate, nihil autem actu, arbitratu naturae, quae in ipsa materia singulos pro ratione distribuit motus et singulas qualitatum proprietates singulis materiae partibus ponit, ut alias quidem natura ipsa necessarias ordinarit, ita ut quamdiu res illa esset eius in ipsa proprietas permaneret, ut igni calorem. nam quamdiu ignis est, tamdiu ignem calidum esse necesse est. allis vero tales qualitates adposuit, quibus carere possint. et illa quidem necessaria qualitas informat uniuscuiusque substantiam. illa enim eius qualitas cum ipsa materia ex natura coniuncta est. istae vero aliae qualitates extra sunt, quae et admitti possunt et non admitti. … ex natura igitur et ex materia ista in rebus possibilitas venit.” II, 239.14— 15; 20–24.
I possibilitas] qua in re casus quoque aliquando subrepit … ex hac autem possibilitate etiam illa liberi arbitrii ratio venit. si enim non esset fieri aliquid possibile, sed omnia aut ex necessitate essent aut ex necessitate non essent, liberum arbitrium non maneret. II, 239.14–15; 20–24.
“illud enim in nobis est liberum arbitrium, quod sit omni necessitate vacuum et ingenuum et suae potestatis, quorundamque nos domini quodammodo sumus vel faciendi vel non faciendi.” II, 218.8–12.
“videmus enim quasdam res ex principio liberi arbitrii et ex nostrorum actuum fonte descendere . . .” II, 230.4–6.
“cras Socrates disputaturus est in palaestra contingens est, quod hoc ex libero venit arbitrio.” II, 203.11–13.
“et illud enim et illud poterit evenire. hoc autem idcirco est quoniam non est ex antiquioribus quibusdam causis pendens rerum eventus, ut quaedam quodammodo necessitatis catena sit, sed potius haec ex nostro arbitrio et libera voluntate sunt, in quibus est nulla necessitas.” II, 246.14–19.
“id quod fit ex nobis et ex nostro iudicio principium sumat nullo extrinsecus …” II, 195.8–9.
“atque ideo quarundam actionum nos ipsi principia, non sequaces sumus.” II, 196. 24–25. For the context, see pp. 17–18 and n. 54 below. Some version of this principle is found also at I, 120.2–6; 19–21; 121.9–10; II, 230.4–6; 231.5–8; 232.11–13; 233.19–20.
For an excellent, well-known contemporary statement of the theory of agent causation, see R. M. Chisholm, ‘Freedom and Action,’ in Freedom and Determinism, K. Lehrer (ed.), Random House, New York 1966, pp. 11–44.
I have found references to God or gods at only five places, all in the second commentary, but I have not made a point of looking for them. All those references are casual, none of them intrinsic to the theory of contingency Boethius is developing. There are also about ten references to fate or providence, but they too have no part to play in the theory.
“nos autem liberum voluntatis arbitrium non id dicimus quod quisque voluerit, sed quod quisque iudicio et examinatione collegerit. … si velle aliquid vel nolle hoc recte liberi arbitrii vocabulo teneretur, non solum hoc esset hominum, sed ceterorum quoque animalium … sed est liberum arbitrium, quod ipsa quoque vocabula produnt, liberum nobis de voluntate iudicium. quotienscumque enim imaginationes quaedam concurrunt animo et voluntatem irritant, eas ratio perpendit et de his iudicat, et quod ei melius videtur, cum arbitrio perpenderit et iudicatione collegerit, facit. atque ideo quaedam dulcia et speciem utilitatis monstrantia spernimus, quaedam amara licet nolentes tarnen fortiter sustinemus: adeo non in voluntate, sed in iudicatione voluntatis liberurm constat arbitriurn et non in irmaginatione, sed in ipsius irmaginationis perpensione consistit. atque ideo quarundam actionum nos ipsi principia, non sequaces surmus. hoc est enirm uti ratione uti iudicatione … sola ratione disiungirnur.” II, 196.4–6; 9–11; 13–26; 27–28.
“omne quod natura est non frustra est; consiliari autem homines naturaliter habeat; quod si necessitas in rebus sola dominabitur, sine causa est consiliatio; sed consiliatio non frustra est, natura enim est; non igitur potest in rebus cuncta necessitas.” II, 220. 10–15. On deliberation and the principle nos ipsi principia sumus see also I, 120.2–6; 19–21.
“omnium rerurm et casus et voluntas et necessitas dominatur …” II, 224.17–18. See also II, 197.5–10; 223.12–22; 230.20–26; 239.14–20. The similar passage at II, 240.2–5 strikes me as confused because it treats possibility as on a par with necessity, chance, and free choice.
“Peripatetici enim, quorum Aristoteles princeps est, et casurn et liberi arbitriurm iudicii et necessitatem in rebus quae fiunt quaeque aguntur curn gravissima auctoritate turm apertissima ratione confirmant.” II, 193 .26 —194 .2.
“ponendurn in rebus est casu quaedarn posse et voluntate effici et necessitate constringi et ratio, quae utrumvis horurn subruit, inpossibilis iudicanda est.” II, 226.22–25.
“pro alia narmque re aliquid ex libero arbitrio facientibus ex isdern veniens causis casus interstrepit. ut [cum] scrobern deponens quis, ut infodiat vitem, si thesaururn inveniat, scrobem quidern deponere ex libero venit arbitrio, invenire thesaururn solus atulit casus, earm tamen causam habens casus, quarm voluntas attulit. nisi enim foderet scrobem, thesaurus non esset inventus.” II, 224.2–9. See also II, 194.8–13. (Cf. The Consolation of Philosophy V, 1)
“quotiens aliquid agitur et non id evenit, propter quod res illa coepta est quae agebatur, id quod evenit ex casu evenisse putandum est, ut casus quidern non sine aliqua actione sit …” II, 194 .3 –6 .
II, 239.24–25.
I have not yet tried to find this theory of the basis of contingency in later medieval philosophers, but I can offer this passage from Ockharm as an interesting preliminary sample: “nothing of which the Philosopher speaks here [De int. 9, 19a39–19b4] is fortuitously (utrumlibet) contingent except what is in the power of sormeone acting freely or what depends on such an agent. Therefore in pure natural things — i.e., in animate things only the sensitive soul, and in [all] inanirmate things — there is no contingency, nor any chance or fortune, unless they depend in sorme way on a free agent. In all the other things of which the Philosopher speaks here, however, there is inevitability and necessity.” The passage is frorm Ockharm’s commentary on De interpretatione as translated (in part) in Appendix II of M. M. Adams and N. Kretzrnann, WilliamOckham: Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, Appleton —Century-Crofts, New York 1969; second, revised edition published in 1983 by William Hackett Publishing Company of Indianapolis), p. 106.
“prandere enim vel legere et alia huiusmodi sicut ex nostra voluntate sunt, ita quoque eorum saepe ex nostra voluntate pendet eventus.” II, 224.11–13.
“quod si nunc imperare Persis velit Romanus, arbitrium quidem voluntatis in ipso est, sed hunc eventum durior necessitas retinet et ad perfectionem vetat adduci.” II, 224.13–16.
“et actuum quidem nostrorum voluntas in nobis est. nostra enim voluntas domina quodammodo est nostrorum actuum et totius vitae rationis, sed non eodem modo eventus quoque in nostra est potestate.” II, 223.22–224.1.
The modifiers ‘consciously and rationally’ have no counterparts in Boethius’s discussion. I have introduced them as perhaps overly economical means of turning aside troublesome examples of a sort presented to me by Newton Garver, Carl Ginet, Christopher Hughes, and Allen Wood. In my view the most troublesome of these is Allen Wood’s example of the gambler who intends to roll a seven on the dice and does so. Must that event be classified as free choice by Boethian criteria? I am inclined to say that although the gambler wants to roll a seven, it is only out of ignorance that he or we can say that he intends to do so. But modifying ‘intends’ with ‘rationally’ seems a more cautious and no less effective antidote.
I am grateful to Eleonore Stump for suggesting this way of drawing the distinction. The ut nunc/simpliciter terminology is familiar in connection with the classification of inferences in the theory of consequences, on which see E. Stump, ‘Topics: Their Development and Absorption into Consequences’ and I. Boh, ‘Consequences’, Chapters 14 and 15 respectively in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, N. Kretzmann et al. (eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1982.
Richard Sorabji drew on his own thorough study of the Aristotelian background of the issues addressed in this paper in order to provide me with extensive, learned comments designed to show, among other things, that if my account of Boethius’s theory of contingency is correct, then Boethius is going considerably beyond the Peripatetic tradition according to which we are the source not of all contingency but merely of all chance, chance being a carefully defined and very restricted subdivision of the contingent. I am very grateful to Professor Sorabji, I think that he is right about that implication of my account, and of course I think my account is correct. I have not, however, seen any evidence that Boethius was aware that he had made such a radical (and in my view promising) departure from the tradition.
“non autem oportet ignorare non esse similiter contingentes has quae dicunt Socrates morietur et Socrates non morietur et illas quae dicunt Socrates cras morietur, Socrates cras non morietur. illae enim superiores omnino contingentes non sunt, sed sunt necessariae (morietur enim Socrates ex necessitate), hae vero quae tempus definiunt nec ipsae in numerum contingentium recipiuntur, idcirco quod nobis quidem cras moriturum esse Socratem incertum est, naturae autem incertum non est …” II, 202.21–203.1.
II, 203.5–7; 190.14–19; 191.12–18, 192.9–12; cf. I, 120.28–29.
Actually there are three such features: the one that concerns me, the one I dismiss in a parenthesis near the top of p. 42 above, and the fact that in both these examples the chance occurrence is a consequence of the interaction of two free choices. I pay no attention to the third because I assume that even Boethius would have accepted it as a case of chance if the vine-planting farmer had struck a vein of gold rather than a treasure someone else had deliberately buried.
“ergo agenti aliquid homini, aliud tamen agenti res diversa successit. hoc igitur ex casu evenire dicitur, quodcumque per quamlibet actionem evenit non propter earm rem coeptam, quae aliquid agenti successerit.” II, 194 .13 –17 .
It should be compared especially with The Consolation of Philosophy V, 1, where some of these difficulties do not appear (although others take their place).
I am grateful to Newton Garver, Carl Ginet, Christopher Hughes, and Allen Wood for thought-provoking questions about Boethian chance, and to Terry Irwin for an illuminating discussion of II, 194 .13 –17 . I am grateful also to Gail Fine, Carl Ginet, and Robert Stalnaker for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and especially to Eleonore Stump, who pointed out several shortcomings for which she generously suggested remedies.
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Kretzmann, N. (1985). Nos Ipsi Principia Sumus: Boethius and the Basis of Contingency. In: Rudavsky, T. (eds) Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy. Synthese Historical Library, vol 25. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7719-9_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7719-9_2
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