Abstract
Gersonides, writing in fourteenth-century France, offers an interesting and provocative analysis of the problems inherent in prophecy and its relation to divine omniscience.1 This cluster of problems can be summarized as follows. Many scriptural prophecies concern contingent events. Hence the existence of prophetic statements about future contingent events suggests that these events can be foreknown. If they are foreknown how can they be contingent? And yet if they are not foreknown, how can the events in question be prophesied? In short, what sense can we make of prophetic statements which purport to relate information about future contingent events?2
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
The philosophical questions raised by Gersonides (Levi ben Gerson, 1288–1344), are contained in his major work Sefer Milḥamot Adonai (Wars of the Lord), Leipzig 1866. A recent English translation of book three of this work can be found in Gersonides: The Wars of the Lord; Treatise Three: On God’s Knowledge, translated by N. Samuelson, University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1977. In this paper references will be made both to the Hebrew edition (Milḥamot), as well as to Samuelson’s translation (Wars). In both cases reference will be made to treatise, chapter, and page number. For an extensive bibliography of scholarly works on Levi ben Gerson, cf. M. Kellner, ‘R. Levi ben Gerson: A Bibliographical Essay’, Studies in Bibliography and Booklore 12 (1979), pp. 13–23. References to specific articles will be made in the present essay when relevant;
however, the following works should be noted for their treatment of Gersonides’ theory of divine omniscience: N. Samuelson, ‘Gersonides’ Account of God’s Knowledge of Particulars’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 10 (1972), pp. 399–416;
T. M. Rudavsky, ‘Divine Omniscience and Future Contingents in Gersonides’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (1983), pp. 513–536;
C. Sirat, Les théories des visions surnaturelles dans la pensée juive du’ moyen-âge, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1969;
C. Toutai, La Pensée Philosophique et Théologique de Gersonides, Les Editions de Minuit, Paris 1973;
Gersonides, Les Guerres du Seigneur, Livres III, et IV, translated by C. Touati, Mouton, Paris 1969.
Gersonides presents a modified version of the problem of prophecy in Milḥamot II.1.
Allusions to the problem of divine omniscience occur in other contexts as well, most notably when Gersonides is discussing issues connected with prophecy and divine providence. For these discussions, cf. Gersonides’ commentary on Job, in A. L. Lassen, The Commentary of Levi ben Gershon on the Book of Job, Bloch Publishing Co., New York 1946; and
in A. Altmann, ‘Gersonides’ Commentary on Averroes’ Epitome of Parva Naturalia II.3’, PAAJR 66–67 (1979–1980), pp. 1–31 (henceforth referred to as Altmann).
Milḥamot II.2, p. 94.
Milḥamot II.2, p. 95.
Altmann, op. cit., pp. 17–18.
Gersonides, Supercommentary on Averroes’ Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, Chapter 9 (found in the 1562 edition of Aristotelis omnia quas extant opera... Averrois Cordubensis in ea opera omnes qui ad haec usque tempora pervenere commentarii... cum Levi Gersonidis in libros logicos annotationibus... a Iacob Mantino in Latinum conversi... Venetiis, apud Iunctas, MDLXII (vol. I, ff. 82vbK — 83rbF). An English translation of this portion of Averroes’ commentary and Gersonides’ supercommentary has been prepared by Professor N. Kretzmann. The quoted passage is found in 83rb D 46ff.
This distinction will allow Gersonides to maintain that the objects of prophetic knowledge are determined and structured from one standpoint, and undetermined and unstructured from another standpoint: “The aspect from which they are determined and structured is that of the heavenly bodies... the aspect in which they are contingents, i.e., indeterminate and unstructured, is that of our intellect and will”. Cf. Milḥamot II.2, pp. 96ff.
Milḥamot II.2, p. 97.
Milḥamot II.2, p. 96.
A similar point is made by Thomas Aquinas. In his Summa Contra Gentiles Bk III, ch. 41, Thomas maintains that only man’s body is subject to the stars; his intellect is subject to intellectual substances, while man’s will is subject to God’s influence. Cf. also Ibid. Bk. III ch. 84; D. W. Silverman, The Problem of Prophecy in Gersonides, PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1975, p. 103.
Milḥamot IV.3, pp. 160–161.
Milḥamot II.2, p. 96. 14 Cf. Gersonides’ Supercommentary on Averroes’ Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, Chapter 9, 83 raA 11. 5–10.
Wars III.4, p. 232.
Wars III.1, pp. 99–100.
Wars III.4, pp. 233–234.
Wars III.4, pp. 235–236. Abraham Ibn Daud, in his work Sefer-ha-Emunah ha-Ramah (The Exalted Faith), edited by S. Weil, Frankfurt 1852, (II, vi, 2, p. 96), develops a similar view according to which God’s lack of knowledge of future contingents is not a deficiency in him. For a discussion of the historical importance of Ibn Daud’s position, cf. S. Pines, ‘Scholasticism after Thomas Aquinas and the Teachings of Hasdai Crescas and his Predecessors’, Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, vol. 1, no. 10, (1967), pp. 90ff.
For an elaboration of this critique, see my paper ‘Divine Omniscience and Future Contingents in Gersonides’, op. cit.
Gersonides’ Supercommentary on Averroes’ Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, Chapter 9, 82vbK 34–36.
Ibid. 82vbL 15.
Averroes’ position is stated in his Qissur Sefer Ha-Ḥush We-Ha-Muḥash Le-Ibn Rushd, H. Blumberg (ed.), Medieval Academy of America, Cambridge 1954. Blumberg’s English translation of this work — henceforth called Blumberg — is found in his Averroes’ Epitome of Parva Naturalia, Cambridge, Medieval Academy of America, 1961.
Gersonides summarized and rejected Averroes’ position in Milḥamot II.2, p. 95.
Milḥamot II.2, p. 95.
Milḥamot II.2, p. 94.
Ibid.
Milḥamot II.2, pp. 94–95.
Milḥamot II.6, p. 104.
Blumberg, op. cit., p. 43.
Blumberg, op. cit., p. 46.
Milḥamot II.6, p. 106.
Ibid.
Milḥamot II.6, pp. 105–106.
In elucidating the process of prophecy, Samuelson employs the analogy of a radio station which transmits messages from a great distance. These messages can be received by anybody who satisfies the requisite criteria, ie has a strong enough receiver, has no local competing stations, etc. See Samuelson, op. cit. pp. 285–6.
Samuelson discusses Gersonides’ example in his introductory comments to Wars. Cf. Wars, pp. 50, 238.
Wars III.5, p. 286.
Milḥamot VI, Pt. 2, ch. 13, p. 460.
Milḥamot VI, Pt. 2, ch. 13, p. 461.
Ibid. “It is likely that a prophet may be tested completely if (the predicted event) does not occur. Then it can be truly seen that he is not a prophet; for if the good was ordained from the aspect of the heavenly bodies, it is unlikely that it would not occur. However, if the (predicted) good does occur, this is not sufficient to show that he is a prophet, for it is possible that it be conveyed in divination or in a dream”.
Milḥamot VI, Pt. 2, ch. 13, p. 461.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Gersonides discusses this example in Milḥamot VI, Pt. 2, ch. 13, pp. 461–462. An analogous discussion occurs in his Commentary on the Pentateuch, Exodus 32:10, Venice 1547.
Ibid.
Touati, op. cit., p. 463.
Milḥamot II.2, p. 94.
For recent discussions of the status of conditionals, cf. the collection of articles edited by E. Sosa, Causation and Conditionals, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1975.
Cf. J. Pollock, Subjunctive Reasoning, D. Reidel, Dordrecht 1976, pp. 25–44 for these and other examples.
For recent discussion of this prophecy in late scholastic sources, cf. R. M. Adams, ‘Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil’, American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977), pp. 109–117. In this paper, Adams is concerned primarily with the formulations of Suarez and Molina.
Cf. Abraham Ibn Daud, Sefer-ha-Emunah ha-Ramah, ed. by S. Weil, Frankfurt A. M., 1852, II vi, 2 p. 97. In this work, Ibn Daud develops a view of divine omniscience similar to that of Gersonides; although he does not fully expand the implications of his theory with respect to prophecy, it is interesting to note this one implication. Pines has suggested a possible influence between Ibn Daud and Gersonides; cf S. Pines, op. cit., pp. 91ff.
Pollock, op. cit., pp. 31ff.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1985 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Rudavsky, T. (1985). Divine Omniscience, Contingency and Prophecy in Gersonides. In: Rudavsky, T. (eds) Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy. Synthese Historical Library, vol 25. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7719-9_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7719-9_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-8395-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-7719-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive