Abstract
This Chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part I will examine some of the features of Kant’s theory of objective experience. In the second part I will examine some of the features of Popper’s theory of objective experience and, at the same time, compare his theory with Kant’s. In the course of these comparisons I will thus be able to refer to those features of Kant’s theory previously selected for comparison and examined in part one, without having to interrupt the comparison itself with my reconstruction of vexed Kantian issues.
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© 1985 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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De C. Fernandes, S.L. (1985). Our Cognitive Grasp of an Objective World. In: Foundations of Objective Knowledge. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 86. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7704-5_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7704-5_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-8402-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-7704-5
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