Saying that one knows that something is the case need not be confused with knowing that something is the case. (To avoid excessive repetitions of the sentence nominal, ‘that something is the case’, I shall also speak of knowing that p, or knowing p, where the letter ‘p’ is a dummy for some appropriately formed sentence or sentence nominal, and including expressions customarily incorporated into SNEAE, such as ‘Jan. 23rd is Hilbert’s birthday’, ‘2 + 2 = 4’, and so forth. (There is no reason to confuse, and good reason not to confuse, ‘2 + 2 = 4’ with ‘Two plus two equals four’.)33 Furthermore, again in the interest of brevity, I shall also speak of p’s being true, or false, or in doubt and so forth, even though I would not suggest that sentences are the bearers of truth, the subject of doubt and so forth. A remark to the effect that p is true is to be taken merely as a succinct way of saying that what is said in uttering p under appropriate conditions is true.)
KeywordsIdentical Twin Philosophic Discourse Chapter VIII Epistemic Position Moral Position
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