Abstract
I Know that p if and only if p is true, and I am in a position in which any possibility of my being in error with respect top may safely be discounted. If a skeptic claims that there is no position which I can be in, in which there is no possibility of error, I agree. No one is, or ever is, infallible. But serious skeptical problems are posed by the claim that no one can ever be in a position in which the possibility of error may safely be discounted, thus by claims that, for any given p,there is no position that is safe with respect to p. Or, more simply, for any given p,no one ever knows, or ever can know, whether or not p.
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© 1984 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Ziff, P. (1984). Skepticism. In: Epistemic Analysis. Synthese Library, vol 173. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7697-0_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7697-0_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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