• Paul Ziff
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 173)


One speaks of knowing a variety of matters: one may know George, that giraffes have four stomachs, how to swim, the proof, a way to do it, the answer, what the problem is and so forth. Knowing that p, on virtually all accounts, requires that p be true. But neither knowing George nor knowing how to swim seem to have anything to do with truth. Why not?There is an easy answer to this question that one should not, cannot, accept unless one is driven to it as a last resort, namely, that ‘know’ has a multiplicity of meanings and this remarkable polysemy is activated by the diverse linguistic environments in which the verb occurs. The principle being appealed to here is what I have elsewhere called “Occam’s eraser”: do not multiply dictionary entries beyond necessity.52


True Belief False Statement Local Coherence Great Coherence Coherent Conception 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1984

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul Ziff
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of North Carolina at Chapel HillUSA

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