One speaks of knowing a variety of matters: one may know George, that giraffes have four stomachs, how to swim, the proof, a way to do it, the answer, what the problem is and so forth. Knowing that p, on virtually all accounts, requires that p be true. But neither knowing George nor knowing how to swim seem to have anything to do with truth. Why not?There is an easy answer to this question that one should not, cannot, accept unless one is driven to it as a last resort, namely, that ‘know’ has a multiplicity of meanings and this remarkable polysemy is activated by the diverse linguistic environments in which the verb occurs. The principle being appealed to here is what I have elsewhere called “Occam’s eraser”: do not multiply dictionary entries beyond necessity.52
KeywordsTrue Belief False Statement Local Coherence Great Coherence Coherent Conception
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