Consequences and Alternative Methodologies

  • G. L. Pandit
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 73)


If my arguments (in Chapters 2 and 3) concerning the epistemic/developmental structures of our knowledge and its growth have followed any pattern at all, then these must now be developed further according to my thesis (in Chapter 3) that a sound methodological model of epistemic appraisal must be embedded in a sound model of epistemic structure, the latter entailing the former. It is possible to do this in more precise terms once it is clear that there is an intimate connection between the two problems of epistemic structure and epistemic appraisal. So intimate is the connection indeed that TE and the current methodologies, which are a variation on the former, treat them as a single problem. This is the familiar, but currently controversial, problem of the unit of scientific appraisal. This fact may explain why there is no explicit discussion of any such thing as what I call the problem of epistemic structure. But the complexity of the problem is revealed only if we realize that every methodology of epistemic appraisal must be embedded in a corresponding theory of the epistemic structure.


Scientific Revolution Normal Science Radical Translation Alternative Methodology Scientific Research Programme 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1983

Authors and Affiliations

  • G. L. Pandit
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of DelhiIndia

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