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Computational Models of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Sentences

  • Robert C. Moore
  • Gary G. Hendrix
Part of the Synthese Language Library book series (SLAP, volume 16)

Abstract

Over the years the psychology of belief and the semantics of belief sentences have provided a seemingly endless series of fascinating problems for linguists, psychologists, and philosophers. Despite all the attention that has been paid to these problems, however, there is little agreement on proposed solutions, or even on what form solutions should take. We believe that a great deal of light can be shed on the problems of belief by studying them from the viewpoint of computational models of the psychological processes and states associated with belief. The role of computational theories and computational models in the cognitive sciences always seems to be a matter of controversy. When such theories and models are discussed by non-computer scientists, they are frequently presented in a rather apologetic tone, with assurances and caveats that, of course, this is all oversimplified and things couldn’t really be like this, but ...

Keywords

Truth Condition Natural Kind Propositional Attitude Competent Speaker Internal Language 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1982

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert C. Moore
  • Gary G. Hendrix

There are no affiliations available

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