The Potato War

Abstract

Like every prince of his day Joseph had received a very thorough military education. Indeed, in spite of his lifelong love for the army he later had reason to complain that other equally important subjects had been neglected in favor of the study of warfare. So far as we can judge from those of his copybooks which have been preserved, one theme was constantly drummed into him by his tutors, namely that attack was the key to military success. There are many passages laboriously copied out by the perhaps fifteen-year old crown prince which maintain that the defense of fortified places is extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible because of the superiority of the methods of attack over those of defense. The best the defenders can hope to achieve is to slow up the advance of the attackers.¹ Yet in the war with Prussia which Joseph now, in the summer of 1778, saw himself constrained to fight the Austrians devoted themselves almost entirely to the defense of fortified places or lines and did not undertake one offensive operation worthy of notice. This was not the consequence of some startling revolt of the Emperor against the teachings of his youth but rather the result of the military philosophy which had come to prevail in the Austrian general staff. This, in turn, was the direct issue of the campaigns of the Seven Years’ War.