Abstract
Bergson’s sharp distinction between intelligence and intuition had, he thought, saved metaphysics and the domain of the spirit from the attacks of Kant and of the scientific positivists. Can such a distinction be justified, however? Bergson believed that it could and that the evidence for it is to be found in the facts of human history, and particularly in the history of the evolution of life.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Creative Evolution, pp. 138–40 (O. 612–13).
Ibid., pp. 368–70 (O. 806–07).
Georges Cattaui, “Henri Bergson, His Work and Influence,” Colosseum, III (December, 1936), p. 283. For the sources of Bergson’s theory of evolution see Ben-Ami Sharfstein, Roots of Bergson’s Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943 ), Ch. V.
The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, p. 91 (O. io61).
For Bergson’s critique of mechanism and finalism see Creative Evolution, pp. 36–48 (O. 52535). See also The Two sources, pp. soi—o6 (O. 1069–73) where Bergson summarizes the shortcomings of both of these doctrines and outlines the data which led him to his theory of the élan vital and creative evolution. Cf. Écrits et Paroles. III, pp. 603–04.
Creative Evolution, pp. 39–40, 223 (O. 528–29, 685). In his critique of finalism Bergson has in view especially the doctrine of Leibniz which he characterizes as nothing but an “inverted mechanism.” Ibid. P. 39 (O. 528).
Ibid., pp. 51–52 (O. 538).
Life and Consciousness, Mind-Energy (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1920), p. 25 (O. 829).
Ibid., pp. 27–28 (O. 831).
The Two Sources, pp. 237–38 (O. 1186–87).
Ibid., pp. 101–02 (O. 1069–70). Jankélévitch compares Bergson’s“ évolution en gerbe” with the “évolution rectiligne” of the finalists and mechanists. Henri Bergson, p. 15O.
Creative Evolution, pp. 181–82 (O. 649).
Ibid., 98, 247–48 (O. 578, 705). For Bergson’s use of images in the development of his doctrine of the élan vital see Lydie Adolphe, “Bergson et l’élan vital,” Les Etudes Bergsoniennes, Vol. III, pp. 79–138.
Life and Consciousness, Mind-Energy, p. 23 (O. 828); Creative Evolution, p. 251 (O. 708).
Creative Evolution, p. 251 (O. 708): “The impetus of life, of which we are speaking, consists in a need of creation. It cannot create absolutely, because it is confronted with matter, that is to say with the movement that is the inverse of its own. But it seizes upon this matter, which is necessity itself, and strives to introduce into it the largest possible amount of indetermination and liberty.”
Ibid., p. 245 (O. 703).
Ibid., p. 239 (O. 698).
Ibid., p. 245 (O. 703).
Ibid.. pp. 247–48 (O. 705). For a fuller discussion of the genesis of matter and its role in the evolution of life see pp. 236–71 (O. 696–725). In a brief but informative study Angèle KremerMarietti shows how Bergson’s psychology of perception throws light on his conception of matter. See “Bergson métaphysicien de la matière,” Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie (May 1959), PP. 177–81.
Ibid., p. 254 (O. 710).
Ibid., pp. 98–103 (O. 578–81).
Ibid., p. 102 (O. 582). See also pp. 254–55 (O. 711).
Ibid., pp. 203–05 (O. 583–84).
Ibid., p. 143 (O. 616).
Ibid., p. 135 (O. 609). For a summary of Bergson’s doctrine of the élan vital and the evolution of species see “Life and Consciousness,” Mind-Energy, pp. 7–31 (O. 818–33).
Ibid., p. 266 (O. 721). Italics in the original.
Ibid., p. 270 (O. 723–24).
Ibid., p. 271 (O. 724–25). Emil C. Wilm regards this striking image of life’s struggle with matter as a “grotesque flight of rhetoric.” Henri Bergson: A Study in Evolution ( New York: Sturgis and Walton Co. 1914 ). p. 557.
Ibid., p. 270 (O. 724).
Life and Consciousness, Mind-Energy, p. 25 (O. 829).
Creative Evolution, pp. 127–29 (O. 604).
Ibid., pp. 151, 185 (O. 623, 652).
Ibid., p. 267 (O. 722).
Ibid., pp. 135–36, 143 (O. 610, 616).
Ibid., p. 139 (O. 6,3). Italics in the original.
Ibid., p. 153 (O. 625). Italics in the original.
Ibid., p. 161 (O. 632): “Thus, all the elementary forces of the intellect tend to transform matter into an instrument of action, that is, in the etymological sense of the word, into an organ. Life, not content with producing organisms, would fain give them as an appendage inorganic matter itself, converted into an immense organ by the industry of the living being. Such is the initial task it assigns to intelligence. That is why the intellect always behaves as if it were fascinated by the contemplation of inert matter. It is life looking outward, putting itself outside itself, adopting the ways of unorganized nature in principle, in order to direct them in fact.”
Ibid. p. 157 (O. 628). Italics in the original.
Ibid., pp. 140–41 (O. 614–15). See pp. 335–76 (O. 609–44) for a detailed comparison of instinct and intelligence. See also The Two Sources, pp. 107–09, 198–99 (O. 1074, 1152–54 ).
Ibid.. p. 151 (O. 623).
See ibid., pp. 159–60 (O. 63o) where Bergson explains how the intellect seeks to go beyond its original function of fabricating instruments.
Ibid., pp. 167–68 (O. 636–37). Jankélévitch provides a helpful analysis of the relationship between instinct and intelligence in his work, Henri Bergson, pp. 144–66. On p. 16o he states: “Cette alternative nous fait bien sentir l’opposition foncière de l’instinct et de l’intelligence. L’instinct est irrémédiablement limité parce qu’il ne se sait pas connaissant. Nous dirions voluntiers qu’il est en soi, mais non encore pour soi. L’intelligence au contraire, capable de fabriquer ‘des outils à faire des outils,’ possède par nature une puissance de dédoublement infini qui lui permet de refléchir sur soi, et trouve dans le langage un moyen de séparer définitivement l’intelligence de ses objets. L’instinct est extatique, c’est-à-dire inconscient, puisqu’il n’a pas encore projeté hors de soi, dans l’univers des abstractions, un objet problématique et distinct de lui-même ”
Ibid., P. 175 (O. 644).
Ibid., p. 176 (O. 645). See also The Two Sources, pp. 237–38 (O. 1186–87).
Ibid., pp. 577–78 (O. 645–46). Despite the close relationship between instinct and intuition Bergson does not wish to identify the two. Instinct is a debasement of intuition. It is like intuition in that it is closer to life than intelligence but it is not reflective. Protesting the misinterpretation of his doctrine on this point Bergson says, “How could certain people have mistaken my meaning? To say nothing of the kind of person who would insist that my `intuition’ was instinct or feeling. Not one line of what I have written could lend itself to such an interpretation. And in everything I have written there is assurance to the contrary: my intuition is reflection.” See “Introduction (Part II),” Creative Mind, p. 103 (O. 1328 ).
Ibid., p. 178 (O. 646).
Ibid., pp. 267–68 (O. 721–22).
The Two Sources, P. 49 (O. 1023 ).
Ibid., p. 42 (O. 1018–19).
Ibid., p. 49 (O. 1023).
Ibid., p. 228 (O. 1178): “In reality, the task of the great mystic is to effect a radical transformation of humanity by setting an example. The object could be attained only if there existed in the end what should theoretically have existed in the beginning, a divine humanity.”
Ibid., p. 224 (O. 1175).
Ibid., pp. 298–99 (O. 1239).
Ibid., p. 299 (O. 1239).
Ibid., p. 300 (O. 1240). See Pierre Mesnard, “La doctrine de l’Héroisme Morale considerée comme Clef de voûte de la Philosophie Bergsonienne,” Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie (May 1959), pp. 229–33.
Ibid., p. 306 (O. 1245).
One year prior to the publication of The Two Sources Bergson expressed his purpose in these words, “ce que ie dirai dans ce travail, c’est ce que i’ai été amené à penser de l’origine et des fondements de la morale, et non pas ce qui est à faire.” Immediately before its appearance he said, “Mon livre traite de l’origine du sentiment moral et religieux.” Jacques Chevalier, Entretiens avec Bergson, pp. 145. 15o. Italics mine.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1970 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Gallagher, I.J. (1970). The Evolutionary Background of Morality. In: Morality in Evolution. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7573-7_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7573-7_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-017-0034-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-7573-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive