Abstract
The first question confronting any choice-of-law methodology is: why should a forum ever bother to consider applying foreign laws? Traditional thinking has identified several reasons allegedly explaining the desirability or expediency of occasionally resorting to foreign laws. Among the most familiar of these are the following: obedience to constitutional or statutory mandate and the compulsion of precedent; judicial justice; economic and social policies; the jurisprudential conception of law; political ideologies (e.g., the concept of nationality); considerations pertaining to international relations — comity, reciprocity, sense of universalism.1
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References
See Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility (1945), in Selected Readings On Conflict Of Laws 48, 49, 52 (compiled by the Association of American Law Schools, 1956 — hereinafter cited as Aals Readings).
See Cavers, Comment: The Two “Local Law” Theories (1950), in Aals Readings 124, 125.
See Rheinstein, Book Review, Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 370 (1965).
See Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 Yale L. J. 1087, 1105, 1116 (1956).
The traditional principle of “legislative jurisdiction” is currently endorsed by Briggs as a cornerstone of his “institutional” approach to conflict of laws. See Briggs, An Institutional Approach to Conflict of Laws: “Law and Reason” Versus Professor Ehrenzweig, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 29 (1964).
Katzenbach, supra note 5, at 1097.
See generally Dicey and Morris Conflict Of Laws (8th ed. 1967). It is not at all surprising that Dicey, usually considered an adherent of Austinian Positivism, was inclined to endorse such territorialist ideas. His version of the vested rights doctrine, however, is said to display both positivist (effectiveness, convenience) and non-positivist (justice in particular cases) notions. See Graveson, Philosophical Aspects of the English Conflict of Laws, 78 L. Q. REV. 337, 344 (1962).
See generally Beale Conflict Of Laws (1935); Restatement, Conflict Of Laws (1934); Beale, Conflict Of Laws (1916).
See, e.g., Slater v. Mexican Nat’l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
See Wolff, Private International Law 3 (2d ed. 1950); Cf. Currie, Selected Essays On The Conflict Of Laws 458 n. 30 (1963).
See Graveson, supra note 8, at 345.
See SCHMITTnoFF, The English Conflict Of Laws (3d ed. 1954).
Graveson, supra note 8, at 345.
See Currie, supra note 12, at 582; Katzenbach, supra note 5, at 1116.
See Cheatham, Sources of Rules for Conflict of Laws (1941), in Aals Readings 133, 135, 136.
See Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale L.J. 736, 747–48 (1924).
Baxter, Choice of Law, 42 CAN. B. REV. 46, 51 (1964).
See Rheinstein, supra note 4, at 369.
See Sohn, New Bases for Solution of Conflict of Laws Problems, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 978 (1942).
Hancock, `In the Parish of St. Mary le Bow, in the Ward of Cheap“ Choice-ufLaw Problems Resolved by Statutory Construction: The Charitable Testamentary Gift Cases, 16 STAN. L. REV. 561, 567 (1964).
Von Mehren and Trautman, The Law Of Multistate Problems 166 (1965).
For a brief description of the typical “jurisdiction selecting” rule see Cavers, The Choice-Of-Law Process 9 n. 24 (1965). See generally, on the formal structure, models and characteristics of traditional rules in Baxter, supra note 19. See von Mehren, The Renvoi and its Relation to Various Approaches to the Choice-of-Law Problem, XXth Century Comparative And Conflicts Law 380, 385 (Nadelmann, von Mehren and Hazard, eds. 1961).
See Cavers, supra note 24, at 65.
In the sense of making “... the result reached in a particular case independent of the forum in which it is brought.” Griswold, In Reply to Mr. Cowan’s Views of Renvoi, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 257, 261 (1939). See Cook, An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1943), in Aals Readings 97, 99; von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 23, at 62; von Mehren, supra note 24, at 385.
“If... [certainty and uniformity] are to be revalued, their deflation will carry with it the chief arguments on behalf of mechanical rules for choice of law.” Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem (1933), in Aals Readings 101, 124.
See Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies (1938) in Aals Readings 213, 214.
Cf. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924), in Aals Readings 71, 96. Even Currie concedes that “The choice-of-law rule provides a convenient rule of thumb for the expeditious disposition of perplexing cases.” Currie, supra note 12, at 53 n. 126.
“It is... undeniably true that uniformity of result should be one of the primary objectives... [but] while it is a basic and ever-present desideratum in conflict-of-laws cases, is one that should at times be made to yield to stronger considerations.” Currie, supra note 12, at 101. Id. at 120, 138.
“.. [R]ules cannot bring certainty and predictability to a subject in which these values do not exist.” Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 law and contemp. Prob. 679, 681 (1963).=
That much is acknowledged even by contemporary European commentators. See, e.g., Neuhaus, Legal Certainty Versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws, 28 law and con-temp. Prob. 795, 800 (1963).
See Cavers, supra note 27, at 117. The author proceeds to suggest that the traditional “... indifference to the disposition of individual cases is atypical in the profession and is strongly suggestive of a defense mechanism born of repeated failures to achieve the certainty and uniformity desired.” Id. at 118–19.
Currie, supra note 12, at 120. Id. at 159.
“Bad law makes hard cases. The hypnotic power of the idea of territorial jurisdiction and vested rights is not to be underestimated.” Id. at 99. “. [T]here is no doubt that to a considerable extent... [conventional dogma] has been and is taken seriously.” Id. at 614.
See Ehrenzweig, A Treatise On The Conflict Of Laws 313 (1962).
“A sensitive and ingenious court can detect an absurd result and avoid it; I am inclined to think that this has been done more often than not...” Currie, supra note 12, at 181.
Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.REv. 267, 300–302 (1966).
E.g., the place of contracting and place of performance rules in the sphere of contracts. See Kramer, Interests and Policy Clashes in Conflict of Laws, 13 Rutgers l. Rev. 523, 538 (1959).
E.g., the validation principle in consensual transactions.
E.g., the English concept of the “proper law” of contracts.
See, e.g., Levy v. Daniels’ U.-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 Atl. 163 (1928).
See, e.g.,Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P. 2d 944 (1953).
See Currie, supra note 12, at 184 where the author brands the tool of characterization as a display of “juridical gymnastics.” For illustrations of judicial use of primary characterization in conflicts instances see Leflar, Choice of Law: Torts: Current Trends (1953), in Aals Readings 561, 564–65.
See 2 Rabel, The Conflict Of Laws: A Comparative Study 251 (2d ed. 1960).
See Ehrenzweig, supra note 38, at 352.
Namely, including the conflicts rules of the foreign governing system.
See, e.g.,Ehrenzweig, supra note 38, at 314.
See Leflar, supra note 48, at 571; Prosser, Interstate Publication (1953), in Aals Readings 585, 593.
See Currie, supra note 12, at 50.
Or its continental companion of “fraud on the law.”
On the local-public-policy doctrine as an escape device see generally Paulsen and Sovern, “Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws, 56 Comm. L. REV. 969 (1956).
But see Currie, Ehrenzweig and the Statute of Frauds: An Inquiry Into the “Rule of Validation”, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 243, 244 (1965) where the author frankly acknowledges that “I dare not claim that these cases demonstrate that, as a matter of living law, cases are decided on the basis of the governmental interests involved, though many of these turn out to be consistent with that analysis.”
Ehrenzweig, supra note 38, at 353.
Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71, 161 (1928).
“On the whole is it not much simpler to proceed on the assumption that judges mean what they say? It also has the advantage of being generally true, and even put at its lowest is how the doctrine of precedent normally works.” Graveson, Book Review, Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws, 79 L. Q. REV. 441, 443 (1963).
See Cavers, supra note 27, at 122.
Compare, Currie, supra note 57, at 244: “All too often the results seem directed by devout and orthodox commitment to the fundamentalist theology of territorialism and vested rights...” with Hancock, supra note 22, at 625 n. 199: “... while the courts have often repeated the conventional formulas... the opinions are also replete with statements regarding the policies of particular domestic laws and the bearing of those policies upon the question of choice.”
See Childers, Toward the Proper Law of the Tort, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 336, 347 (1962).
Since not infrequently the real reasons may be covered up by conventional apologetics via the “... use of fallacious reasoning to reconcile a desirable functional result with an antiquated but respected `rule of law’.” Hancock, supra note 22, at 581. For an interesting post mortem analysis of a court decision performed by one of the judges who actually decided the case, see Tate, Book Review, Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws, 39 Tn. L. REV. 163, 174 (1964). Judge Tate readily concedes a governmental-interest rationale as the real underlying reason (“... although as... a member of the deciding court I did not recognize it at the time...”) of an opinion couched in traditional abstractions.
Kramer, supra note 43, at 538.
See Ehrenzweig, supra note 38, at 326; Leflar, supra note 42, at 302–303.
Hughes, Duties to Trespassers: A Comparative Survey and Revaluation, 68 YALE . J. 633, 695 (1959).
Cavers, supra note 24, at 65. This phenomenon has been characterized as “... the anomaly of the blindfold test”-Cavers, supra note 27, at 109 and is in flagrant defiance of the “simple truth” that “... all conflicts relate to rules or groups of rules rather than to legal orders as such.” Ehrenzweig, supra note 38, at 310.
“The court is not idly choosing a law; it is determining a controversy. How can it choose wisely without considering haw that choice will affect that controversy?” Cavers, supra note 27, at 112.
See Currie, Selected Essays On The Conflict Of Laws 126 (1963); Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 Law and Contemp. Prob. 706, 726 (1963). This is all the more deplorable if one accepts Currie’s reiteration that “The basic problem in conflict of laws is to reconcile or resolve the conflicting interests of different states...” Id. at 163. See id. at 178. Incidentally, on occasion one encounters traditionalists who employ in their writings the terminology of “governmental policies” but totally subordinate it to a pre-conceived system-pointing formula. See, e.g.,Briggs, Utility of the Jurisdictional Principle in a Policy Centered Conflict of Laws (1953), in Aals Readings 198, 204.
The conventional broad legal categories of “contracts,” “torts” etc. on which the traditional system builds are increasingly losing favor in contemporary juridical thinking. The whole conception of a generalized, symmetric classification of legal issues seems in large measure anachronistic and functionally of no great significance to the legal apparatus. Contemporary complex policy issues cannot adequately be accommodated within the narrow confines of such classification.
Cf. Currie, supra note 72, at 121, 627 where the author reiterates that any attempt at a construction of a systematic, universal body of choice-of-law rules is inherently futile and doomed to failure, much as the classic ambition of geometricians to square the circle.
Restatement, Conflict Of Laws (1934). Its reporter, quite naturally, was Prof. Beale, the high priest of traditional thinking throughout the first half of this century in the United States.
Currie, supra note 72, at 179, 195 n. 22; von Mehren and Trautman, The Law Of Multistate Problems 62 (1965).
The arbitrariness stems from the simple fact that the process of territorial localization of the birthplace of an “obligatio” inevitably dictates that “... a single feature of an often complicated transaction had to be fixed upon as the only significant one.” Von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 77, at 180.
`Because the dogmatic framework is not adequate to contain the reality to which it is addressed, an element of irrationality emerges.“ Id. at 78. Irrationality in the administration of law may have the propensity of fostering public confusion, frustration and disrespect for the law.
Cavers, supra note 27, at 109.
See the following picturious description: “The realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon.” Prosser, supra note 53.
Ehrenzweig, supra note 38, at 548.
Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L. J. 1087, 1105 (1956).
Von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 77, at 302.
Cijrrie, supra note 72, at 52.
See generally Cook, The Logical And Legal Bases Of The Conflict Of Laws (1942). The local law theory has usually been attributed to both W. W. Cook and Judge Learned Hand. It was, however, suggested that there were in effect two distinct versions of this theory, one identified with Cook and the other with Judge Hand. The latter version was criticized as still tainted with Vested Rights conceptuality. See Cavers, Comment: The Two “Local Law” Theories (1950) in Aals Readings 124, 127. For a formulation of the Local Law theory by an English writer see Cheshire, Private International Law 8–9 (7th ed. 1965).
Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924), in Aals Readings 71, 81. Incidentally, a very similar idea is prevailing in current Italian conflicts thinking where the function of choice-of-law rules is envisaged as one of “... supervis[ingl the creation of special rules of private law, modeled on those of the `governing’ foreign order, for the legal assessment of relationships with one or more `foreign elements’.” De Nova, New Trends in Italian Private International Law, 28 law and con-temp. Prob. 808, 815 (1963).
The ideas of Cook and Lorenzen “... are still harnessed to the old task of devising (or justifying) rules for selecting the appropriate jurisdiction whose law should govern a given case...” Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem (1933), in Aals Readings 101, 105.
Cook, An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1943), in Aals Readings 97, 101.
See generally Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 736 (1924).
Cavers himself squarely concedes not furnishing the judicial branch with specific, articulate guidance which goes further than a general admonition recommending .. the adoption... of an approach fundamentally different from that which seems generally to have been pursued by the courts...“ Cavers, supra note 92, at 121.
See, e.g.,Restatement, Conflict Of Laws §§ 377, 378 (1934); Leflar, supra note 48; Reese, Comment on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLuM. L. REV. 1251, 1254 (1963). RABEL, supra note 49, adopts all along the line a strict lex loci delicti approach with regard to all aspects of tort liability, including: delictual capacity; causation, fault and contributory negligence; the proper parties to litigation; the impact of family relations between the parties; vicarious liability; damages and other remedies; survival of actions; burden-of-proof presumptions; and specific statutes of limitations.
See generally Rabel, supra note 49, at 301–35.
Restatement, Conflict Of Laws § 377 (1934). See Leflar, supra note 48, at 561.
See Katzenbach, supra note 83, at 1121. For a classic formulation of the rule in terms of a “... cause of action [which] can be given only by the law of the place where the tort was committed,” see 2 Beale, Conflict Of Laws § 378.1 (1935). Mr. Justice Holmes commended the lex loci delicti rule as a logical derivative of his obligatio version of the vested rights doctrine — see, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914); Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912); Slater v. Mexican Nat’l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
See, e.g.,Reese, supra note 101, at 1254; Comment, 61 CoLUM. L. REV. 1497, 1509 (1961).
See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 72, at 699.
Rabel, The Conflict Of Laws: A Comparative Study 252 (2d ed. 1960). But see Currie, supra note 72, at 703: “... the concern of the state is with the people involved rather than the scene of the activity.” Incidentally, observe that the “submission” rationale militates strongly in favor of a “place of conduct” rather than a “place of injury” localization of a tort.
See Rabel, supra note 107, at 253.
See Currie, Book Review, Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws, 1964, Duke L. J. 424, 427.
“Of all choice-of-law rules, the one which United States courts have most widely accepted and universally applied is the rule governing liability for tort by the law of the place of wrong’...” Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems — Torts, 48 Cornell L. Q. 215 (1963).
E.g. characterization designed to exclude issues such as survival of actions and intrafamily immunity from the reach of the tort category.
On the shaky position of the rule in recent American judicial decisions see, e.g., Note, Conflict of Laws-Torts-the Passing of Lex Loci Delicti, 19 ARK. L. REV. 168 (1965); Comment, Choice of Law in a Physical Tort, 14 DE PAUL L. REV. 419 (1965). But see Chappell, Lex Loci Delicti and Babcock v. Jackson, 7 W. and M. L. REV. 249, 257 (1966); LaBrum, The Fruits of Babcock and Seider: Injustice, Uncertainty and Forum Shopping, 54 A.B.A.J. 747 (1968). On current trends in American tort choice of law see generally Leflar, American Conflicts Law 317–50 (1968); Cramton and Currie, Conflict Of Laws (1968).
Dicey and Morris, Conflict Of Laws 919–20 (8th ed. 1967). The future durability of this traditional rule is questionable in view of the “proper law of the tort” doctrine currently endorsed in England by, among others, Lord Denning, M.R. See the decision of the Court of Appeal in Boys v. Chaplin, [1968] 1 All E.R. 283, 286–87; Ehrenzweig, The Not So “Proper” Law of a Tort: Pandora’s Box, 17 INT’L and COMP. L. Q. 1 nn. 1, 2 (1968); Kahn-Freund, Comment, Conflict of laws — Damages for Tort, 46 CAN. B. REV. 137 (1968); Webb, Tort in the Conflict of Laws, 16 INT’L and COMP. L. Q. 1145 (1967). But see the recent decision of the House of Lords in Chaplin v. Boys, [1969] 2 All E.R. 1085, where only two of the five Law Lords were prepared to accord the “proper law” doctrine the role of a subsidiary tort choice-of-law guideline. For a comparative analysis of the English and American traditional tort choice-of-law rules, as well as other conflicts principles, see Graveson, The Comparative Evolution of Principles of the Conflict of Laws in England and the U.S.A., 99 Recueil Des Cours 25 (1960—I).
Which is limited to a handful of court decisions squarely in point.
See Machado v. Fontes, [1897] 2 Q.B. 231 (C.A.) (now overruled by the House of Lords).
See Cheshire, supra note 90, at 246.
See id. at 248; Rabel, supra note 107, at 242; Childers, supra note 65, at 344; Webb, The Conflict of Laws and the English Fatal Accidents Acts, 24 modern l. Rev. 467, 470 (1961).
Wolff, Private International Law 493 (2d ed. 1950). But see Schmitthoff, Torts Committed Abroad,27 CAN. B. REV. 816, 822, 826 (1949) where the author advances the idea of “actionability” under the lex loci. This idea has recently been adopted by a majority in the House of Lords: see Chaplin v. Boys, supra note 115.
See Childers, supra note 65, at 344.
Cf. Katzenbach, supra note 83, at 1112–13.
Monro (George) Ltd. v. American Cyanamid and Chem. Corp., [1944] 1 K.B. 432. But see Bata v. Bata, [1948] Weekly N. 366 (C.A.).
Webb and North, Thoughts on the Place of Commission of a Non-Statutory Tort, 14 INT. and COMP. L.Q. 1314 (1965). Quite surprisingly, the two co-authors purport to found this conclusion on a pseudo-functional analysis of the supposedly underlying purposes of the various torts.
L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 (Ex. Ch.).
See,e.g., Cheshire, supra note 90, at 246–47.
See, e.g., Currie, supra note 72, at 10; Drion, The Lex Loci Delicti In Retreat, in Festschrift For Orro Riese 228 (published by C. F. Müller Karlsruhe, 1964). But see Currie, supra note 72, at 723.
See,e.g., Samson v. Holden, 1963 Can. Sup. Ct. 373.
See civil appeal 180/51 Goldkorn v. Wisotzky, 8 Sup. Ct. Judgments 262; civil claim 440/58 Blowe v. State of Israel, 22 District Cts. Judgments 37.
Cheshire, supra note 90, at 240 n. 4; Rabel, supra note 107, at 235–36 n. 20.
BGH 2.2. 1961, NJW 1961 p. 731.
See Cheshire, supra note 90, at 240 n. 4; Rabel, supra note 107, at 235–36 n. 20.
For citation see Drion, supra note 128, at 230 n. 14. But see Cavers, The Choiceof-Law Process 147–48 n. 12 (1965).
For citations to text see De Nova, Current Developments of Private International Law, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 542, 552 n. 40 (1964). The Provisions of the draft are discussed in id. at 551–53.
See Cheshire, supra note 90, at 240 n. 4; Rabel, supra note 107, at 235–36 n. 20.
For citation see Drion, supra note 128, at 230 n. 15.
Quoted from McCusker, The Italian Rules of Conflict of Laws, 25 TUL. L. REV. 70, 82 (1950). According to McCusker, id. at 83, the law referred to is that “... of the place of the tort... and not... the law of the place where the damage occurred,” by which he presumably means the law of the place of tortious conduct. Cf. Ehrenzweig, A Treatise On The Conflict Of Laws 542 H. 8 (1962).
Rabel, supra note 107, at 235–36 n. 20.
An act imposing absolute liability on the possessor of the vehicle.
For an English text see 1 INT. and COMP. L. Q. 426 (1952).
Quoted from Drion, supra note 128, at 229.
Yet a strong belief has been expressed in the feasibility of the draft’s coming into effect and eventually even being expanded so as to unify the conflicts laws of an integrated European community. See De Nova, supra note 136, at 553.
Thus the Dutch Hoge Raad (High Court) invoked Dutch law in a case of a car accident in Spain involving Dutch parties travelling from Lisbon to Holland on the basis of a share-expenses arrangement. Hoge Raad April 11, 1958, Ned. Jur. 1958 467. Twenty years earlier, however, the same court referred to the law of the place of accident when dealing with a defense based on a contractual exemption clause against the claim of a dependent of a deceased passenger killed near Bangkok in an air-crash. Hoge Raad March 18, 1938, Ned. Jur. 1939 69. The two cases are discussed in Drion, supra note 128, at 231–32 n. 18.
Id. at 229 nn. 9, 10, 11.
See Cheshire, supra note 90, at 240 n. 4; Rabel, supra note 107, at 235–36 n. 20.
For citation see Drion, supra note 128, at 230 n. 12.
A striking resemblance to the English double-limb rule. For citation see id. at 231 n. 17.
See Ehrenzweig, supra note 139, at 542 n. 8; Rabel, supra note 107, at 235–36 n. 20.
For an English text see 7 Law In Eastern Europe 321 (1963).
Rajski, The New Polish Private International Law, 1965, 15 INT. and Comp. L. Q. 457, 459 (1966). The topics of jurisdiction and foreign judgments are dealt with elsewhere. For a lengthy review of the new act see id.
Of December 4, 1963 No. 97/1963.
Compare the utterly negative current American attitude to the feasibility or desirability of a codification of conflicts law: “... almost no one believes that it would be wise for a legislature... today or in the near future, to enact a conflicts code, or that such a code would or ever could be well drafted.” Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 267, 278 (1966). Civil lawyers view the question of codification differently: see Schwind, Problems of Codification of Private International Law, 17 INT’r_ and Comp. L. Q. 428 (1968).
Namely, setting a hierarchy of connecting factors primarily where the traditional exclusive connecting factor proves to be inconsequential or futile in a particular situation. For detailed discussion of the two acts see De Nova, supra note 136, at 544–51.
Rajski, supra note 152, at 467.
See De Nova, supra note 136, at 550.
Law No. 40 of June 4, 1951. For citation to text see id. at 556 n. 53.
No. 62–041 of September 19, 1962. For citation to text see id. at 557 n. 56.
Thereby following the principle traditionally adopted in Brazil. See Rabel, supra note 107, at 235–36 n. 20.
See Ehrenzweig, supra note 139, at 542 n. 8; Cheshire, supra note 90, at 240 n. 4; Rabel, supra note 107, at 235–36 n. 20.
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Shapira, A. (1970). The Traditional Approach to Choice of Law. In: The Interest Approach to Choice of Law. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7549-2_2
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