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The Mission of Vincent Benedetti to Berlin 1864–1870 pp 38–79Cite as

Prelude to Sadowa

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Abstract

Ambassador Benedetti, upon arrival in Paris from Kissingen in mid-October, learned that the Prussian minister-president had passed through the capital on his journey to Biarritz, where he was to vacation and meet with Emperor Napoleon. As imperial envoy to the Prussian court he was no doubt interested in the forthcoming meetings on the Bay of Biscay, for they might have repercussions which could greatly influence the ambassador’s mission. Not only was Bismarck expected to try to erase the adverse effect the Gastein convention had had in France, but, more important, the talks would most likely cover future developments in the affairs of Europe. Bismarck’s courtesy calls on Rouher and Drouyn de Lhuys gave no indication as to his political projects,1 and thus Benedetti, like everyone else in Paris, could only hope ultimately to be acquainted with the content of the talks at Biarritz. Benedetti probably was disappointed by the fact that Ambassador Goltz had been invited while he himself had not been summoned to Biarritz.2 His exclusion only serves to illustrate the pronounced handicap under which he carried out his duties in Berlin. In effect, the curious methods of the emperor almost exploded the Nothombsponsored myth of the preceding fall that Benedetti was the emperor’s personal agent.

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Reference

  1. Cf. Bismarck to Goltz, Berlin, 26 November 1865, BGW, V, 327, in which Bismarck states that his calls in Paris were only made, reluctantly, for reasons of courtesy.

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  2. Both Ambassador Goltz and the legation secretary, Radowitz, accompanied the emperor as his guests to Biarritz. Cf. J. M. VON RADOWITZ, Aufzeichnungen and Erinnerungen, ed. H. Holborn (Stuttgart, 1925), I, 79, for Goltz-Bismarck dispute in Biarritz.

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  3. Perhaps as many as nine conversations constitute the Napoleon-Bismarck exchange of views.

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  4. Bismarck to William I, Biarritz, 5 October 1865, APP, VI, 403–404; Sybel, IV, 213-221.

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  5. “Bismarck had come with the intention ‘to shift Napoleon’s eyes from the Rhine to Belgium.’ This attempt failed completely. Napoleon remained steadfast in his demand for compensation on the Rhine and indicated that in a form clearly comprehensible to Bismarck but without showing any interest in an understanding with Prussia. Bismarck took care not to advance further than he had to in order to recognize how Napoleon would react to overtures going further” (F. Frahm, “Biarritz,” HVj, XV, Heft 3 [19Z2], pp. 352-353); “It was no more a question of Belgium than of the Rhine provinces or any other country where French is spoken. Bismarck, despite all his ingenuity, received nothing but compliments and vague phrases” (E. Ollivier, L’Empire libéral [Paris, 1895–1918], VII, 480); “A grand conversation took place between the emperor and Bismarck, but neither one nor the other said anything to me about it. My impression is that he was received politely but quite coldly”(Merimer, II, 24r); “Bismarck reached his first political aim completely [to dispel the emperor’s reservation on the Gastein convention]. Regarding the second one [to ascertain the emperor’s intentions in case of an Austro-Prussian war], the emperor maintained an attitude of benevolent reserve toward the minister Nonetheless, Bismarck discerned that the emperor would adopt a friendly attitude vis-à-vis a Prusso-Italian alliance against Austria as well as toward the acquisition of the Elbe duchiesChrw(133). The minister also had the correct impression that the emperor counted on the superiority of the Austrian army and that he reserved for himself the role of arbiter at the appropriate moment” (W. vox Lou, Erinnerungen aus meinem Berufsleben, 1849 bis 1867 [2nd ed.; Stuttgart, 1906], pp. 78–80); “Emperor Napoleon himself told me several years later that Bismarck had promised him various compensations, but that it came to no written agreement concerning them” (K. Vitzthum von Eckstadt, London,Gastein, Sadowa, Denkwürdigkeiten 1864–1866 [Stuttgart, 1889], p. 318); Aufzeichnung von Goltz aber Bismarcks politische Gespräche in Paris and Biarritz, Otto Graf zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, Robert Heinrich Graf von der Goltz, Botschafter in Paris 1863–1869 (Oldenbourg, 1941), Pp- 403–408; Goltz to Bismarck, Paris, 18 October 1865, APP, VI, 406, ft. 4; Sybel, IV, 213–221; J. G. de Persigny, Mémoires, ed. H. d’Espagny (Paris, 1896), p. 376; Oncken, I, 69–76; BGW, V, 308–311; P. Bernstein, “Biarritz,” Year Book of the American Philosophical Society, 196o (Philadelphia, 1961), pp. 365-366; R. Fester, “Biarritz, eine Bismarck-Studie,” Deutsche Rundschau,CXIII, Heft 2 (November 1902), pp. 2x2–236; Geuss, pp. 142–151; E. Eyck, Bismarck. Leben und Werk (Erlenbach-Zürich, 1944) II, 98 ff.; ODG, VII, 114, ft. I.

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  6. Bismarck to foreign office, Paris, 3 November 1865, BGW, V, 315.

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  7. A See above ft. 2, p. 39. “At the French embassy [in Berlin, Bismarck’s] sojourn in Paris is summarized with the words: They have been very polite to Count Bismarck. They have played games with him, but he has brought nothing back, and the bad impression of the Gastein convention has not been swept away at all”’ (Hohenthal toBeust, Berlin, 10 November x865, APP, VI, ft. 2 to no. 349).

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  8. Zuylen to Cremers, Berlin, 9 November 1865, RBZ, Pruisen/ 1865, no. 934.

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  9. Nothomb to Rogier, Berlin, 9 November 1865, BAE CP, Prusse/23, Pt. I, no. 70.

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  10. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, II November 1865, FAE CP, Prusse/353 no. 154.

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  11. Same to same, Berlin, 15 November 1865, ibid., no. 155.

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  12. Same to same, Berlin, 26 November 1865, ODG, VII, 197–202.

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  13. “Benedetti assures me that if Drouyn de Lhuys had earlier been pro-Austrian he now is cured thereof” (Bismarck to Goltz, Berlin, 26 November 1865, BGW, V, 328).

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  14. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 26 November 1865, ODG, VII, 197–202.

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  15. Bismarck to Goltz, Berlin, 12 December 1865, APP, VI, 477, ft. 4 to no. 373.

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  16. The friendly relations between Bismarck and Benedetti became momentarily strained over a protocol matter on the occasion of the marriage of Princess Alexandrine, daughter of Prince Albert of Prussia, to Duke William of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. Both the French and the British ambassadors left the wedding banquet as the result of differences over the seating arrangements (Friedrich III., p. 404).

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  17. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 14 December 1865, FAE CP, Prusse/353, no. 169.

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  18. King Leopold I had died at Laeken on 10 December.

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  19. Goltz to Bismarck, Paris, 9 December 1865, APP, VI, 483–485.

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  20. Chotek to Mensdorff, Berlin, 16 December 1865, Hhsta, Preussen/89, no. 75; see above ft. 5, p. 42.

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  21. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 4 January x866, FAE CP, Prusse/354 no. r.

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  22. Same to same, Berlin, 14 January 1866, FAE MD, Autriche/67.

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  23. It is rather interesting to note that during January Bismarck, in his correspondence with Goltz, stressed the difficulties which might develop for France in her relations with the United States over the Mexico affair. For Prussia it would spell less concern over French intervention in Germany, while forcing France to cultivate Prussian sympathies. Bismarck expressedly forbade Goltz to exert a restraining influence upon the American minister in Paris (GEuss, p. 152).

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  24. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 15 January 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/354 no. 5.

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  25. H. von Cuappuis, Bei Hof und im Felde (Frankfurt, 1902), P. 45.

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  26. Bismarck to William I, Berlin, 31 January r866, Wilheml I., Kaiser-und-KanzlerBriefe, ed. J. Penzler (Leipzig, 1900), pp. 67–68.

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  27. Bylandt to Cremers, Berlin, 12 February 1866, RBZ, Pruisen/ 1866, no. 33.

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  28. “Both Benedettis have the best of intentions, but cannot overcome their parvenu airs” (Friedrich III., p. 409). Cf. C. Tschudi, Augusta, Empress of Germany, tr. E. M. Cope (London, 1900), p. 153, who states that the queen was always very favorably disposed toward the French ambassador.

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  29. According to Benedetti, the breach of protocol occurred when the guests were passing from the reception room into the ballroom. He insisted that, since he was the highest ranking foreign envoy, his wife should have been escorted to the ballroom immediately following the royal family and ahead of the ladies of the realm. Negligence on the part of the master of ceremonies had left Madame Benedetti without an escort, until Prince August of Württemberg had come to her rescue. When Benedetti inquired later in the evening of the master of ceremonies, Count Rudolf Stillfried d’Alcántara, if there had not occurred a breach of protocol, the count averred that Madame Benedetti was ranked with and not necessarily ahead of the ladies of the realm. The ambassador felt insulted by this remark and, next day, addressed an official note to Bismarck, setting forth the occurrence of the previous evening and announcing his decision to remain absent from court ceremonies until apologies had been tendered. Bismarck was disturbed by this new incident, and he informed the king of the contents of the note. William, acknowledging the slight to Madame Benedetti, disavowed the actions and remarks of the master of ceremonies and asked the minister-president to present his personal apologies to the ambassador. He was to tell Benedetti that the master of ceremonies would be reprimanded and ordered to apologize. Although Count Stillfried never did tender his personal apologies, Benedetti attended the last major ball at the court. Perhaps the sensitive ambassador was mollified by the fact that Madame Benedetti, attending the ball of Prince Charles alone on the previous evening, had been offered the arm of the prince himself (Bylandt to Cremers, Berlin, 12 February 1866, RBZ, Pruisen/r866, no. 33; same to same, 16 February 1866, ibid., no. 36).

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  30. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, r1 February 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/354, no. 20.

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  31. Same to same, Berlin, 14 February 1866, MMP (2d ed.; Paris, 1872), P. 30.

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  32. Ibid., p. 31. Cf. Prince Napoleon to Queen Sophie of Holland, Paris, 11 February 1866, France. Commission des Papiers Saisies Aux Tuileries, Papiers et correspondance de la famille impériale (Paris, 187o), I, 389–390. The prince wrote that Benedetti believed a serious conflict between Prussia and Austria was near.

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  33. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 14 February 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/354 no. 22.

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  34. Ibid. The adverse resolution of the chamber on 3 February regarding the acquisition of Lauenburg had probably strengthened Bismarck’s desire for a diplomatic victory (same to same, Berlin, 20 February 1866, ibid., no. 25).

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  35. Goltz to Bismarck, Paris, 17 February 1866, Oncken, I, go. In his interview with Goltz, Drouyn de Lhuys remarked that at present France would continue her attitude of neutrality but would have to consult her own interests at all times (Drouyn de Lhuys to Benedetti, Paris, 22 February 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/354 no. 1o).

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  36. Turckheim to Edelsheim, Berlin, 20 February 1866, APP, VI, 570–571. Cf. a remark made by the emperor to Goltz: “Only I alone know what the foreign policy of France will be, I and my minister of foreign affairs, naturally” (Goltz to Bismarck, Paris, 17 February 1866, Oncken, I, go). Cf. E. Brandenburg, Untersuchungen and Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Reichsgründung (Leipzig, 1916), PP. 475-476, who states that Bismarck knew that France hoped for an Austro-Prussian war and would endeavor to benefit from it. He repeatedly sought to ascertain Napoleon’s plans because William’s suspicion of France was a constant obstacle to Bismarck’s plans for war.

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  37. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 24 February 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/354, no. 28. Benedetti thought it probable that the legislative session would soon be closed by the king at the behest of his minister-president, who preferred not to have to reckon with the opposition of the Landtag. For the Austrian reaction to Bismarck’s pressure, see Clark, pp. 333–343

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  38. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 26 February r866, FAE CP, Prusse/354 no. 30.

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  39. Same to same, Berlin, 26 February x866, MMP, pp. 34-35.

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  40. Same to same, Berlin, z8 February 1866, ibid., pp. 35–37. Cf. I.A.A.a. 27; W. BUSCH, “Bismarck und die Entstehung des Norddeutschen Bundes,” HZ, CIII, Heft r (r9ro), pp. 52–78.

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  41. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, I March 1866, ODG, VII, 358–36o. Bismarck, on the basis of the inevitability of war with Austria, had urged that Helmuth von Moltke be sent to Italy to negotiate an alliance, the conclusion of which would not be a signal for war but a cause for increased apprehension in Vienna, forcing Austria to realize the gravity of the situation. King William approved this program and the diplomatic steps necessary to promote Prussia’s preponderance. In accord with this decision, Goltz was to convey a letter from the king to Napoleon, requesting an exchange of views between France and Prussia with the expectation of concluding an entente (Kronratsprotokoll, 28 February 1866, APP, VI, 611–616; cf. BGW, V, 386, ft.); Friedrich III., pp. 541–544; GEuss, pp.1 53-1 54 Pflanze p. 284.

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  42. Cf. V. Valentin Bismarcks Reichsgründung im Urteil englischer Diplomaten (Amsterdam, 1938), p. 279, whose belief that Benedetti, up to the time of the Luxemburg crisis, was far better informed than his British colleagues is strongly seconded by the research of the present writer.

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  43. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 3 March 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/355, no. 34.

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  44. Same to same, Berlin, 3 March 1866, ODG, VII, 368.

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  45. William I to Napoleon III, Berlin, 3 March 1866, BGW, V, 386–387.

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  46. Goltz to Bismarck, Paris, 5 March 1866, ibid., p. 389; “Regarding sympathies in the Bavarian Palatinate the emperor must be wrongly informed. In Luxemburg the sympathies of the rich in particular are perhaps oriented more toward Paris. If we start by ceding federal territory with German inhabitants, we cut off the national development of our plan” (Bismarck to Goltz, Berlin, 6 March 1866, ibid.; same to same, 9 March 1866, ibid., p. 394).

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  47. Sybel, IV, 285-288; Ollivier, VIII 23.

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  48. Goltz to Bismarck, Paris, 5 March 1866, BGW, V, 389.

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  49. Napoleon III to William I, Tuileries, 7 March 1866, Oncken, I, 98–99.

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  50. Goltz to William I, Paris, 17 March 1866, ibid., 1rr.

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  51. Benedetti to Gramont, Berlin, 9 March 1866, MMP, pp. 49-5o.

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  52. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 8 March 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/355 no. 38.

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  53. Károlyi to Mensdorff, Berlin, 8 March 1866, HHStA, Preussen/89, no. 15.

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  54. Benedetti to Gramont, Berlin, 9 March 1866, MMP, p. 49.

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  55. In hopes of seeing his policy of moderation prevail, Mensdorff made a great effort in late March to bring the influence of Queen Victoria and others to bear on King William. The so-called “Coburg intrigue” failed to achieve the desired result of driving a wedge between William and his bellicose minister-president (QDPO,V/I, 240, 292 ff., 29H-299, 302-323,380-395; BGW, V, 410–411, XIV, 710–711; Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, Deutsche Einheit. Idee und Wirklichkeit vom Heiligen Reich bis Königgrdtz [Munich, 1935–1942] IV, 335 ff.; Clark, pp. 374 ff.; Stolberg-Wernigerode, pp. 146 ff.).

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  56. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, II March 1866, ODG, VII, 407–411.

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  57. “With laudable care, Benedetti reports to Paris everything the Prussian minister-president is willing to tell him. His numerous dispatches remain most of the time unanswered” (LA GoRCE, Etudes, p. 322). Cf. Ollivier, VIII, 438, who attributes Benedetti’s ignorance about some of the emperor’s diplomatic moves to a lack of confidence in him on the part of the emperor and Drouyn de Lhuys. His analysis seems rather biased and reflects a desire to overlook serious flaws in the methods of imperial diplomacy. Cf. Valentin, p. 279; ft. 3, P. 47 above.

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  58. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 14 March 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/355 no. 42; see also F. Beiche, Bismarck and Italien. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges, 1866, “Historische Studien,” Vol. 208 (Berlin, 1931), passim.

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  59. BGW, V, 412, explanatory ft.

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  60. Govone to La Marmora, Berlin, 15 March 1866, G. Govone, Mémoires, 1848–1870, tr. M. H. Weil (Paris, 2905), P. 437; Clark, P. 344.

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  61. Cf. Bondy to Reiset, Cassel, 16 March 1866, G. Reiset, Mes souvenirs, Vol. III L’unité de l’Italie et l’unité de l’Allemagne (Paris, 2903), p. 389. Bondy had visited Benedetti in Berlin where he had been informed by the ambassador of the developments and the issues engaged between Prussia and Austria, which convinced him that Bismarck would not turn back.

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  62. Countess Gabriele Hatzfeld-Weisweiler to Mensdorff, on the railroad between Berlin and Dresden, 17 March 1866, QDPO, V/1, 313. Cf. Bylandt to Cremers, Berlin, 16 March 1866, RBZ, Pruisen/1866, no. 61, who reports that Benedetti had had very long conversations with both Bismarck and Károlyi after a party at Bismarck’s residence. Cf. Károlyi to Mensdorff, Berlin, 17 March 1866, QDPO, VII, 308.

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  63. Govone to La Marmora, Berlin, 18 March 1866, GOVONE, P. 443.

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  64. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 18 March 1866, ODG, VIII, 15–17.

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  65. Same to same, Berlin, 27 March 1866, ibid., pp. 81–82.

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  66. Ibid., p. 84. “I think I should tell you that the president of the council [Bismarck] keeps Benedetti exactly informed of the negotiations with us” (Govone to La Marmora, Berlin, 28 March 1866, GOVONE, p. 45o).

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  67. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 27 March 1866, ODG, VIII, 81–82. For text of the draft treaty, see same to same, Berlin, 28 March 1866, ibid., pp. roi-1o2.

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  68. Same to same, Berlin, 27 March 1866, ibid., pp. 81–92. The interview took place on the 27th and Bismarck treated with Barrai because Govone did not have full powers of negotiation (ibid., p. 82, ft. 3).

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  69. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 27 March 1866, ibid., p. 84.

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  70. “Although the French ambassador states that he has no instructions, it is evident that he pushes with all his force our offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia (Barrai to La Marmora, Berlin, 27 March 1866, L. Chiala, Ancora un po’ più di luce sugli eventi politici e militari dell’anno z866 [Florence, 1902], p. 90).

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  71. “I was well received by the emperorChrw(133). He thinks the signing of the treaty with Prussia useful” (Arese to La Marmora, Paris, 3o March 1866, J. Grabinski, Un ami de Napoléonlll; le comte Arese et la politique italienne sous le Second Empire [Paris, 1897], pp. 225–226); Goltz to Bismarck, Paris, 3o March 1866, Oncken, I, 121, ft. I; Ollivier, VIII, 56.

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  72. Drouyn de Lhuys to Benedetti, Paris, 3o March 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/355 no. 20.

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  73. Benedetti was able to hide for a time his intimate knowledge about the Prusso-Italian negotiations from some of his colleagues. “I have alluded once or twice in a conversation with Benedetti to the existence of the supposed treaty between Prussia and Italy, but he gave me no information which could induce a belief that he was cognizant of the terms of the treaty, or of the nature of any negociations between Count Bismarck and General Govone; on the contrary, he spoke with some sensitiveness as if the Italian envoy [Count Barral] and General Govone had withheld from him all the information on the subject of their negociations with Count Bismarck. Be this as it may, whether Benedetti has been informed or not of the negociations carried on between Count Bismarck and General Govone, or whether he has cognizance of said treaty or not, being of Italian origin, and devoted to the Italian cause, —it may be surmized that he would not view with a jealous eye any event calculated to promote the ambition of the Italian nation to acquire possession of Venetia” (Loftus to Clarendon, Berlin, 9 May 1866, PRO FO 64/594 no. 19o). “Being a Corsican by birth, patriotism led him [Benedetti]to espouse the cause of Italian unity and independence, and he was probably the more anxious and ready to do so knowing they were the sentiments of his Imperial master” (A. Loftus, Diplomatic Reminiscences, Second Series [London, 1894], I, 52). Cf. Metternich to Mensdorff, Paris, 31 March x866, Oncken, I, 123.

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  74. Goltz to Bismarck, Paris, 23 March /866, ibid., 121, ft. 1.

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  75. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin,/April 1866, ODG, VIII, 135–136.

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  76. Govone to La Marmora, Berlin, 6 April 1866, Govone, p. 457.

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  77. Ibid., p. 458. Cf. “There were no real grounds nor justification for a war between Austria and Prussia as regarded the question of the Elbe DuchiesChrw(133). So much was this the case that the French ambassador Count BenedettiChrw(133) said to me, ’Je défie â M. de Bismarck d’arriver au champs de bataille”’ (LoFTUS,I, 43).

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  78. Govone to La Marmora, Berlin, 6 April 1866, Govone, pp. 457–458.

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  79. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 26 March 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/355 no. 49.

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  80. Same to same, Berlin, 1 April 1866, ibid., no. 55.

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  81. Same to same, Berlin, 6 April 1866, ibid., no. 6o.

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  82. A Same to same, Berlin, g April r866, ODG, VIII, zoo, T. For text of alliance see ibid., PP. 462–463.

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  83. Cf. Lot, p. 85. Loë, Prussian military attaché in Paris, had been recalled to Berlin in the latter part of March to report on the ability of the French army to launch a war. Asked how strong Prussian forces on the Rhine would have to be to deal successfully with any French intervention attempt, he replied that the French army would not be able to concentrate a large force in that area. Loë writes that Moltke agreed with his view and that Berlin was fully aware of French military weakness in 1866.

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  84. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 21 March 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/355 no. 47. For Austrian military measures and the Kârolyi démarche in Berlin in March, see CLARK PP. 363-370.

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  85. Kârolyi to Mensdorff, Berlin, 22 March 1866, HHStA, Preussen/ 91, no. 21. Cf. Lot, pp. 84–85, who states that King William told him in an interview that he would go to war if the Austrian government retained its anti-Prussian attitude relative to the duchies question. Benedetti’s speculation that Prussia might use Austrian military preparations as a pretext to blame the tension in Germany on Austria and to accuse her of hostile intent was borne out by a circular sent to Prussian diplomatic representatives in Germany, in part of which Bismarck asked the envoys to denounce Austria’s military preparations and to inform the governments to which they were accredited that Prussia might be forced to take military measures for her own security (Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 26 March 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/355 no. 49).

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  86. About this time, Bismarck had told Lord Loftus that the alliance between Austria and Prussia was at an end, and added, “I mightChrw(133) use the words of Richelieu to his discarded mistress: `Nous ne sommes pas enemies: mais nous ne nous aimons plus”’ (LoFTus, I,45).

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  87. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 27 March 1866, ODG, VIII, 77–79.

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  88. Same to same, Berlin, 28 March 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/355 no. 51.

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  89. Same to same, Berlin, II April 1866, ibid., no. 64.

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  90. Same to same, Berlin, 9 April 1866, ibid., no. 63. Bismarck later characterized the note as sounding like a communication from the emperor of Germany to the margrave of Brandenburg, a phrase no doubt employed to wound further the intimate susceptibilities of the king and strengthen his resolve (same to same, Berlin, 10 April x866, ODG, VIII, 204); CLARK, pp. 37o-372.

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  91. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 14 April r866, FAE CP, Prusse/355 no. 66.

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  92. Same to same, Berlin, 15 April 1866, ibid., no. 68.

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  93. Same to same, Berlin, 9 April 1866, ibid., no. 63; Reculot to Drouyn de Lhuys, Frankfort, 9 April 1866, ibid., Confédération Germanique/842, T.

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  94. “I note furthermoreChrw(133) that Benedetti is supposed to have designated the proposals in question a ‘joke.’ If this were true, which I still doubt, that report must have been made some time ago, before the formulation and official presentation of the proposal” (Goltz to Bismarck, Paris, ro April r866, Oncken, I, 131). Metternich claims that Drouyn de Lhuys stated that Benedetti’s dispatch on the Prussian reform proposal had been written with an indifférence étonnante and that Benedetti viewed the proposal as simply a coup d’épée dans l’eau (Metternich to Mensdorff, Paris, 9 April r866, Oncken, I, 126). Both reports are refuted by the evidence of Benedetti’s very meticulous analysis of Bismarcks’ moves in the reform issue.

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  95. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 17 April 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/355 no. 70. Cf. Nothomb to Rogier, Berlin, 19 April 1866, BAE CP, Prusse/23, Pt. I, no. 121.

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  96. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 18 April 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/ 355, no. 72.

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  97. Same to same, Berlin, 21 April 1866, ibid., no. 74, “England and France have acted in this sense [a return to the status quo] in Vienna; in view of the urgency, Benedetti has even taken it upon himself to write to the duke of Gramont to have him advise Count Mensdorff to take the initiative in this sort of disarmament” (Nothomb to Rogier, Berlin, 19 April 1866, BAE CP, Prusse/23, Pt. I, no. 121).

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  98. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 25 April 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/355 no. 77. News of the Italian military preparations strengthened the hand of Francis Joseph’s military advisers, who were concerned already over the military advantages conceded to Prussia since 28 March by Mensdorff’s conciliatory diplomatic efforts (Clark, pp. 379 ff.). For an account of the April mediation efforts of the Gablenz brothers, see ibid., pp. 414 ff.

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  99. Govone to La Marmora, Berlin, 23 April 1866, Govone, P. 470.

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  100. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 25 April 1866, FAE MD, Allemagne/r7r.

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  101. Cf. Bylandt to Cremers, Berlin, 28 April 1866, RBZ, Pruisen/ 1866, no. 104, who heard that Benedetti had written a private letter to the duke of Gramont saying that the “inflexible and precipitate decision of the Vienna cabinet” favored the aims of Bismarck and the only way for Austria to paralyze those aims would be to show herself partout sincerely and frankly peaceful, and not to admit that she could be anymore attacked in the south than in the north.

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  102. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 29 April 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/355, no. 80. 4 A. Kulessa, Kongressidee Napoleons III. im Mai 1866 (Leipzig, 2927), pp. 23–24; cf. SYBEL, IV, 364–365.

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  103. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 25 April 1866, FAE MD, Allemagne/r7r.

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  104. Drouyn de Lhuys to diplomatic agents, Paris, 2 May 1866, FAE CP, Angleterre/737, T. Cf. Sybel, IV, 365–366. Drouyn de Lhuys supposedly told Goltz that France had enough influence and desired, like the other powers, to gain more territory.

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  105. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 3 May 1866, FAE MD, Allemagne/171.

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  106. Drouyn de Lhuys to Benedetti, Paris, 6 May 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/356, T. The conjecture can be advanced that the emperor had not yet abandoned hope of persuading Italy to accept the cession of Venetia in spite of her obligations under the treaty of alliance with Prussia. Such an event would satisfy Italian grievances toward Austria, while at the same time create for Prussia a disadvantage in Germany. Napoleon could hope to exploit the Prussian dilemma to the fullest. However, La Marmora’s rejection was wired to Nigra in Paris on Saturday, 5 May, and perhaps was not known to the emperor when he delivered a speech in Auxerre on Sunday, 6 May. The telegram to Benedetti was evidently sent in ignorance of the Italian rejection and in anticipation of favorable arrangements with Austria and Italy. Cf. Drouyn de Lhuys to Gramont, Paris, 1r May 1866, ODG, IX, 95–97; ibid., 95-97, ft. r; CASE, pp. 200 ff.

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  107. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 2 May 1866, FAE MD, Autriche/67.

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  108. Govone to La Marmora, Berlin, 2 May 1866, Govone, p. 473.

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  109. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 3 May 1866, FAE MD, Allemagne/171.

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  110. See ODG, IX, 95–97, ft. r. “The Emperor Napoleon was a mystic dreamer, and, being a fatalist, believed that his dreams were destined to be fulfilled; and the secret means he employed for carrying out his ambitions and tortuous policy ended disastrously to himself and to France” (Lofrus, I, 84).

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  111. See Metternich to Mensdorff, Paris, 5 May 1866, Oncken, I, 16o. The prince reports a proposal of the emperor to remain neutral and to guarantee Italy’s neutrality in case of an Austro-Prussian war. The date of this report indicates that Napoleon was still ignorant of La Marmora’s refusal to accept Venetia. Cf. PERSIGNY pp. 358–361; KULESSA pp. 28–29, who shows that La Marmora was advised of the Austrian offer by Nigra on 5 May. CLARK P13.403 ff.

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  112. A. DE LA MARMORA Un peu plus de lumière sur les événements politiques et militaires de l’année 1866, trans. Niox and Descoubes (Paris, 1874), pp. 215–226. To his refusal La Marmora appended: “But since the treaty expires 8 July one can arrange the thing at a congress.”

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  113. Goltz to Bismarck, Paris, 1 May 1866, ONCKEN, I 145–15o. Cf. Bismarck to Goltz, Berlin, 5 May 1866, BGW, V, 482–484, in which Bismarck informed the ambassador that Prussia could not offer the left bank of the Rhine to France. GEUSS pp. 16o ff.

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  114. See above ft. 2. The speculation can be allowed that, as in the case of Italy, the emperor was unaware at the time of the Auxerre speech of Bismarck’s denial of his bid for the left bank of the Rhine; the explanation of the telegram of Drouyn de Lhuys offered above may now be extended to the entente feelers toward Prussia.

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  115. Goltz to Bismarck, Paris, L May x866, Oncken, I, 147–148.

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  116. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 15 May 1866, FAE MD, Allemagne/171.

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  117. France had entered into such consultation on the initiative of the British government (Drouyn de Lhuys to diplomatic agents, Paris, 18 May 1866, FAE CP, Autriche/491, no. 52).

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  118. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 19 May 1866, FAE MD, Allemagne/171.

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  119. Bismarck insisted that the consultation of the French government with Russia and Britain was a deliberate attempt to give Austria a free hand to seek the annexation of Silesia in compensation for a renunciation of Venetia (ibid.). Drouyn de Lhuys had rejected such a proposition from Metternich (Drouyn de Lhuys to Gramont, Paris, II May 1866, ODG, IX, 95-97).

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  120. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 19 May 1866, FAE MD, Allemagne/171.

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  121. Same to same, Berlin, 19 May 1866, MMP, pp. 151–152.

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  122. Drouyn de Lhuys to diplomatic agents, Paris, x8 May 1866, FAE CP, Autriche/49i

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  123. Drouyn de Lhuys to Benedetti, Paris, 22 May 1866, ibid., Prusse/356, no. 38, no. 39.

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  124. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 22 May 1866, ibid., T. For the movements of Govone, see ODG, IX, 223, ft. i. The Italian general did not discuss any political issues during his stay in Berlin the purpose of which was to pay a farewell call to the king (Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 23 May 1866, FAE MD, Autriche/67).

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  125. Same to same, Berlin, 22 May 1866, ibid., Allemagne/171.

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  126. Drouyn de Lhuys to diplomatic agents, Paris, 24 May 1866, ibid., France/Circulaires politiques, 1863–1869, V, 2128; same to same, Paris, 26 May 1866, ibid. Cf. Projet d’allocution pour l’ouverture du congrès [Paris], 29 May 1866, FAE CP, Autriche/491.

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  127. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 3 May 1866, ibid., Prusse/356, T. The first orders called for the mobilization of the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th corps; the 8th was mobilized on 6 May, followed by the 1st, 2nd and 7th corps on 8 May.

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  128. Same to same, Berlin, 5 May x866, ibid., no. 85.

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  129. Same to same, Berlin, 7 May 1866, ibid., no. 88; same to same, Berlin, 8 May 1866, ibid., no. 89.

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  130. Same to same, Berlin, 12 May 1866, ibid., no. 94; AD (Paris, 1861–1914), 1866, II, 425-428.

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  131. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 28 May 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/356, no. 109.

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  132. Same to same, Berlin, 29 May 1866, ibid., no. 11o.

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  133. Bismarck to Goltz, Berlin, 29 May 1866, ibid., copy.

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  134. Barrai to La Marmora, Berlin, 29 May 1866, LA Marmora, p. 269.

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  135. Same to same, Berlin, 3o May 1866, ibid., p. 270.

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  136. Drouyn de Lhuys to diplomatic agents, Paris, 31 May 1866, FAE CP, Angleterre1737, T.

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  137. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, r June 1866, ibid., Prusse/357, T.

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  138. Same to same, Berlin, r June 1866, ibid., no. 112. “There is no doubt, the French ambassador told me, that Count Bismarck goes [to the congress] with the decided wish to touch off the powder keg” (Barra! to La Marmora, Berlin, Z June 1866, LA MARMORA p. 29x); Nothomb to Rogier, Berlin, 1 June 1866, BAE CP, Prusse/23, Pt. II, no. 184.

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  139. Drouyn de Lhuys to Benedetti, Paris, 1 June 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/357, no. 46. The plenipotentiary of the Confederation, Pfordten, was designated on 1 June (AD, 1866, III, 29–3o).

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  140. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 3 June 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/357 no. 116.

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  141. Same to same, Berlin, 4 June 1866, FAE MD, Allemagne/17x. Benedetti added that Bismarck, on reading the telegram, exclaimed, “Long live the king.”

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  142. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 12 June 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/357, T.

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  143. ODG, IX, 337–338. For the proceedings in the diet see CLARK, pp. 466 ff.

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  144. C. ZU HOHENLOHE-SCHILLINGSFÜRST, Denkwürdigkeiten, ed. F. Curtius (Stuttgart, 1906), I, 16o-161.

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  145. For the Austro-French negotiations see Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, “Der Geheimvertrag Österreichs und Frankreichs vom 12. Juni 1866,” Historisches Jahrbuch, Vol. 57 (1937), PP• 454-507; G. Ritter, “Bismarck und die Rheinpolitik Napoleons III.,” Rheinische Vierteljahrsblätter, XV—XVI (1950–1951), PP. 339-370; ODG, X, 145, 257-260; ONCKEN, I, 265-268; CLARK, pp. 428 ff.

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  146. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 8 June 1866, MMP, pp. 134-137.

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  147. Same to same, Berlin, 12 June 1866, FAE CP, Prusse/357, no. 128. “Through the exclusion of Luxemburg one makes this land, the only one on the left bank of the Rhine which remains French, available for future arrangements; one can in that case, as has been done in Savoy, sanction there the annexation to France through universal suffrage. I do not pretend that there is a pact with the emperor of the French but Bismarck knows that without compensation for France he cannot, if he is victorious, make the territorial aggrandizement and increase in power of Prussia acceptable to the French emperor” (Nothomb to Rogier, Berlin, 12 June 1866, BAE CP, Question du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg/I, Pt. I, no. 18 bis). “The imperial government has a consul in the grand-duchyChrw(133) who always takes care to note in his reports that the house of Orange has no adherents in the land but that there exists a French partyChrw(133). Benedetti who was for a long time in the Direction politique told me that these reports often impressed him” (ibid., no. 19). Cf. Govone to La Marmora, Berlin, 3 June 1866, Govone, pp. 491–492. Govone writes that Bismarck was willing to cede the entire area between the Moselle and the Rhine to France as compensation if necessary. He told Govone that he was more Prussian than German and thus felt no compunction concerning that area.

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  148. Napoleon III to Drouyn de Lhuys, Tuileries, 1r June 1866, FAE CP, Angleterre/738. The letter, read to the chamber by Rouher on 13 June, had been sent to French diplomatic representatives abroad on the preceding day.

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  149. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 15 June 1866, ibid., Prusse/357, no. 134.

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  150. Gramont to Drouyn de Lhuys, Vienna, 16 June 1866, ODG, X, 197–198.

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  151. Baudin to Drouyn de Lhuys, The Hague, 15 June 1866, FAE CP, Hollande/665, no. z8.

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  152. Benedetti to Drouyn de Lhuys, Berlin, 24 June 1866, ibid., Prusse/357, no. 141; same to same, Berlin, 25 June 1866, ibid., no. 143

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  153. Drouyn de Lhuys to Benedetti, Paris, 2 July x866, ibid., Prusse/358, no. 66; cf. Drouyn de Lhuys to La Tour d’Auvergne, Paris, 26 June 1866, ibid., Angleterre/738, no. 76, regarding the foreign minister’s views on the possible dissolution of the Confederation.

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    Willard Allen Fletcher

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Fletcher, W.A. (1965). Prelude to Sadowa. In: The Mission of Vincent Benedetti to Berlin 1864–1870. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7547-8_3

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