Abstract
The increased revolutionary temperament in Italy placed upon France and England a great obligation to seek a settlement on the broad question of Italy. England’s role in this regard was conducted simultaneously at Vienna and Paris for a solution favorable to the Italians, at the cost of both the papacy and Austria. The issue of power complicated these clear lines the English had settled upon nonetheless, for if the Palmerston government distrusted French motives toward self-aggrandizement, it also feared that the patience of Austria would, as in 1859, vanish at a critical moment, and thus precipitate a general war from the area of northern Italy. Palmerston’s anxiety was never greater than in December 1861 when he predicted that France would initiate a general war in the spring, integrate its military efforts with the revolutionary movements in Italy and Hungary, at a moment when England would (Palmerston thought inevitably) fall into conflict with the Federal Government in America. He recognized that Ricasoli would soon fall from power, but showed no great concern with this prospect, since the succession of Rattazzi promised a better avenue for resolving the Italian question, by turning the eyes of the patriots from Rome to some other sector. If Ricasoli had refused to exchange the island of Sardinia for either Rome or Venice, Palmerston believed Rattazzi would agree to such a trade. To salvage some of Austria’s declining power, to preserve it from a war which it could not finance and could not win, Palmerston also returned to the idea of selling Venetia.1 Italian problems, by this view, became entangled with the Eastern question, and Palmerston began to meditate upon a project which would keep the peace in Europe and yet solve the most inflamed of the national questions.
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References
Palmerston to Russell, 94 Piccadilly, 3o December 186r, copy, PRO, FO 519/199.
Cowley to Russell, Paris, is March 1862, British parliamentary papers, Papers respecting the French occupation o/ Rome (1862), LXIII, 481; Arch. dip. (1863), I.
Same to same, Paris, 14 March 1862, ibid.; FO 27/1435/329.
Russell to Cowley, F.O., 17 March 1862, Thouvenel papers, XVII, 28–29.
Cowley to Russell, 20 March 1862, FO 27/1435/374.
Russell to Cowley, 22 March 1862, Pirri, Questione, 483.
Cowley to Russell, Paris, 28 March 1862, Papers respecting the French occupation of Rome (1862), LXIII, 489.
Russell to Cowley, 2 April 1862, Arch. dip. (1863), I, 234-235.
Gramont to Thouvenel, Vienna, I May 1862, confidential and secret, AMAE, CP, Autriche, 481: 200.
Apponyi to Rechberg, London, 18 Feb. 1862, telegram, HHSA, PA, VIII, England, 57: 158.
Gorchakov to Budberg, Tzarskoe-Selo, 20 June 1862, Thouvenel papers, XIV, fois
Thun to Rechberg. St. Petersburg, 16/4 Jan. 1862, HHSA, PA, X, Russland, 52: 44.
Rechberg to Metternich, Vienna, 22 January 1862, confidential, ibid., I X, Frankreich, 73: 35.
Thouvenel to Fournier, Paris, 18 Feb. 1862, AMAE, CP, Russe, 226: 12.
Flahault to Thouvenel, London, zo March 1862, AMAE, CP, Angleterre, 721: 97.
Apponyi to Rechberg, London, 18 Feb. 1862, telegram, HHSA, PA, VIII, England, 57: 158.
PRO RP 30/22/21. The first efforts for the Austrian project were raised by Palmerston and Russell in October 2860, when the sale of Venetia was originally considered as a solution for the Italian question. Clarendon endorsed its purpose the next January, describing its necessity on three heads: sale of Venetia, internal reform of the Austrian empire, Austria’s avoidance of “aggressive errors” which had led to the war of 1859 (Clarendon to Russell, 16 January, 1861, Clarendon papers, C 104)•
Gramont to Thouvenel, Vienna, 1 May 1862, confidential and secret, AMAE, CP, Autriche, 481: 200; L. Thouvenel, Le secret, II, 287–288.
Memoir of Klindworth, Vienna, 31 March 1862, AMAS, CP, Autriche, 481: 203–206; L. Thouvenel, Le secret, II, 287–288.
De Lucca to Antonelli, 13 April 1862, Pirri, Questione, 484-485.
Antonelli to Chigi, 13 May 1862, ibid., 491.
Bastgen, II, 231–234, passim.
Gramont to Thouvenel, Vienna, 23 April 1862, confidential, L. Thouvenel, Le secret, II, 284.
Same to same, Vienna, 23 April 1862, confidential, AMAE, CP, Autriche, 481: 186.
Flahault to Thouvenel, London, 2 May 1862, AMAE, CP, Angleterre, 721: 17–18. Thouvenel heard some further demands from Cowley on the subject of Rome. The pope, he replied early in May, might be told that France would evacuate Rome in two years. Palmerston expressed shock with this dilatory suggestion. “Two years, ” he wrote, “Thouvenel might as well say it would be in twenty years as to any effect it can have on the pope” (Palmerston to Russell, 7 May 1862, PRO RP 30/22/22).
territorial status quo, (2) transfer to Italy of the greater part of the papal debt, (3) contributions by the powers of Europe to the civil list of the Holy Father, (4) internal reforms by the Holy Father [011ivier, V, 471].
Bellune to Thouvenel, Rome, 10 May 1862, AMAE, CP, Rome, 1020: 32.
Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, 2 May 1862, HHSA, PA IX, Frankreich, 72: 75.
Same to same, Paris, io May 1862, ibid., 84–87; 209–213.
Metternich’s compte-rendu of Hübner’s audience with Napoleon III, ibid., 36-37.
Rechberg to Metternich, Vienna, 20 May 1862, private and confidential, ibid., 73: 302–304.
See chapter VIII for Russell’s reception of the French congress proposal of 1863.
Napoleon III to Thouvenel, 20 May 1862, AMAE, CP, Rome, Zozo: 115–118; Staatsarchiv (1863), IV, 20–22.
Thouvenel to Gramont, Paris, 24 May 1862, L. Thouvenel, Le secret, II, 303. Legitimists and Orleanists alike, wrote the court gossip, Prosper Mérimée, had become papalists, “papa-lists conspiring with fanatics” (Prosper Mérimée to the countess Montijo, Paris, 28 April 1862, P. Mérimée, Prosper Mérimée a la comtesse de Montijo, I, zio).
Vimercati to Rattazzi, Paris, 29 May 1862, DDI, 1st series, II, 385–386; “Sulla via di Roma, da Aspromonte a Mentana,” (henceforth cited as Sulla via di Roma), anonymous, Nuova antologia di lettere, scienze, ed arti, 4th series (January 1900), LXXXV, 13–14.
J. Durieux, Le ministre Pierre Magne, 1806–1879, d’après ses lettres et ses souvenirs (Paris, 1929), II, 35-36, 38.
Vimercati to Rattazzi, Paris, 29 May 1862, DDI, Ist series, II, 385-386.
Nigra to Durando, Paris, 29 May 1862, ibid., 383.
Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, 9 June 1862, HHSA, PA, IX, Frankreich, 72: 227–229.
Bach to Rechberg, Rome, 14 June 1862, ibid., 74: 417–418; Jacini, 90–91. “You will,” Thouvenel instructed La Valette, “leave the impression that if they oppose you as categorically as in the past by their theory of immobility, the government of the emperor would have to act accordingly; and that if unfortunately it became certain that these efforts for persuading the Holy Father to accept a transaction would become henceforth useless, it would be necessary, while safeguarding as much as possible the interests which up to now it has protected by its solicitude, to consider abandoning a situation, which by being prolonged beyond a certain point would falsify its policy and would only serve to produce the greatest disorder” (Thouvenel to La Valette, Paris, 3o May 1862, Moniteur, 25 Sept. 1862). The letter of the foreign minister to the ambassador which appeared in the Livre jaune the next year carried the date 31 May, a change of dates caused by a change of instructions in the last phase of drafting the four points.
La Valette to Thouvenel, Rome, 17 June 1862, telegram, AMAE, CP, Rome, ro2o: 203, 214. The pope’s remarks were important phraseology. It was curt advice used against him later when the Italians were indeed consulted first, and a convention without the pope’s knowledge established between France and Italy. “It is thus to Piedmont,” Pius said in 1862, “that you must first address yourself. After you will have treated with her, I do not promise to accept the terms of the convention that you will have concluded, but I would have to examine them seriously.” This offhand dismissal of their efforts angered the liberals greatly in 1862; but two years later it offered a providential excuse for the moderate conservatives who had decided to bypass the pope.
Thouvenel to La Valette, Paris, 22 June 1862, telegram, ibid., 231.
La Valette to Thouvenel, Rome, 24 June 1862, Livre jaune (1862), Io.
“I thought I should remark,” Metternich wrote to his government, “that if they demanded too much at Rome it would be a mistake — it would be to wish to bring on arefusal” (Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, 13 June 1862, HHSA, PA, IX, Frankreich, 74: 250-252).
Depretis to Garibaldi, ro February 1862, Archivio Depretis, series I, Busta 4, fasc. II (Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome).
Denis Mack Smith, Garibaldi, a great life in brief (New York, 1956). 123–126. See also Mori, I, 86–105, passim.
Durando’s circular letter to his diplomatic representatives abroad, Naples, 19 May 1862, DDI, 1st series, II, 362: Arch. dip. (1863), I, 125.
Napoleon III to Victor Emmanuel II, Paris, ro May 1862, DDI, Ist series, II, 346.
Durando’s note and quotations on Prince Napoleon’s visit to Naples, Episodi, 222–223.
Thouvenel assured the nuncio, Chigi, that France would maintain the status quo (Chigi to Antonelli, Paris, 18 May 1862, Pirri, Questione, 479). Eugenie made the contents of Napoleon’s letter to Victor Emmanuel known to Metternich (C. W. Hallberg, Franz-Joseph and Napoleon 111, 1852–1864, a study of Austro-French relations [New York, 1955], 276).
Smith, 127–128.
Rattazzi to Garibaldi, date unknown, Luzio, 169–170.
Luzio, 170.
Russell to Hudson, 26 May 1862, Affari esteri, 772, pacco 134.
Thouvenel to La Valette, Paris, 12 May 1862, G. Rothan, La France et sa politique en 1867 (Paris, 1887), II, 53.
Durando to Teccio di Bayo, 8 July 1862, DDI, 1st series, II, 512.
Proclamation of Garibaldi, end of July 1862, Arch. dip. (1863), I, 135.
Rattazzi to Victor Emmanuel, Turin, 2 August 1862, Luzio, 146–147.
Proclamation of Victor Emmanuel, 3 August 1862, Arch. dip. (1863), I, 135–136; 138139; G. Pasolini, Memoir of Count Giuseppe Pasolini, trans., the Dowager Countess Dalhousie (London, 1885), 231–232; Durando to his agents abroad, Turin, 3 August 1862, DDI, 1st series, III, 5.
Rattazzi to Teccio di Bayo, 3 August 1862, DDI, 1st series, III, 4.
Proclamation of Garibaldi to take arms against Rome, 24 August 1862, Arch. dip. (1863), I, 141–142.
Chigi to Antonelli, Paris, 16 August 1862, De Lucca to Antonelli, Vienna, 22 September 1862, Pirri, Questione, 515–516.
Chigi to Antonelli, Paris, 29 August 1862, ibid., 525.
Russell to Cowley, London, 7 August 2862, AMAE, CP, Angleterre, 722, 42.
Minute by Lord Clarendon, undated, 1862, Clarendon papers, 555.
Pepoli to Rattazzi, Paris, 16 August 1862, Sulla via di Roma, 24.
Nigra to Rattazzi, Paris, 15 August 1862, Luzio, 216. The Italians were as slow as the French in making up their minds, hoping that they could wring concessions from France without taking an unpopular step as the necessary price. Only in its sittings of 2–5 September did the king’s council decide definitively to carry out legal proceedings against the patriot who had defied the king’s proclamation of 3 August (Verbali dei ministri, 1861–1867, I, 31–32).
Durando to Thouvenel, Turin, 11 August 1862, Thouvenel papers, IV, 343; Sulla via di Roma, 23; Episodi, 315–316; DDI, 1st series, III, 226.
The English cabinet betrayed no inclination to support Italy, and had but little interest in a congress, the Greek movement in particular making Palmerston suspect Italy’s motives in that question (D’Azeglio to Durando, 4 August 1862, DDI, 1st series, III, 6–7) Russia could not be stirred from its neutrality for these same reasons. It is also clear in the correspondence of Di Sonnaz’s special mission to St. Petersburg that it was not Italy’s official policy to contest France’s strong influence at the Russian court, but rather that it was Italian policy to strengthen the understanding Russia had obtained earlier with France whereby a general intervention of the powers in the Italian question would not be allowed. The maintenance of the principle of nonintervention, and not the acquisition of Rome, was Italy’s policy, a condition of security for Italy which would allow it to profit from events according to how they might occur; but a condition which would enhance Italy’s international reputation. Russia’s recognition of Italy, said Gorchakov, was based upon the conviction that Italy could maintain a regular order. Garibaldi’s challenge was the acid test for a well-constituted government, a touchstone for Italy’s future development, perhaps an opportunity, observed Gorchakov: “pour vous fournir l’occasion de trancher d’un coup la question et prendre position en Europe.” But France’s efforts, warned Gorchakov, already made at St. Petersburg on behalf of Italy, made it impossible for Russia to have either a pro-Italian or an anti-French policy (Di Sonnaz to Durando, St. Petersburg, 16/4 August /862, confidential, The Mission of S. E. it generale Ettore di Sonnaz to St. Petersburg, August 1862, Affari esteri).
Pepoli to Rattazzi, Paris, 16 August 1862, Sulla via di Roma, 24.
Nigra to Rattazzi, Paris, 15 August 1862, Luzio, 216.
Project of a convention with France, 22 August 1862, Durando papers, 16/126/46.
Episodi, 269–276, passim.
Giuseppe Garibaldi, Autobiography, authorized translation, A. Werner (London, 1889), II, 247.
Thouvenel to Flahault, Paris, 26 August 1862, AMAE, CP, Angleterre, 722: 8o-81.
The measure of Russell’s anxiety was revealed when he asked the Admiralty for an increase for the Mediterranean fleet; it was also a measure of England’s farflung interests when Sea Lord Somerset dissented at once, citing Britain’s need for frigates in every quarter of the globe (Somerset to Russell, private, 24 August 1862, PRO RP 3o/22/24.)
Montebello to Thouvenel, St. Petersburg, 25 August 1862, AMAE, CP, Russe, 226: 215–216; Diary of Count Oldoini, minister to Russia, as cited by G. Berti, Russia e stati italiani nel Risorgimento (Turin, 1957), 825.
Nigra to Rattazzi, 28 August 1862, Sulla via di Roma, 27.
Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, 16 August 1862, HHSA, IX, Frankreich, 74. Bach obtained assurances from the Vatican that neither Antonelli nor the pope had charged Nardi with a special mission, but the elusiveness of this response on the part of the papacy must be considered (Bach to Rechberg, Rome, 7 September 1862, HHSA, XI, Vatikan, 2o4: 321).
Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, 4 September 1862, ibid., IX, Frankreich, 73: 135-140, passim.
Same to same, ibid., 139–140.
Nigra to Durando, Paris, 3o Aug. 1862, Episodi, 318–319.
Nigra to Durando, 2 Sept. 1862, A. Colombo, “La questione romana nei carteggi NigraDurando,” Il Risorgimento italiano, 3rd series (Turin, 1929), XXII, 529–530.
Viel Castel, Mémoires du comte Horace de Viel Castel sur le règne de Napoléon III (Paris, 1884), VI, 188.
Nigra to Durando, Paris, 2 Sept. 1862, Colombo, 529-530.
Sulla via di Roma, 27–28.
Prince Napoleon to Rattazzi, Paris, 1 Sept. 1862, Luzio, 276.
Nigra to Durando, Paris, 1 Sept. 1862, telegram, Durando papers, 16/127/121.
Thouvenel to Flahault, Paris, r Sept. 1862, L. Thouvenel, Le secret, II, 380.
Mülinen to Rechberg, Paris, 1 Sept. 1862, secret, no. 5o, A—C, HHSA, PA, IX, Frankreich, 73: roe-114, passim.
Same to same, ibid., 127.
Thouvenel to Flahault, Paris, 1 Sept. 1862, L. Thouvenel, Le secret, II, 380.
Nigra to Rattazzi, Paris, 6 Sept. 1862, private, Durando papers, 16/127/126.
Same to same, Paris, 4 Sept. 1862, Colombo, 534. The rumor, as subsequent events showed, was incorrect (Maurain, Baroche ministre de Napoléon III, d’après ses papiers inédits [Paris, 1936], 242, no. 2), but its effect upon the Italians was not less important because not true.
Durando to Nigra, 2 Sept. 1862, Colombo, 532–533.
Rattazzi to Victor Emmanuel, 8 September 1862, Luzio, 148–149.
Nigra to Durando, Io Sept. 1862, Colombo, 562–563.
Durando to Nigra, II Sept. 1862, ibid.,563.
Nigra to Durando, Paris, 14 Sept. 1862, ibid., 539.
Durando’s circular letter to his repensentatives abroad, Turin, 10 Sept. 1862, AMAE, CP, Italie, 555: 127–128; Arch. dip. (1863), I, 142–144; Staatsarchiv (1863), IV, 34-35; Bastgen, II, 171–173; Livre jaune, (1862), 47–48.
Thouvenel to Gramont, Paris, 25 Sept. 2862, L. Thouvenel, Le secret. II, 407.
Thouvenel to Massignac, Paris, 21 Sept. 2862, AMAS, CP, Italie, 555: 149.
Thouvenel to La Valette, Paris, 24 Sept. 1862, ibid., Rome, 1021: 210. The king of Italy inquired if the princess Mathilda, vacationing at Lake Maggiore, might come to Turin for a visit (Thouvenel to Massignac, Paris, 25 Sept. 1862, ibid., Italie, 555: 134). The princess, an extreme antipapalist, had taken up the Italian cause, if only for that reason, establishing relations with La Valette, Benedetti and Thouvenel (Joachim Kühn, La Princesse Mathilde, 1820–1904, d’après des papiers de la famille royale de Wurtemberg et autres documents inédits, trans, J C Guidau [Paris, 1935], 216).
Thouvenel to Massignac, Paris, 21 Sept. 1862, AMAE, CP, Italie, 555: 249
Massignac to Thouvenel, Turin, 19 Sept. 1862, Thouvenel papers, IV, 349
Apponyi to Rechberg, London, 24 Sept. 1862, HHSA, PA, VIII, England, 57: 199–204, passim.
Russell to Palmerston, 16 Sept. 1862, Palmerston papers. England demonstrated an immediate concern for the cabinet crises in France and Italy. Where Russia had assumed a noncommittal attitude towards Durando’s circular, England was positive, promising that an early communication would be made to Paris (Episodi, 329–333; Oldoini to Durando, 20 Sept. 1862, St. Petersburg, Durando papers, 16/127/133).
Palmerston to Russell, 13 Sept. 1862, Later Correspondence, II, 280.
Flahault to Palmerston, private, 18 Sept. 1862, Palmerston papers. The plight of the pope, Russell wrote Palmerston, placed Napoleon in a stronger position than before for putting off an evacuation. “I hope to see Odo today,” wrote the foreign secretary, “and ask him whether it is possible to induce the pope to leave Rome for a time to go to Malta. Small chance I feel.” (Russell to Palmerston, 22 Sept. 1862, ibid.).
Palmerston to Flahault, Broadlands, 22 Sept. 1862, ibid.
Flahault to Palmerston, 24 Sept. 1862, ibid.
Russell to Cowley, F.O., 29 Sept. 1862, Thouvenel papers, XVII, 3o-33, passim.
Thouvenel to Flahault, Paris, 4 Oct. 186z, L. Thouvenel, Le secret, II, 424.
Flahault to Palmerston, 9 October 2862, ibid., 434–435. Palmerston gratified Flahault’s desire in this respect, for the prime minister advised D’Azeglio that the English note on Rome would be suspended in order not to further agitate the French ministers upon the return of Napoleon from Biarritz (D’Azeglio to Durando, London, 7 October 1862, DDI, 1st series, III, III).
English policy on Italy, said Palmerston, was equivalent to the policy it held for Spain: the preservation of their independence, because this was a way to prevent the growth of French power in the Mediterranean. Portugal must remain England’s ally, because in case of war between France and England, this country could help maintain England’s naval supremacy. It was clear, therefore, in this report of Palmerston’s thought, that radicalism in Italy only entrenched French influence in the peninsula, provoked an expansion of French military power and weakened incidentally the hegemony English cruisers exercised over the weak peninsulas of southern Europe (D’Azeglio to Durando, Broadlands, 3 October 1862, confidential, DDI, ist series, III, 109).
Nigra to Thouvenel, 14 Sept, 1862, Demaria, 257.
Russell to Palmerston, 22 Sept. 1862, Palmerston papers.
Benedetti to Thouvenel, Turin, undated, Thouvenel papers, IV, 358–359.
Durando to Nigra, Turin, 8 Oct. 1862, Episodi, 339–340; Arch. dip. (1863), I, 146–147.
Prince Napoleon and Princess Mathilda arrived at Genoa on 24 September, accompanied thereafter to Turin by Benedetti (Rattazzi to La Marmora, 25 Sept. 1862, Luzio, 312; Benedetti to Thouvenel, Turin, 24 Sept. 1862, telegram. AMAE, CP, Italie, 555: 350).
Rattazzi to La Marmora, 7 Oct. 1862, Luzio, 314.
In view of the “tacit approbation that the parliament and public opinion” had given “at other times to acts of this nature,” it was proposed that a decree be prepared, expressing to Italy and to Europe “your [Victor Emmanuel’s] magnanimity and the force of your government” (Benedetti to Thouvenel, Turin, 6 Oct. 3862, AMAE, CP, Italie, 555: 192).
Same to same, Turin, 7 Oct, 3862, ibid., 196.
Durando to Nigra, Turin, 8 Oct. 1862, ibid., 198–20o.
Nigra to Durando, Paris, 10 Oct. 1862, telegram, Durando papers, 16/127/137.
Benedetti’s private correspondence with Thouvenel suggests that the ambassador was no better informed of the note’s actual formation than was the foreign minister (Benedetti to Thouvenel, Turin, 6 Oct. 1862, Thouvenel papers, IV, 362–363).
Cowley to Russell, Paris, without date, confidential, Clarendon papers, C 87: 358-359. S Nigra to Durando, Paris, sr Oct. 1862, telegram, Durando papers, 16/127/139
L. Thouvenel, Pages d’histoire, 391–395.
Salomon, 46–57, Passim. Thouvenel to Flahault, Paris, i Sept. 1862, L. Thouvenel, Le secret, II, 38 1- 383.
R. Schnerb, Rouher et le Second Empire (Paris, 1931), 128.
Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, z Oct, 1862, HHSA, PA, IX, Frankreich, 73: 15.
Mérimée to Panizzi, Paris, 25 April 1860, P. Mérimée, Lettres it M. Panizzi, 185o-187o, ed., Louis Fagan (Paris, 1881), I, 89. “The unity of Italy is a danger for France,” declared the Marquis de la Rochejaquelein, and a permanent threat to both France and Austria. “This new England,” he said, would control the seas around it; Italy “would destroy the truth of an old proverb: `the Mediterranean ought to be a French lake’ ” (Marquis de la Rochejaquelein, “L’Unité de l’Italie est-elle un danger pour la France” [Recueil politique, XIX, no. 222, 12–13]). G. Dethan, “Napoléon III et l’opinion française devant la question romaine (18602870),” Extrait de la Revue d’histoire diplomatique (April—June 1958), no. 2: 7–9, passim.
Napoleon III to Randon, 22 Sept. 1862, Rastoul, 267.
Walewski to Napoleon III, z6 Sept. 1862, Bernardy, Un fils de Napoléon, 691–693.
If Drouyn could not accept the emperor’s program, Walewski wrote Napoleon on 24 September, he would call on La Tour d’Auvergne (Walewski to Napoleon III, 24 Sept. 1862, ibid., 690).
Schnerb, too. Thouvenel to Flahault, Paris, 1 Sept. 1862, L. Thouvenel, Le secret, II, 381.
Mülinen to Rechberg, Paris, 14 Oct. 1862, cited by Salomon, 70.
Flahault to Palmerston, 9 Oct. 1862, L. Thouvenel, Le secret, II, 435. The Italian government pressed the English cabinet to make a circular note of Russell’s despatch of 29 September. Palmerston refused, “fearing the evils of such a step” (D’Azeglio to Durando, London, 7 Oct. 1862, telegram, Durando papers, 16/127/135.
Walewski to Napoleon III, to Oct. 1862. Bernardy, Un fils de Napoléon, 694–695.
Mülinen to Rechberg, Paris, 13 Oct. 1862, HHSA, PA, IX, Frankreich, 73: 38.
Same to same, Paris, 14 Oct. 1862, ibid., 67–68.
Notes by the minister Baroche on the ministerial crisis of 1862, Baroche papers, 1025: 22–23.
Thouvenel to Flahault, Paris, 13 Oct. 1862, L. Thouvenel, Le secret, II, 427–428.
Bernardy, Un fils de Napoléon, 696.
Napoleon III to Thouvenel, St. Cloud, 15 Oct. 1862, L. Thouvenel, Le secret, II, 438-439; Moniteur, 19 Oct. 1862.
Viel Castel’s account is probably too simple to be correct: “Morny seems to wish to resign. He pretends he is not able to abandon his friends.” Cited by L. Thouvenel, Le secret, II, 431.
Mülinen to Rechberg. Paris, 14 Oct. 1862, HHSA, PA, IX, Frankreich, 73: 58.
Cowley to Russell, Paris, 18 Oct. 1862, most confidential, Palmerston papers. Drouyn’s other condition was of the same character: he would not accept Thouvenel’s nomination as ambassador to London, which was the emperor’s desire.
Schnerb, 129. Rouher could not evidently bring himself to use the word “abandon,” but his words and his actions amounted to desertion.
Circular letter of Drouyn de Lhuys to his representatives abroad, Paris, 18 Oct. 1862, Livre jaune (1862), 15; Arch. dip. (5863), I, 196–197.
Nigra to Durando, 19 Oct. 1862, Colombo, 571.
Drouyn to Massignac, 26 Oct. 1862, AMAE, CP, Italie, 555: 246-251.
Antonelli to Chigi, Rome, 21 Oct. 1862, Pirri, Questione, 544•
Chigi to Antonelli, Paris, 21 Oct. 1862,ibid., 545. But this was to be countered by Drouyn’s remark to Reuss, the Prussian ambassador, that Napoleon would never abandon the pope so long as His Holiness was not reconciled with Italy (Reuss to Bismarck, Paris, 27 Oct. 1862, APP, III, 61–6z).
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Scott, I. (1969). The Revival of Democracy. In: The Roman Question and the Powers, 1848–1865. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7541-6_7
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