Abstract
A discussion of Lichtenberg’s thoughts on education2 introduces a problem of meaning: What is philosophy? What is education? What is a philosophy of education ? 3 Lichtenberg says: “The invention of language preceded philosophy, which is what makes philosophy difficult, especially when one wishes to make philosophy intelligible to others who do not think much for themselves.” 4
What am I ? What should I do ? What can I believe and hope for ? Everything in philosophy may be reduced to these three questions.1
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Notes
VS., I, p. 81.
Only three treati’ses that shed any light on Lichtenberg’s thoughts on education have been published thus far. Chronologically they are: H. Kluge: “Die pädagogischen Gedanken Lichtenbergs,” IV Jahrbuch des Vereins für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik, 1912, PP. 49–94; V. Boullier: Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, 1914, pp. 20–30; and A. Schneider: Georg Christoph Lichtenberg: Penseur, 1953, pp. 145–48.
That the problem of definitions is not only an international one in scope but almost defies a satisfactory solution as well, may be surmised by the nature of W. Reyer’s “solution”: “Der praktische Erzieher braucht sich um Definitionen nicht zu bemühen. Er verfolgt bestimmte Absichten und greift sein Werk in der Tat an. Die Erziehungspraxis ist älter als die Erziehungslehre. Bevor man anfing, über die Erziehung nachzudenken, erzog man; aber indem man erzog, dachte man nach.” Allgemeine Erziehungsund Unterrichtslehre (Berlin, 1954 ), p. 1o.
VS., I. p. 84. The assertion that “all philosophy is... at bottom philology” is, in one sense, obviously true., Unamuno, M. de, The Tragic Sense of Life, trans. by J. E. Crawford Flitch (London 1921 ), p. 311.
Kluge, H., op. cit., p. 64.
Lichtenberg’s misinterpretation of his favorite subject is understandable in the light of the embryonic development of educational psychology in the eighteenth century. That educators in the twentieth century can make a similar mistake is, however, harder to overlook. Says Kluge: “Während gewöhnlich bei ausgesprochener mathematischer Begabung eine Abneigung gegen die Sprachen vorhanden zu sein pflegt, wie es auch umgekehrt der Fall ist, spricht Lichtenberg den Sprachen grosses Lob.”, op. cit., p. 73. See also VS, V, p. 94.
Says J. Laurup-Fogt: “Lichtenberg was filled with ideas and therefore — without one thought.”, “Georg Christoph Lichtenberg,” Orbis Litterarum, 1943, p. 238.
For a historical treatment of these words, see, for example: J. Hoffineister: Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe (Hamburg, 1955), PP. 467–69.
In his efforts to interpret the paradoxical nature of Lichtenberg’s aphorisms, R. Trachsler leaves us — it seems — with a well-nigh impossible choice. Says Trachsler: “Lichtenberg ist weder Dichter noch Philosoph.” Lichtenberg: Ursprung und Grösse wirklicher Freiheit (Zürich, 1956), p. 31. On page 37, however, Trachsler reverses himself, because here he admits: “Wir kommen aber keinen Schritt weiter, wenn wir nicht einsehen, dass Lichtenberg dennoch Philosoph ist, und dass ihm hohe denkerische Qualitäten eigen sind; — freilich Qualitäten ganz besonderer Art.”
Smith, Stanley, and Shores, Fundamentals of Curriculum Development (New York, 1950), pp. 217–18, conceive of education as “the formation of character and personality.” Whitehead defines education as the “acquisition of the art of the utilization of knowledge” and then adds that “this is an art very difficult to impart.”, A. N. Whitehead, The Aims of Education and Other Essays (New York, 1929), p. 6. Webster defines education as “the process of training and developing the knowledge, skill, mind, character, etc., especially by formal schooling; systematic study of the problems, methods, and theories of learning; the impartation or acquisition of skill, knowledge, or discipline of character.” No single definition will suffice; it is clear that one should include all of these concepts when discussing thoughts about education in its fullest meaning; viz., the harmonious development of all the spiritual, physical, and mental powers of man.
VS., I, p. 85.
Ibid., I, pp. 98–99.
S. V. Henderson cites some of the questions a student wants to have answered or clarified through a philosophical study of education. “How does it happen that mankind is here? What is life for? What is right for man to do? What is wrong? How can man live a life that is worthwhile and satisfying? Is there any intelligent purpose back of the fact of this world and its phenomena? What can man hope for after this life? What sort of world is this in its essence? Is there any one substance out of which everything is composed? Or, are there two or more substances? What is the nature of the substance or substances ? What does it mean ”to be?“ Is man’s mind capable of answering these and many other questions? How do we get the knowledge we think we have? How valid is this knowledge or supposed knowledge?”, Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (Chicago, 1947 ), P. 4.
B. an d. F., p. 208.
VS., I, p. 70.
Ibid., VIII, P. 45.
Ibid., I, p. 158.
Ibid., I, p. 90.
Ibid., I, p. 224.
Ibid., II, p. 254.
Ibid., I, p. 52.
Ibid., I, p. 31.
Henderson asserts that “an adequate philosophy of life is a prerequisite for a sound philosophy of education.”, op. cit., p. 12.
VS., I, p. 29.
A philosophy of life that Raabe, for example, treated in Abu Telfan.
VS., I, p. 88.
Ibid., II, p. 171.
For a short analysis of this important aspect of human nature, see S. Freud: Abriss der Psychoanalyse ( Hamburg, 1956 ), Chapter V.
VS., I, p. 123. One is also reminded here of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: “Wer aber der Weiseste von euch ist, der ist auch nur ein Zwiespalt und Zwitter von Pflanze und von Gespenst. Aber heisse ich euch zu Gespenstern oder Pflanzen zu werden?”, ( Leipzig, 1904 ), P. 13.
Schiller, in his essay, “Die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen,” was more categorical about his knowledge about the nature of man. Says he: “Der Mensch, wissen wir, ist weder ausschliessend Materie, noch ist er ausschliessend Geist.”, Schillers Werke, II, ed. by P. Stapf, ( Berlin, 1956 ), p. 61o.
VS., I, p. 56.
Ibid., IV, p. 56.
For a philosophical interpretation of the philosophy of pessimism, see, for example, L. Marcuse: Pessimismus: Ein Stadium der Reife (Hamburg, 1953 ).
vs., II, p. 113.
Ibid., I, p. 82.
K. Jaspers is convinced, as Lichtenberg was convinced, that “within the human predicament the quest for truth presents an impossible task.”, Tragedy is Not Enough, tr. by H. A. T. Reich, H. T. Moore, and K. W. Deutsch, (Boston, 5952 ), p. 70.
VS., I, p. 201.
Jaspers says: “Es ist nicht zu leugnen: in der Philosophie gibt es keine Einmütigkeit des endgültig Erkannten Was aus zwingenden Gründen von Jedermann anerkannt wird, dass ist damit eine wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis geworden, ist nicht mehr Philosophie, sondern bezieht sich auf ein besonderes Gebiet des Erkennbaren.”, Einführung in die Philosophie (München, x955 ). p. 9.
VS., VIII, p. 265.
Although Kant was not a pessimist, a reading of his thoughts on the philosophy of history will reveal that his conviction about mankind as a whole contains basic elements characteristic of the philosophy of pessimism. He wrote (1784): “One cannot avoid a certain feeling of disgust, when one observes the actions of man displayed on the great stage of the world. Wisdom is manifested by individuals here and there; but the web of human history as a whole appears to be woven from folly and childish vanity, often, too, from puerile wickedness and love of destruction: with the result that at the end one is puzzled to know what idea to form of our species, which prides itself so much on its advantages.”, Kant’s Werke (Berlin, 1912), VIII, p. 17–18. (As quoted in W. H. Walsh: An Introduction to Philosophy of History, London, 1951, p. Z23.
R. Niebuhr argues the case for the philosophy of pessimism in the following manner: “The pessimists rightly declare that the optimists do not understand the misery of man in the ambiguity of his subordination to and transcendence over nature; that they hide or willfully deny the elements of dishonesty and pretensions in human culture, which are the consequences of man’s effort to obscure his true situations; and that they give a false estimate of the stability of culture and civilizations because they do not understand the destructive character of human pretentions.”, Faith and History (New York, 1949 ), p. 186.
VS., 1, pp. 17–18.
Ibid., I, p. 173.
Ibid., I, p. 16.
Ibid., I, p. 16.
Ibid., I, p. 108.
B. an d. F., p. 235.
Ibid., p. 235.
VS., VI, PP. 48–49.
Ibid., pp. 28–29.
Ibid., VIII, P. 54.
It is noteworthy that even Rousseau, this pedagogical genius, was fully as pessimistic in regard to certain fundamental aspects of human existence. Says he: “Man is born to suffer; pain is the means of his preservation.” J. J. Rousseau, Emile, tr. by B. Foxley, ( New York, 1938 ), p. 15.
O. Hentzschel, in his doctoral dissertation on Lichtenberg’s Lebensanschauung, sums up his evaluation of Lichtenberg’s pessimistic philosophy as follows: “Lichtenbergs Charakter ist von ergreifender Tragik: Ein Leidender, der sich das Recht auf Pessimismus nicht zugestehen will - und unterliegt. Wenn er eine grosse Aufgabe gehabt hätte!”, Lichtenbergs Lebensanschauung (Leipzig, 1910 ), p. 34.
VS., I. P. 93.
Ibid., I, p. 42.
Says Kluge: “Die Halbheit war für Lichtenberg der ärgste Stein des Anstosses. `Alles oder Nichts,’ diese Fichtische Losung, die Ibsens Brand so machtvoll durchbraust, war Lichtenberg ureigen.”, op. cit., p. 67.
VS., I, p. 73.
I. Kant, Critiqué of Practical Reason, tr. by L. White Beach (New York, 1956 ), p. 23.
F. M. Mautner says: “Mit dem Grundthema seines Lebens, Menschenkenntnis, offenbart sich auch seine Grundhaltung: Skepsis gegenüber allem Wissen, eine Skepsis aber, die nicht die Hände in den Schoss sinken lässt, sondern die zu immer neu tätigem und rücksichtslosem Forschen, Denken, Überprüfen antreibt.”, “Lichtenbergs Vortrag über die Charactere in der Geschichte,” MLN, Vol. 55, 1940, p. 124.
V. Brinitzer, op. cit., p. 307.
Hermann Wessel, a Dano-Norwegian dramatist and contemporary of Lichtenberg, and who probably, more than any other Scandinavian, helped in the propagation of the spirit of Enlightenment in the Scandinavian countries, voiced the same sceptical philosophy in a line of one of his few, but provocative, poems: “Jeg sielden noget troer, som troes of for mange.”, Digte (Oslo, 1952 ), P. 314.
VS., II, p. 136.
B. an d. F., p. 192.
Lichtenberg reminds us that Hobbes, for example, was afraid of ghosts during the night (VS., V, p. 25).
VS., I, p. 8.
Ibid., I, p. 29.
Ibid., I, p. 171.
Ibid., II, p. 155.
Ibid., I, p. 141.
Ibid., I, p. 59.
Ibid., VIII, p. 159.
Ibid., I, p. 138.
Says L. Marcuse: “Es geht vieles in der menschlichen Seele zusammen, was in der Logik einander beisst.”, Die Philosophie des Glücks (Zürich, 1949 ), P. 164.
VS., II, P. 57.
See A. Neumann’s article, “Lichtenberg als Philosoph und seine Beziehungen zu Kant,” Kantstudien, IV, 1904, pp. 68–93, for a thorough analysis of Kant’s influence on Lichtenberg.
Hentzschel maintains that Lichtenberg was not necessarily a Kantian. Says Hentzschel: “Griesebach und Neumann wissen viel von seiner Geistesverwantschaft mit Kant zu reden: ich glaube, der Nachweis, dass die beiden Antipoden sind, liesse sich ebenso leicht führen - wo nicht leichter.”, op. cit., pp. 39–40.
VS., II, p. 230.
Ibid., II, p. 89.
Ibid., II, p. 122.
Ibid., II, p. 505.
Kant’s appreciation of Lichtenberg’s criticism needs, perhaps, to be stressed at this point, because Kant especially thought of Lichtenberg as a teacher - and not (necessarily) as a philosopher. Kant recommended, on one occasion, a son of a friend of his to Lichtenberg so that this son could get a “thorough education.” Wrote Kant: “Wer aber könnte dieser wohl sonst sein, als der verdienstvolle, mir besonders wohlwollende, öffentlich mich mit seinem Beifall beehrende und durch Beschenkung mit seinen belehrenden sowohl als ergötzenden Schriften zur Dankbarkeit und Hochachtung verpflichtende Herr Hofrat Lichtenberg in Göttingen.”, Immanuel Kants Werke, ed. by E. Cassirer (Berlin, 2923), X, P. 347.
VS., I, p. 69.
Ibid., VIII, p. 4.
Kant omitted, perhaps, some very important clarifications of terms or of philosophical theory; he may also have taken too much for granted, believing that people (including his own university colleagues) might have understood more than they actually did of his writings. This is a point that Lichtenberg, the teacher, felt it necessary to stress if one wants to interpret any of Kant’s many works.
VS., VIII, p. 5.
Lichtenbergs Briefe, ed. by A. Leitzmann and C. Schddekopf Leipzig, 2902(), II, p. 335.
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Øksenholt, S. (1963). Lichtenberg’s Philosophy of Education. In: Thoughts Concerning Education in the Works of Georg Christoph Lichtenberg. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7528-7_2
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