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Propositional Attitudes

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Dialogue Games

Part of the book series: Synthese Language Library ((SLAP,volume 17))

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Abstract

A third central consideration in the game theoretical description of any game concerns the players’ knowledge of the game situation at each stage of the game. If each player knows what the actual game situation is at each stage of the game, we have a game of perfect information: else the game is one of imperfect information.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Academy of Finland, Finland

    Lauri Carlson

Authors
  1. Lauri Carlson
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© 1983 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Carlson, L. (1983). Propositional Attitudes. In: Dialogue Games. Synthese Language Library, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-3963-0_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-3963-0_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1951-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-3963-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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