Man, Nature, and Morality

Abstract

We now pass from the consideration of the nature of infinite and eternal creation, and of the conditions governing the creation of finite agents by which these are involved in a dialectic of emanation and emendation, to an examination of the nature, and the conditions governing, the resulting durational exposition of this dialectic, directing our attention primarily, though by no means exclusively, to durational human nature and life as exemplifying for us, as men, the finite agent most notably, most profoundly, and with greatest distinctness. In so doing, it is necessary to have regard to the duality of human nature, as both mental and physical — a distinction so far relatively negligible in the general exposition of creative action which, by reason of the identity of all Attributes in Substance, is identical under whichsoever Attribute it may, by intellect, be considered. Not, of course, that it has been possible wholly to ignore the distinction of mental and physical in the discussions of Part I., the emphasis being almost wholly on the physical in Chapters III. and IV. and chiefly on the mental in Chapter V.; but in view of the widespread belief, or tacit assumption, that the moral life of man consists very largely, if not wholly, in the control of bodily action by the mind, in the interest of purposes essentially mental, the relations of mind and body must first be clarified if the nature of morality is rightly to be conceived.

The distinction of Nature and Morality signalized by the titles of Parts I and II of this essay must not be understood as implying that Morality transcends, or is a passage to a realm transcending, Nature. On the contrary, eternal Nature transcends Morality which is but a ‘moment’ in the dialectic of microcosmic creation. It is thus that though ‘ought’ cannot be reduced to ‘is,’ eternal ‘value’ to durational ‘fact,’ yet what is obligatory for an agent is so because he is what he is, not merely subject to its authority, but also its author, original or delegate Thus ‘ought’ is a privation of ‘is,’ which must thus also never be reduced to ‘ought.’ “By reality and perfection I understand the same” (Eth. II, Def. vi).