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The Special Function of the Principle of Restrictive Interpretation

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Abstract

The principle of restrictive interpretation serves authoritative interpreters as an indispensable complement to the principle of effectiveness. It embodies considerably more than a vague preference for “narrow interpretation” or the fundamental policy that in a free society agreements should not be made for or imposed upon parties. It is the special function of the principle of restrictive interpretation both to point to the factors in the context of an agreement, such as the varying responsibilities of the Parties as Governments or private associations, which experience has established as valid indices of limits upon the expectations of the Parties as to the extent of commitment, and to prescribe that the implementing inference of an interpreter in remedying ambiguities or gaps or contradictions in the agreement should be confined to what is necessary to achieving the essential purposes of the Parties and should not be extended to imposing new purposes and unnecessary detailed obligations upon the Parties.

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Reference

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© 1968 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

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Sultan, H. (1968). The Special Function of the Principle of Restrictive Interpretation. In: Mélanges Offerts à Juraj Andrassy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-3486-4_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-3486-4_19

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-015-2247-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-015-3486-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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