Abstract
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the “pre-objective” world is the key at once to his theory of perception and to his philosophical anthropology. His Phénoménologie de la perception 1 might almost be interpreted as an attempt to introduce the concept into philosophy and into those sciences that have man for their subject matter. The phenomenology of perception is for Merleau-Ponty the discovery and exploration of the world not such as everyday and scientific discourse describe it, but of the “pre-objective” world which it presupposes. As such it implies an exploration of the phenomenal field or the “original” content of perception, which is supposed to set norms for, and limits to the kind of language psychologists, sociologists and laymen should use in talking about man. These two aspects of his work are closely linked, and are even held to stand or fall together. The link is made through the concept of the “pre-objective” world.2 Other expressions are used by Merleau-Ponty such as “le monde vécu,” “the phenomenal field,” as near equivalents, but we shall generally use the terms “pre-objective” or “pre-predicative.”3
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References
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Phénoménologie de la perception, Paris, 1945. Hereinafter quoted as “P. P.”
For uses of the term cf. P. P., pp. 19, 37, 279, 309, 318, etc.
For uses of the term cf. P. P., pp. 85, 150, 272, 372, 395, etc.
Cf. P. P., pp. 34, 35 et seq.
Cf, P. P., pp. 24, 38, 39, 49.
Cf. P. P., pp. 11, 31, and particularly pp. 66–69.
Cf. P. P., pp. 12, 71, 370, for which Merleau-Ponty uses also the Husserlian expression “natural attitude.”
Cf. P. P., p. xiii.
Cf. P. P., p. ii.
Cf. P. P., p. 69 et seq.
Cf. P. P., p. 71 et seq.
Cf. P. P., p. 40.
Cf. Michotte, A., La Perception de la causalité, Paris, 1946.
Merleau-Ponty, M., La Structure du comportement, 2me ed., Paris, 1949, pp. 207, 217, 222 also pp. 23–4. Hereinafter referred to as S. C.
P. P., p. 31.
Gibson, James J. and E. J., “Perceptual Learning: Differentiation or Enrichment?,” Psychological Review, LXII, 1955, pp. 32–41.
P. P., pp. 33, 39.
P. P., pp. 71.
P. P., p. 11.
P. P., pp. 9, 81–85.
P. P., p. v.
p. p., p. 11.
Cf. P. P., pp. 29, 44, 46, 66.
Cf. P. P., 40, 50, 53.
Cf. P. P., pp. 19, 75–77.
Empiricism and intellectualism share the same presupposition regarding the nature of the given or directly perceived. They both start with a physiological definition of sensation. Cf. P. P., pp. 29, 33, 40.
P. P., p. 28.
P. P., p. 424.
Far from perception having to be explained by knowledge, it is itself original knowledge. Cf. P.P., p. 53–54 (particularly p. 54, where perception is described as the birth of intelligence).
Cf. P. P., pp. 29, 30, 33.
Cf. P. P., pp. 40–55.
The thesis here is that if what we perceive and our perception did not have a minimum of complexity, we could not be said to perceive anything at all. For arguments in support of this cf. Gibson, J., The Perception of the Visual World, Boston, 1950
32a Koffka, K., Principles of Gestalt Psychology, New York, 1935, pp. 110 ff.
S. C., p. 201.
S. C, p. 217.
P. P., pp. 31 and 32.
Cf. P. P., p. 46.
Cf. S. C, p. 200.
Cf. P. P., p. x.
Cf. P. P., pp. 81–86.
We should refer the reader to recent criticisms of Russell’s (and to Quine’s) views regarding the eliminability of particulars — particularly Strawson, P. F., “On Referring,” Mind, LIX, 1950.
Cf. P. P., p. 82.
Cf. P. P., pp. 343–344.
Cf. Ryle, Gilbert, Concept of Mind, London, 1949, in particular p. 30.
Cf. P. P., pp. 275–6.
P. P., p. 44.
P. P., pp. 53–4.
For uses of such expressions, cf. P. P., pp. 29, 44–5, 48, 60–1, 66.
Cf. P. P., pp. 45, 48, 61.
Cf. P. P., p. xvi.
Cf. P. P., pp. 157, 451, where Merleau-Ponty uses the term “Fundierung”, borrowed from Husserl, to refer to what we call “presupposition.”
Cf. P. P., pp. 93–95, et passim.
Cf. P. P., p. viii.
Cf. P. P., p. ix.
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© 1966 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Kullman, M., Taylor, C. (1966). The Pre-Objective World. In: Natanson, M. (eds) Essays in Phenomenology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-3427-7_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-3427-7_6
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