Abstract
Both phenomenology and psychology are concerned with consciousness in general as well as with specific acts of consciousness like perception, memory, comprehension of meaning, reasoning, etc. Yet, the theoretical orientation and perspective in which consciousness is studied in psychology is highly different from that of phenomenology.
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References
As to “natural attitude” see Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (referred to hereafter as Ideen) §§ 27 f. (All our references to Ideen are to the 2nd edition of 1922 which is a reprint of the 1st edition of 1913. The Louvain edition, Husserliana III (ed. by W. Biemel), Haag, 1950, gives on the margin the pagination of the previous editions.) Cf. also Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology, pp. 522 ff.
Husserl, loc. cit. pp. 52 ff.
Id. ibid§§ and Abschnitt II chap, IV; Farber, loc. cit. pp. 526 ff. A very clear, though brief, presentation is given by Schutz in the preceding chapter of this book.
It is thus interpreted by Farber, loc. cit. pp. 561 f.
Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen, Husserliana I (ed. by S. Strasser), Haag, 1950 p. 59: “Die in diesem reflektierenden Leben erfahrene Welt bleibt dabei in gewisser Weise für mich weiter und genau mit dem ihr jeweilig zugehörigen Gehalt erfahrene wie vorher. Sie erscheint weiter, wie sie vordem erschien, nur dass ich als philosophisch Reflektierender nicht mehr den natürlichen Seinsglauben der Erfahrung im Vollzug, in Geltung halte, indes er doch mit da ist und vom aufmerkenden Blick mit erfasst ist.”
Such misunderstandings are not infrequent; cf. e.g. Spiegelberg, H., “The ‘Reality-Phenomenon’ and Reality” IV and McGill, V. J., “A Materialistic Approach to Husserl’s Philosophy” pp. 239 ff.; both articles in Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl.
The privilege and priority of consciousness in the sense under discussion was for the first time formulated by Descartes in his Meditationes de prima philosophia. Summarizing his analysis of perception, Descartes writes, Oeuvres (ed. by Ch. Adam and P. Tannery), VII, p. 33: “Quid autem dicam de hac ipsa mente, sive de me ipso?...Quid, inquam, ego qui hanc ceram videor tarn distincte percipere? Nunquam me ipsum non tantum multo verius, multo certius, sed etiam multo distinctius evidentiusque, cognosco? Nam, si judico ceram existere, ex eo quod hanc videam, certe multo evidentius efficitur me ipsum etiam existere, ex eo quod hanc videam.... Porro autem, si magis distincta visa sit cerae perceptio, postquam mihi, non ex solo visu vel tactu, sed pluribus ex causis innotuit, quanto distinctius me ipsum a me nunc cognosci fatentum est, quandoquidem nullae rationes vel ad cerae, vel ad cuiuspiam alterius corporis perceptionem possint juvare, quin eaedem omnes mentis meae naturam melius probent.”
Cf. Husserl, Ideen §§ 47 ff. and 142; Formale und transzendentale Logik, §§ 61, 94 f., 104; Cartesianische Meditationen §§ 7 f. and pp. 84 f.
Cf. Id., Ideen p. 142.
Id.,Cartesianische Meditationen, pp. 60 f. and 71: “...die Welt überhaupt in phänomenologischer Einstellung (ist) nicht in Geltung als Wirklichkeit sondern nur als Wirklichkeitsphänomen.” A very clear presentation of the phenomenological reduction from the point of view of its function to disclose the world as a phenomenon has been given by Berger, Gaston, Le Cogito dans la philosophie de Husserl, Paris, 1941, chap. III. Berger writes (p. 54): “Ce qui s’opère, dans la réduction phénoménologique, c’est moins le passage de l’objet au sujet, que la prise de conscience du monde en tant que phénomène — qua cogitatum-... il y a une catégorie plus profonde que celle d’être ou de non-être, c’est celle d’objet pensé.” (Italics mine.)
Cf. Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen p. 74.
Cf. Id., Ideen §§ 41, 88 ff., 97 and Cartesianische Meditationen II. See also our article “On the Intentionality of Consciousness,” II, Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl.
For the formulation and development of these problems cf. Husserl, Ideen § 86 and Ab-schnitt IV.
Id., “Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie” § 9, Philosophia, I, 1936.
Scheler, Max, Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, Leipzig, 1926, pp. 361 ff.
Köhler, Wolfgang, Gestalt Psychology, New York, pp. 5 ff.
Id. ibid. p. 22 note.
Descartes, Oeuvres VII, p. 26. (Italics mine.)
Sartre, Jean-Paul, L’Être et le néant, Paris, 1943, pp. 365 ff.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, La Structure du comportement, Paris, 1942, pp. 195 ff. and 256 ff.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Phénoménologie de la perception, Paris, 1945, pp. 110 ff., 122 ff., and 403 f.
Cassirer, Ernst, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren leit, I, Berlin, 1922, pp. 554 f.
Husserl, “Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie” §§ 10 f., loc. cit.
A few examples by which that analogy is illustrated have been discussed in our article “La place de la psychologie dans l’ensemble des sciences” pp. 170 ff., Revue de Synthése, VIII, 1934.
Cf. the classical formulation by Helmholtz, Handbuch der physiologischen Optik, 2nd ed., Hamburg & Leipzig, 1896, pp. 584 ff.
Cf. Marcel, Gabriel, Journal métaphysique, Paris, 1935, p. 124: “...le mode de représentation des rapports de l’âme et du corps, dépendant de la façon dont le corps même est pensé, dépend indirectement de ce mouvement même par lequel l’esprit se réalise dans la science... la notion que l’esprit peut se faire des rapports de l’âme et du corps doit être fonction du mouvement par lequel la notion du corps se construit. Or cette construction du corps se révèle solidaire dans une mesure extraordinairement étroite de la construction même du monde extérieur.”
Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception, Introduction.
Köhler, loc. cit. p. 7: “To the influence of other physical objects my organism responds with processes which establish the sensory world around me. Further processes in the organism give rise to the sensory thing which I call my body.”; p. 22 note: “My body is the outcome of certain processes in my physical organism, processes which start in the eyes, muscles, skin, and so forth, exactly as the chair before me is the final product of other processes in the same physical organism.”
The legitimacy of ‘explanation’ of the style in question in psychology has been challenged by Merleau-Ponty, La Structure du comportement, pp. 177 ff. and 256 ff.; Phénoménologie de la perception, pp. 58 if. and 112 f.
For the following brief presentation of the constancy-hypothesis and its consequences cf. Köhler, loc. cit. chap. III and IV and Koffka, K., Principles of Gestalt Psychology, New York, 1935, chap. III. Of necessity we must here confine ourselves to a few theoretical statements.
Cf. Helmholtz, loc. cit. p. 569.
Ehrenfels, Chr. v., “Ueber Gestaltqualitäten,” Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, XIV, 1890.
Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, Halle, 1891, pp. 217 ff.
Cf. the critical discussion of V. Benussi’s explanation of the features in question on the basis of the constancy-hypothesis by Koffka, K., “Zur Grundlegung der Wahrnehmungspsychologie,” Zeitschrift für Psychologie, LXXIII, 1915; see also our article “Quelques aspects et quelques développements de la psychologie de la forme,” II, Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique, XXXIII, 1936.
Köhler, W., “Ueber unbemerkte Empfindungen und Urteilstäuschungen,” Zeitschrift für Psychologie, LXVI, 1913.
For technical discussions of this question and related ones, which pertain to experimental psychology, we refer to Köhler’s article as well as to his afore-mentioned book and that by Koffka.
For the first time we have ventured a phenomenological interpretation of Gestalt theory along similar lines in our article “Phänomenologie der Thematik und des reinen Ich” I Anhang, Psychologische Forschung, XII, 1929.
Cf. supra p. 52 ff.
Cf. supra pp. 45 ff.
This is Husserl’s theory of perceptual adumbration; cf. Ideen §§41 ff., 97 f., 135, 149 f.; Cartesianische Meditationen §§ 17 ff.; Erfahrung und Urteil, Hamburg, 1948, § 8.
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© 1966 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Gurwitsch, A. (1966). The Phenomenological and the Psychological Approach to Consciousness. In: Natanson, M. (eds) Essays in Phenomenology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-3427-7_3
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