Abstract
G. E. Moore, R. M. Hare and other recent analysts have contended that good is a supervenient property, i.e. that if one object possesses it and another lacks it, they must differ in some other property as well. As Hare observes, it would be improper to say of two pictures P and Q that “P is exactly like Q in all respects save this one, that P is a good picture and Q not,” for “there must be some further difference between them to make one good and the other not.”1 In the present paper, I shall consider whether the same point is true of the aesthetic quality gracefulness. There is, at any rate, a prima-facie case for supposing that gracefulness may be supervenient, namely that if anyone applies the term “graceful” to an object, he can appropriately be asked for a reason.
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References
R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 81.
The parallel between theological grace and the ability to perceive aesthetically was suggested by A. K. Coomaraswamy in “Art and Craftsmanship,” Reflections on Art, S. K. Langer, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 240–242.
G. E. Moore, “The Conception of Intrinsic Value,” Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 253–275.
B. Croce, Aesthetic (New York: The Noonday Press, 1953), p. 90.
Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 119.
H. S. Langfeld, The Aesthetic Attitude (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1920), p. 139.
See Sibley’s article, “Aesthetic Concepts,” in Philosophy Looks at the Arts, J. Margolis, ed. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1962), p, 70.
See Stout’s essay, “The Nature of Universals and Propositions,” Studies in Philosophy, J. N. Findlay, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 5–24.
See also Williams’ book, Principles of Empirical Realism (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1966), pp. 74–109.
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© 1971 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Burkholder, P.M. (1971). Is Gracefulness a Supervenient Property?. In: Aesthetics II. Tulane Studies in Philosophy, vol 20. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-1116-2_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-1116-2_2
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