Abstract
During the first year of peace, the British Cabinet dealt with foreign policy in a frequently partial, somewhat haphazard, and decidedly discontinuous fashion. In the main, its most persistent concern was with the implications of British intervention in Russia. Yet these rather protracted discussions were devoted to attempts, by individual ministers, to temper what they saw as the dangerous conciseness of Churchill’s Russia policy, and to frustrate his (admittedly expensive) efforts to secure its execution. There is no evidence in the minutes of these meetings to suggest that any minister endeavoured to develop a counter policy for either Russia, or any other section of Europe. In particular, there was no attempt to define the objectives of British German policy, or to implement specific measures to facilitate their realization. The Cabinet accordingly advanced no comprehensive plans for the reincorporation of Germany in the European community, or, more specifically, for dealing with the infinitely more complex question of reconciling France with her powerful neighbour across the Rhine. In fact, Germany rarely crept onto the Cabinet’s agenda in these post-Versailles months, and when it did it was invariably incidental to the troubles in Russia. To this extent, the Cabinet’s experience in dealing with German affairs paralleled that of the Secretary of War.
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References
The creation of the personal Secretariat or “Garden Suburb,” as it came to be called, is discussed in D. N. Chester (ed.), The Organization of British Central Government, 1914–1956 (London, 1968; 2nd edition), pp. 287–91, Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, pp. 16 (T.J. to Sir Henry Jones, 15 December 1916), 17 (T.J. to his wife, as with succeeding references, 29 December 1916), 19 (2 January 1917), 31 (18 April 1917), describes the various stages by which the Cabinet Secretariat, and particularly the personal Secretariat, were evolved. There is a sketchy account of Kerr’s role in J. R. M. Butler, Lord Lothian (London, i960), chapter IV, passim.
W.C. 606A, 5 August 1919, Cab. 23/15, ff. 147–171.
Memorandum by the General Staff (5 February 1920), “Present Situation in Germany,” D.B.F.P., I, ix, p. 41.
ibid., pp. 42–3.
An admiration which, significantly, was shared by the Secretary of War: Winston Churchill, The Aftermath, p. 201.
Churchill made his position explicit during conversations with André Lefèvre, the French Minister of War, in Paris, on 13 April 1920. See the precis of this conference’s proceedings in D.B.F.P., I, x, pp. 61–3. The Secretary of War also referred to the need to maintain the existing German Government, “from a military point of view,” in the course of a speech to the Commons on 22 March 1920. See, 127 H.C. Deb., cols 188–9.
D.B.F.P., I, ix, pp. 44–5.
Conclusion of a Conference of Ministers, 25 February 1920, 5 p.m.; filed as an Appendix to C. 13 (20), 4 March 1920, Cab. 23/20, ff. 229–30.
Austen Chamberlain’s letter, 26 February, is printed ibid., f. 234; also in D.B.F.P., I, x, p. 204. Bradbury, it is interesting to note, was directly responsible to the Treasury, and not the Foreign Office. Curzon put the Foreign Office view on the prestige of the Reparations Commission in a private letter to the Earl of Derby (H. M. Ambassador in Paris), 19 February: D.B.F.P., I, x, pp. 196–7. Article 235 of the Versailles Treaty allowed Germany, out of her first reparation payment, such supplies of food and raw material as might be considered necessary to enable her to meet her financial obligations. See letter no. C.R. 751 (4 March 1920) from the Reparations Commission to the German Government: D.B.F.P., I, vii, pp. 432–4, n. 3.
Sir John Bradbury to the Treasury, 20 March 1920, D.B.F.P., I, vii, pp. 207–8; and minutes by Lord Curzon and Sir E. Crowe (5 April 1920) on a note from the Italian Ambassador (26 March 1920), D.B.F.P., I, vii, pp. 209–210, n. 4.
Letter from Sir H. Stuart (Coblenz) to Mr Waterlow (F.O.), 26 April 1920, D.B.F.P., I, vii, pp. 214–6.
Lord Hardinge to Earl of Derby (Paris), 30 January 1920: D.B.F.P. I, ix, p. 621. Meetings of the Conference of Ambassadors: C.A. 8 (6 February 1920), ibid., pp. 654–660; C.A. 9 (7 February 1920), ibid., pp. 663–670. Earl Curzon to Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin), 8 February 1920, ibid., p. 676. British Secretary’s notes of an Allied Conference at 10 Downing St., London (First Conference of London): 12 February 1920 (3:30p.m.), 13 February 1920 (11 :30 p.m.), D.B.F.P., I, vii, pp. 12–28. The Allied Note to Germany, approving the trial of a selected number of major war criminals before the Leipzig Court, can be found as Appendix IA to the 13 February minutes, ibid., pp. 28–9. The Report of the inter-Allied Commission, and the indictments against selected Germans, are printed as Appendix n to the minutes of the 26 April 1920 (5 p.m.) session of the Supreme Council at San Remo, D.B.F.P., I, viii, pp.234–252.
Dr Otto Göppert’s (8 April) note to Millerand is printed in Cmd. 1325 (Miscellaneous No. 15): Protocols and Correspondence between the Supreme Council and the Conference of Ambassadors and the German Government and the German Peace Delegation between January 10, 1920 and July 7, 1920 respecting the Execution of the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919 (1921), pp. 73–4. See also, notes of a Conversation between Lloyd George and Millerand at San Remo, 18 April 1920 (9:30 a.m.), D.B.F.P., I, viii, p. 6.
On 20 April 1920, Göppert sent a further note to Millerand, enclosing a memorandum from the German Minister for National Defence, requesting the permanent retention of an army of 200,000 men. Cmd. 1325, pp. 88–93.
D.B.F.P., I, viii, pp. 153–4.
The decision was taken during Supreme Council meetings at San Remo, 25 April 1920 (4 p.m.), 26 April 1920 (11 a.m.), ibid., pp. 192–5, 199–204. The Allied Declaration (A.J. 178) in answer to the German Note (20 April) is printed as Appendix 4 to the minutes of the latter session: ibid., pp. 209–210.
ibid.
Notes of a meeting of the Heads of the British, French and Italian Delegations at San Remo, 18 April 1920 (5 p.m.): ibid., pp. 10–19. The appointment of ambassadors was discussed at ist Conference of London, 1 March 1920 (4 p.m.), 3 March 1920 (11 a.m.), D.B.F.P., I, vii, pp. 330–3, PP. 365–66.
Winston Churchill to David Lloyd George, March 1920, quoted in Lewis Broad, Winston Churchill, I: The Years of Preparation (London, 1963), p. 264.
A report of the speech was leaked to the press and published in The Times on 17 July 1919. Amidst growing acrimony, Churchill released the full text of his speech, which can be found in The Times, 25 July 1919. On 2 August 1919, in its “Topics of the Day” column, the Spectator ran a blistering attack on the Secretary of War, and his “shabby” ambitions (pp. 136–7).
This notion is implicit in Churchill’s biography of the first Duke of Marlborough, and explicitly articulated in his May 1931 essay, “Mass Effects in Modern Life,” reprinted in Winston Churchill, Thoughts and Adventures (London, 1932), pp. 255–65.
On 16 October 1919, Churchill had told Henry Wilson that if Denikin was successful, he himself would go out “as a sort of Ambassador,” to “help Denikin mould the new Russian constitution.” Wilson MS. Diary, quoted in Ullman, op. cit.. Il, p. 247 n. 117.
Robert Gilbert Vansittart, The Mist Procession (London, 1958), p. 253.
Edgar Vincent D’Abernon, An Ambassador of Peace, I: From Spa (1920) to Rapallo (1922) (London, 1929), pp. 53–4.
Edgar Vincent D’Abernon, An Ambassador of Peace, III: The Years of Recovery, January 1924-October 1926 (London, 1930), pp. 102 (22 September 1924), 112 (7 November 1924), 116 (24 November 1924).
Letter cited in n. 19 (above). Italics in original.
The various Allied representatives expressed their opinions on these questions in the course of meetings of the first Conference of London: 18 March (4 p.m.), minute 1 ; 22 March (4:15 p.m.), minute 1; 24 March (4 p.m.), minute 2; 31 March 1920 (12 p.m.), minute 2. D.B.F.P., I, vii, pp. 542–47; 584–90; 606–610; 683–685. Britain’s decision to protest against this independent French action was taken at Cabinet on 8 April: C. 18 (20), 8 April 1920, Cab. 23/21, ff. 2–5.
Notes of a conversation between Lloyd George and Millerand at San Remo, 24 April 1920 (10:30 a.m.), D.B.F.P., I, viii, p. 154.
ibid., p. 147. As a concession to France, Lloyd George agreed immediately to issue a press communique, declaring that “on the initiative of Great Britain, the British and French Governments had agreed to propose to their Allies that strong action should be taken to secure the destruction of all war material in Germany.” Notes of a conversation held at Lympne (Second Conference of Hythe), 20 June 1920 (10:55 a.m.), ibid., pp. 311–2.
Winston Churchill to Sir Edward Grey and H. H. Asquith, 23 August 1912: Randolph Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, CII/iii, p. 1639.
This account of the proceedings of the 30 June meeting may be found in Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, pp. 116–7. C. 38 (20), 30 June 1920, Cab. 23/21, ff. 293–4, is by no means so detailed, but corroborates the main outlines of Jones’ account.
Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, p. 117. Bonar Law, Balfour and Curzon all supported Lloyd George’s stand on this issue, and endorsed Curzon’s formula: “‘Danger not serious and discussions premature.’” They likewise did not object to the Prime Minister’s tactless and belligerent declaration that “it is only France who could give us trouble now.”
During the Great War, Spears had served as head of the British Military Mission to Marshal Foch, a position he filled with considerable distinction. After an attempt in April-May 1919 to have Spears appointed Military Attache — a proposition which Lord Derby, Britain’s Ambassador, rejected out of hand — Churchill attempted to secure his appointment as head of an autonomous branch of the Military Attache’s department. Winston Churchill to Lord Derby, 11 April 1920, quoted in Randolph Churchill, Lord Derby, p. 369. Derby was alarmed by Churchill’s proposal and particularly concerned that the Spears Mission should communicate directly with the War Office. On 17 April 1920, he replied to Churchill: “From a military point of view therefore it would appear as if the Spears Mission is no longer required; but you yourself told me the other day, it is not for the purpose of obtaining military information that you wish to keep Spears, but for political information, and you say he gives you lots of information which you do not get from any other source. But is it to you that other political information should go? I was always under the impression that it was the Government generally who got the information, and that ought to be sent to them through the Foreign Office or by private letter from the Ambassador. You are apparently not satisfied with this and wish to have an embassy of your own.” ibid., quoted p. 370. The Spears Mission was, in fact, wound up after Derby left the Embassy in November 1920.
Riddell, Intimate Diary, pp. 203 (12 June 1920); 222–3 (22 July 1920).
Notes of an International Conference at Spa, 6 July 1920 (4:30 p.m.), 7 July 1920 (3:30 p.m.), D.B.F.P., I, viii, pp. 430–41, 455–64.
Notes of an Inter-Allied Conference, 8 July 1920 (11 a.m.), ibid., pp. 467–470. Notes of a meeting of Allied Delegation leaders, 8 July 1920 (11:15 a.m.), ibid., pp. 470–481. The Spa Protocol on Disarmament (9 July 1920) is printed in Cmd. 1325, pp. 171–3. For the attitude of Churchill and the General Staff, see above: III, i (nn. 3, 6). By the terms of the Protocol, the Germans were given until 1 January 1921 to reduce their army to 100,000 men, provided they took immediate steps to withdraw those arms held by the Einwohnerwehren and the Sicherheitspolizei; issued a proclamation to the civilian population demanding the surrender of their arms; and abolished conscription.
Lord D’Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (16 November 1920), D.B.F.P., I, x, pp. 427–9; Lord D’Abernon to Earl Curzon (11 December 1920), ibid., pp. 454–5; Lord Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (Telegraphic, 16 December 1920), ibid., pp. 458–9; Lord Kilmarnock to Earl Curzon (16 December 1920), ibid., pp. 459–61; Lord Kilmarnock to Earl Curzon (Telegraphic, 26 December 1920), ibid., p. 465.
C. 78 (20), 28 December 1920, Cab. 23/23, ff. 322–5; C. 80 (20), 30 December 1920, Cab. 23/23, ff. 348–9; 125 H.C. Deb., cols 1353–6 (23 February 1920); C. 27 (20), 12 May 1920, Cab. 23/21, f. 104; Winston Churchill, “Shall We all Commit Suicide?,” Thoughts and Adventures, pp. 248–52; Lord D’Abernon (Berlin) to Earl Curzon (23 November 1920), D.B.F.P., I, x, pp. 448–50; D’Abernon, op. cit., I, pp. 224–5 (6 November 1921).
C. 3 (21), 20 January 1921, Cab. 23/24, ff. 24–8.
The military proposals (A.J. 235, 25 January 1921), which formed the basis of the Allied note to Germany, are printed as Appendices 2 and 4 to the minutes of an Allied Conference (2nd Conference of Paris) 29 January 1921 (11 a.m.), D.B.F.P., I, xv, pp. 104–110. For the restrictions on the Allied Military Commission of Control, see notes of an Allied Conference on 29 January 1921 (3:30 p.m.), minute 2, ibid., pp. 111–113.
Lloyd George and Curzon were particularly aware of this problem when they attacked Briand, at the Third Conference of Paris, for attempting to “eternalize” the Control Commission. Notes of an Allied Conference at the Quai d’Orsay, 10 August 1921 (4 p.m.), ibid., pp. 666–671. For a concise summary of British attempts to deal with the Commission, see John P. Fox, “Britain and the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control, 1925–6,” Journal of Contemporary History, 4 (April 1969), pp. 143–164.
e.g., Notes of an Allied meeting, 24 January 1921 (4 p.m.), D.B.F.P., I, xv, pp. 9–20.
Notes of an Allied meeting at Spa, 14 July 1920 (11:30 a.m.), D.B.F.P., I, viii, pp. 602–4. For Stinnes’ speech see notes of an International Conference, 10 July 1920 (11 a.m.), ibid., pp. 521–4.
Notes of an Allied Conference at the Quai d’Orsay, 27 January 1921 (4 p.m.), 29 January 1921 (n a.m.), D.B.F.P., I, xv, pp. 59–73, 90–94.
Reparation: Note [by Sir Maurice Hankey] on negotiations at Paris on 28 January 1921, ibid., pp. 73–5. There is an incomplete copy in Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, pp. 126–7.
D’Abernon, op. cit., I, p. 118 (24 January 1921); C. 29 (21), 27 April 1921, Cab. 23/25, f. 172; D.B.F.P., I, xv, p. 225.
Notes of an International Conference in London, 1 March 1921 (11:30 a.m.), D.B.F.P., I, xv, pp. 216–225; Notes of Allied Conferences at 10 Downing St., 1 March 1921 (4 p.m.), 2 March 1921 (12 noon), 2 March 1921 (5 p.m.), ibid., pp. 225–257.
ibid., pp. 251–2. Royal J. Schmidt, Versailles and the Ruhr: Seedbed of World War II (The Hague, 1968), conjectures that Lloyd George may have been ready to compromise with Briand in return for an additional undertaking to co-operate with Britain in dealing with the situation in the Near East (p. 32).
Minutes of an International Conference in London, 3 March 1921 (12 p.m.), D.B.F.P., I, xv, pp. 264–5; Inter-Allied discussions at 10 Downing Street, 4 March (6 p.m.), 6 March 1921 (7:30 p.m.), ibid., pp. 288–9, 302–7.
Interview with Dr Simons, 5 March 1921, ibid., pp. 291–5; Notes of an Allied Conference, 10 Downing St., 7 March 1921 (11 a.m.), ibid pp. 313–6; Notes of a Conference at Lancaster House, 7 March 1921 (12 noon), ibid., pp. 316–24. For the 7 March Cabinet meeting, see notes in Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, pp. 130–1. See also, C. 11 (21), 7 March 1921, Cab. 23/24, f. 136.
Notes of an Allied Conference at 10 Downing St., 2 March 1921 (5 p.m.), D.B.F.P., I, xv, pp. 252–3.
That Lloyd George was perfectly aware of these implications is clear from his exchange with both the French and his own ministerial colleagues. See above: nn. 48, 49.
C. 24 (21), 19 April 1921, Cab. 23/25, f. 142.
On this occasion, neither minister attacked Lloyd George’s preference for conference diplomacy, nor criticized his failure to take the Cabinet into his confidence before reaching decisions. Nonetheless, Churchill and Montagu were both aggrieved by their leader’s conduct. Churchill was particularly angry that Sir Robert Home had been appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer, during his absence from London. On 26 April 1921, Lloyd George’s secretary, Frances Stevenson, wrote in her diary that “Winston is still very vexed ... as a result of having been neglected in the recent promotions.” Stevenson, L.G. Diary, p. 210. Indeed, as Beaverbrook observed, he kept up only the most formal relations with the Prime Minister, and bombarded him with many “exceedingly embarassing letters of protest over numerous policies.” Beaverbrook, Decline and Fall of Lloyd George, pp. 33–35. Montagu’s dismay is recorded in a number of contemporary letters to the Marquess of Reading (Rufus Isaacs), which are reproduced in S. D. Waley, Edwin Montagu: a Memoir and Account of his Visits to India (London, 1964), pp. 259–261.
C. 24 (21), 19 April 1921, Cab. 23/25, ff. 141–2.
C. 28 (21), 26 April 1921, Cab. 23/25, f. 163. Dr Simon’s note (24/25 April 1921) transmitted in two sections by the U.S. Embassy in Berlin, is printed in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921 (Washington, 1936), II, pp. 46–8. For details of procedural changes in Lloyd George’s Cabinet see Kenneth O. Morgan, “Lloyd George’s Premiership: a Study in Prime Ministerial Government,” Historical Journal, XIII (1970), pp. 130–157.
C. 29 (21), 27 April 1921, Cab. 23/25, ff. 172–4. The set of “Alternative Proposals” is filed as Appendix II to these minutes, ff. 181–2.
Minutes of the abortive Fourth Conference of Hythe (or Lympne), 23–24 April 1921, are printed in D.B.F.P., I, xv, pp. 453–486.
Notes of an Allied Conference at 10 Downing St., 30 April 1921 (3 p.m.), ibid., pp. 488–507; C. 31 (21), 30 April 1921 (7:45 P-m-)> Cab. 23/25, ff. 191–195.
Notes of proceedings at the 30 April Cabinet meeting can be found in Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, p. 155.
Jaspar’s draft is printed as an appendix to the British Secretary’s notes of an Allied Conference at 10 Downing St., 1 May 1921 (4:30 p.m.), D.B.F.P., I, xv, p. 5 15.
C. 32 (21), i May 1921 (5:45 p.m.), Cab. 23/25, ff. 205–8; Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, pp. 155–6 (Cabinet notes, 1 May 1921), 158–9 (T. Jones to A. Bonar Law, 19 May 1921); D’Abernon, op. cit., I, p. 159 (2 May 1921).
Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, p. 156.
The London Ultimatum, 5 May 1921, is printed as Appendix II to an Allied Conference, 4 May 1921 (9:30 p.m.), D.B.F.P., I, xv, pp. 579–580. For reparation terms see, “Arrangement for the Discharge of Germany’s Liability for Reparation . . .,” 3 May 1921, ibid., pp. 566–9.
Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, p. 156.
Allied Drafting Committee, 1 May (6:30 p.m.), 2 May 1921 (10:30 a.m.), D.B.F.P., I, xv, pp. 515–523.
Minutes of a Conference of Ministers, 30 April 1921 (11:30 a.m.), Appendix I to C. 31 (21), 30 April 1921, Cab. 23/25, ff. 197–8.
London Payments Plan cited in n. 63 (above); Allied Conference at 10 Downing St., 2 May 1921 (6:15 p.m.), D.B.F.P., I, xv, pp. 527–540.
C. 38 (21), 11 May 1921, Cab. 23/25, f. 260.
See above: III, i.
Notes of an Allied Conference (Fourth Conference of London) at 10 Downing Street, 2 May 1921 (6:15 p.m.), D.B.F.P., I, xv, pp. 540–1.
132 H.C. Deb., cols 502–3 (21 July 1920); 141 H.C. Deb., cols 2380–6 (13 May 1921); C. 14 (21), 22 March 1921, Cab. 23/24, f. 175; Earl Curzon to Col. Percival (British Plebiscite Commissioner), 22 March 1921, D.B.F.P., I, xvi, p.i An outline of the origins of the dispute, and details of the plebiscite, can be found in F. Gregory Campbell, “The Struggle for Upper Silesia,” Journal of Modern History, 42 (September 1970), pp. 361–385. There was a 98% turnout among registered voters; 707,605 cast ballots in favour of Germany, while 497,359 voted for Poland. Germany thus won 60% of the total poll. But in critical regions like the industrial “triangle,” lying between Beuthen, Gleiwitz, and Kattowitz, 259,000 voted for Germany, and 205,000 for Poland. D.B.F.P., I, xvi, pp. 44–5; Campbell, op. cit., pp. 372–3.
General Le Rond to Lloyd George (30 April 1921), D.B.F.P., I, xvi, pp. 47–8, see esp. n. 4; Col. Percival to Earl Curzon (3 May 1921), ibid., pp. 49–50; Col. Percival to Earl Curzon (10 May 1921), ibid., pp. 69–70; Col. Percival to Earl Curzon (18 May 1921) ibid., pp. 104–6.
141 H.C. Deb., col. 2385 (13 May 1921) ; The Times, 19 May 1921 ; Stevenson, L.G. Diary, pp. 216 (15 May 1921), 217 (20 May 1921).
c. 40 (21), 24 May 1921, Cab. 23/25, ff. 282–4.
ibid.
For a report of Churchill’s speech see The Times, g June 1921; there is a complete text in the Manchester Guardian, 9 June 1921.
German press reactions are summarized in Lord Kilmarnock to Earl Curzon, 14 June 1921, F.O. 371/5972, C. 12929/416/18.
Lord Curzon to Winston Churchill, 13 June 1921, quoted in Beaverbrook, Decline and Fall of Lloyd George, pp. 255–6; Winston Churchill to Lord Curzon, 13 June 1921, quoted ibid., pp. 256–7; David Lloyd George to Lord Curzon, 14 June 1921, quoted ibid., pp. 258–9. Lord Derby to David Lloyd George, 10 June 1921, quoted in Randolph Churchill, Lord Derby, pp. 397–8; David Lloyd George to Lord Derby, 13 June 1921, quoted ibid., p. 398.
French Secretary’s Notes of an Anglo-French conversation in Paris, 19 June 1921 (6 p.m.), D.B.F.P., I, xv, pp. 606–7, 608. A new Report from the Commission (A.J. 287) was submitted to the Allies on 6 August, but Britain and France were still at odds in their recommendations. D.B.F.P., I, xv, pp. 622–7.
E. 6, 24 June 1921:, Cab. 32/2/1, f. 38; E. 7, 27 June 1921, Cab. 32/2/1, ff. 45 (verso) — 47.
ibid.; E. 18, 7 July 1921, Cab. 32/2/2, ff. 330–366.
Beaverbrook, Decline and Fall of Lloyd George, quoted p. 44.
With much delight, and an obvious desire to ridicule Curzon’s pompous demeanour, Hughes replied that he fully agreed, “if the matter does not arise. But,” he added sardonically, “you might anticipate something.” Curzon was, however, determined not to anticipate anything. E. 18, 7 July 1921, Cab. 32/2/2, f. 366.
See below: III, iv.
McCallum, op. cit., p. 147.
145 H.C. Deb., cols 1537–8, 1543–4 (3 August 1921); 125 U.C. Deb., cols i353~4 (23 February 1920) ; Riddell, Intimate Diary, p. 222 (22 July 1920) ; Cf. Taylor, “The Statesman,” in Taylor, Churchill, pp. 22–9.
Churchill himself had been involved in a movement in May-June 1921, to force Lloyd George’s resignation, and appoint either Churchill or Birkenhead in his place. See Riddell, Intimate Diary, p. 302 (24 May 1921); Stevenson, L.G. Diary, pp. 220–1 (11 June 1921), 223–4 (20, 24 June 1921); Beaverbrook, Decline and Fall of Lloyd George, pp. 61–81; Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914-IÇ3Ç (London, Fontana Books, 1968), pp. 199–259; Morgan, op. cit., pp. 130–57.
The progress of negotiations can be traced in the British documents, commencing on 17 May 1921, when the Foreign Office instructed the Paris Embassy to press for a meeting of the Supreme Council, until 30 July 1921, when this objective was finally achieved. See Earl Curzon to Sir Maurice Cheetham (Paris), 17 May 1921, D.B.F.P., I, xvi, p. 98; Sir G. Buchanan (Rome) to Earl Curzon, 17 May 1921, ibid., pp. 99–100; Sir M. Cheetham to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 23 July 1921, ibid., pp. 263–4; Marquess Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham, 23 July 1921, ibid., pp. 268–70; Sir M. Cheetham to Marquess Curzon, 24 July 1921, ibid., pp. 273–4; Marquess Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham, 25 July 1921, ibid., pp. 276–8; Note by French Ambassador to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 27 July 1921, ibid., pp. 287–9; Memorandum communicated by Lord Hardinge to M. Briand, 29 July 1921, ibid., pp. 292–6; Marquess Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris), 30 July 1921, ibid., p. 300.
In preparation for the conference, the British Ambassador in Paris, Lord Hardinge, approached the charge d’affaires of the German Embassy, Leopold von Hoesch, and emphasised that some concession would be necessary to appease French opinion. During a conversation on 6 August, he suggested that there would be no need to relinquish the claim to the industrial “triangle,” but recommended that the Germans should be ready to cede the predominantly Polish provinces of Rybnik and Pless. At the same time, he reaffirmed that Britain would never be so foolish as to refer the dispute to the League of Nations, and promised Hoesch that Lloyd George would not leave Paris without concluding a definitive settlement. Hoesch reported this conversation to the German Foreign Office in a telegram on 6 August 1921, summarized in Campbell, op. cit., pp. 380–1.
Notes of an Anglo-French conversation at the Hotel Crillion, Paris, n August 1921 (11:30 a.m.), D.B.F.P., I, xv, pp. 676–681; Notes of a meeting at the French President’s Chateau, 11 August 1921 (3:15 p.m.), ibid., pp. 688–92; Notes of a conversation between Mr Lloyd George and Signor Bonomi at the Hotel Crillion, 11 August 1921 (4:45 p.m.), ibid., p. 692; Notes of a meeting between Mr Lloyd George and M. Briand at the Hotel Crillion, 11 August 1921 (6 p.m.), ibid., pp. 693–4; Notes of a conversation at dinner between Italian and British Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers, 11 August 1921 (8:15 p.m.), ibid., pp. 694–7; Notes of a conversation between Mr Lloyd George and M. Briand at the Hotel Crillion, 12 August 1921 (10:30 a.m.), ibid., pp. 698–700; Notes of an Allied Conference at the Quai d’Orsay, 12 August 1921 (11 a.m.), ibid., pp. 700–704. For the solution reached by the League arbitrators, see F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London, 1960; reissue in one volume), pp. 152–8; Campbell, op. cit., pp. 382–5. For German reactions, see D’Abernon, op. cit., I, pp. 218–9 (25 October 1921).
Riddell, Intimate Diary, p. 325 (15 September 1921).
The Times, 26 September 1921 ; report of Churchill’s speech on Saturday, 24 September.
The Times, 9 June 1921. There is a complete text in the Manchester Guardian, 9 June 1921.
See above: I, v.
J. M. Keynes, “The Treatment of Inter-Allied Debt Arising out of the War” (March 1919), in Elizabeth Johnson (ed.), The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, XVI: Activities 1914–1919, the Treasury and Versailles (London, Macmillan: St Martin’s Press for the Royal Economic Society, 1971), pp. 420–28. The guaranteed finance scheme was elaborated in “Scheme for the Rehabilitation of European Credit and for financing Relief and Reconstruction” (April 1919), and a covering letter for the leaders of America, France and Italy, ibid., pp. 429–31, 431–36.
David Lloyd George, The Truth about Reparations and War Debts (London, 1932), pp. 105–108.
J. M. Keynes, “Memorandum on the Treatment of Inter-Allied Debt Arising out of the War” (November 1918), Johnson, op. cit., pp. 418–9; D. Lloyd George to President Wilson (5 August 1920), quoted in Lloyd George, Truth about Reparations, pp. 108–9; President Wilson to D. Lloyd George (3 November 1920), quoted ibid., pp. 109–110.
The Times, 26 September 1921; a leader hailed this speech as an “Essay in Statesmanship.” The Times, 30 November 1921.
Stevenson, L.G. Diary, p. 329 (24 November 1921); Walther Rathenau, Tagebuch, 1907-IÇ22 (Düsseldorf, 1967), pp. 266–70 (2 December 1921); C. 93 (21), 16 December 1921, Cab. 23/27, f. 275-
D.B.F.P., I, xv, p. 765; Komarnicki, op. cit., p. 512.
Loucheur noted the conversation in his diary: Loucheur, op. cit., pp. 185–8 (8 December 1921).
C. 93 (21), 16 December 1921, Cab. 23/27, ff. 275–6. 102 See above: II, ii.
C. 93 (21), 16 December 1921, Cab. 23/27, f. 276; C. 21 (22), 28 March 1922, Cab. 23/ 29, f. 341.
Notes of meetings between Mr Lloyd George and M. Briand at 10 Downing St., 19 December 1921 (12:15 p.m.), 20 December 1921 (12 noon), D.B.F.P., I, xv, pp. 764–774. The proposal for the trading syndicate was outlined in two memoranda: “Proposals for Reestablishing Better Economic Conditions in Europe” (A.J. 307, 22 December 1921), ibid., pp. 798–800.
The course of negotiations between Loucheur and Rathenau at Wiesbaden is traced in David Felix, Walther Rathenau and the Weimar Republic (Baltimore, 1971), pp. 75–78, 83–88. The text of the Agreement, and its various annexes can be found in Documents relatifs aux reparations (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1922–24), I, pp. 253–277.
The revised British memorandum on German Reparations (A.J. 306, 22 December 1921), is printed in D.B.F.P., I, xv, pp. 800–805.
Notes of an Anglo-French meeting at io Downing St., 22 December 1921 (11 a.m.), ibid., pp. 793–6.
Notes of a conversation between Mr Lloyd George and M. Briand, 21 December 1921, ibid., pp. 785–7. During an interview in early December, the French Ambassador, Count Saint Aulaire, had sounded Curzon on this issue. See Marquess of Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris), 5 December 1921, Cmd. 2169 (France No. 1): Papers Respecting Negotiations for an Anglo-French Pact (1924), pp. 108–112. Clearly, Briand decided upon this course after the hostile reception given to his uncompromising stand at the Washington Conference, when he had insisted that French security could only be preserved through the maintenance of large stocks of land armaments. See, D.B.F.P., I, xiv, pp. 502–505, 513–516.
The opposing points of view are set out in Lloyd George’s memorandum, 4 January 1922, and Briand’s memorandum, 8 January 1922: Cmd. 2169, pp. 114–120, 121–126.
Millerand’s telegram, 10 January 1922, is printed in Georges Suarez, Briand: Sa vie -son oeuvre, 5: Vartisan de la paix 1918–1923 (Paris, 1941), pp. 388–390. It was followed by another, the following day, ibid., pp. 396–7. Briand replied to the first on the same day, asserting that the Council’s attitude would cause a rupture with Britain, and insisting that any agreement on the guarantee would be submitted for their prior approval, ibid., pp. 393–5. Unfortunately, this assurance did nothing to mitigate the impression created by his famous telegram No. 21 of 9 January, which had apprised Millerand of his belief that Lloyd George might relent and extend a reciprocal guarantee. This optimism was not supported by the 4 January memorandum, and hence Millerand remained uneasy lest the President of the Council made a further concession, ibid., p. 384.
C. 2 (22), 18 January 1922, Cab. 23/29, ff. 11–12.
Cmd. 2169, pp. 128–131. Curzon’s note of this conversation with the French Ambassador on this occasion was transmitted to Lord Hardinge on 28 January 1922. ibid., pp. 131–136.
150 H.C. Deb., cols 262–4 (8 February 1922). The British Draft Treaty was approved at Cabinet on 10 January. C. 1 (22), 10 January 1922, Cab. 23/29, ff. 2–6.
Lord Hardinge (Paris) to Earl Balfour (F.O.), 16 June 1922, Cmd. 2169, pp. 166–7.
C. 29 (22), 23 May 1922, Cab. 23/30, f. 98.
The Commission’s decisions (13 January 1922, 21 March 1922) are printed in Documents relatifs aux réparations, I, pp. 185–6, 208–215.
Briand telegraphed the Cannes Resolutions to Paris on 6 January; copy in Suarez, op. cit., pp. 362–4.
For Lloyd George’s account of his Boulogne interview with Poincaré, 25 January 1922, see Wilson, C.P. Scott Diaries, pp. 421–2; Felix, op. cit., pp. 127–9.
C. 21 (22), 28 March 1922, Cab. 23/29, ff. 336–342; Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, pp. 195–7.
By May 1922, almost 2,000,000 were out of work in Britain.
C. 29 (22), 23 May 1922, Cab. 23/30, ff. 86–96.
The Note, which was circulated to France, Italy, Belgium, and the United States, was prepared by the Acting Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour. However, Balfour disclaimed responsibility for the proposals which it advanced. C. 42 (22), 25 July 1922, Cab. 23/30, f. 350. D’Abernon, op. cit., Il, pp. 86–7 (21 August 1922).
C. 35 (22), 16 June 1922, Cab. 23/30, ff. 216–220; C. 36 (22), 30 June 1922, Cab. 23/30, f. 230; C. 38 (22), 7 July 1922, Cab. 23/30, ff. 267–274; C. 42 (22), 25 July 1922, Cab. 23/30, ff. 350–364. The draft Note is filed as Appendix 3 to C. 38 (22), 7 July 1922, Cab. 23/30, ff. 296–300.
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© 1973 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Boadle, D.G. (1973). Foundations for a German Policy, 1920–22. In: Winston Churchill and the German Question in British Foreign Policy, 1918–1922. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-1096-7_3
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