Abstract
Territory and population entitle a State to a territorial and to a personal jurisdiction. The coherence between these elements of a State is assured by a political organization, which is essential for the existence of a State. In a dissenting opinion before the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of the Lighthouses on Crete and Samos, between France and Greece, S. P. Séfériadès enumerated some attributes of sovereignty “without which no sovereignty can be described as such.” They are: “the right of free political organization, the right of autonomy in the conduct of social affairs, prisons, public worship, public education, administrative machinery, systems of taxation, communications, organization of the police, the right of civil and criminal legislation, the right of jurisdiction, the obligation of military service, freedom of trade, the right of the flag, the right to conclude treaties and the right of representation.” 1) This third essential element entitles a State to a third jurisdiction, which might be called “governing” jurisdiction.
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References
8–10-1937, Series A/B No. 71, p. 136. The P.C.I.J. gave another example in the case concerning the payment of various Serbian Loans issued in France, by saying: “it is indeed a generally accepted principle that a State is entitled to regulate its own currency.”, 12–7-1929, Series A. Nos. 20/1, Judgment No, 14 p. 44 (idem Judgment No. 15 p. 122).
“Qu’en effet, la constitution de l’Etat n’est, au sens le plus général du mot, que le mode suivant lequel l’Etat est organisé ou, d’après une autre définition, l’ensemble des règles écrites ou non écrites qui déterminent les attributions des pouvoirs politiques et les rapports de ceux qui gouvernent avec ceux qui sont gouvernés; qu’il est clair que ces attributions et ces rapports sont susceptibles de se modifier, et qu’en cas de substitution d’un Gouvernement à un autre par la voie révolutionnaire, ils devront être le plus souvent modifiés pour être mis en harmonie avec les circonstances et les besoins nouveaux; que le même principe qui consacre, dans les conditions plus haut exprimées, l’institution du gouvernement nouveau, autorise ce gouvernement à déterminer le mode d’exercice du pouvoir dont il est investi.” , Chile-France, arb., 5–7-1901, Descamps-R. 1901 p. 396, Survey No. 172.
“Qu’en dehors des cas d’anarchie pure, la permanence de l’existence de l’Etat suppose nécessairement la présence d’un pouvoir qui agit en son nom et qui le représente; que cette nécessité est si évidente, qu’elle a été reconnue dès le moyen-age par les jurisconsultes qui voient dans le souverain la personnification de l’Etat et deduisent de là l’obligation du prince de reconnaître les engagements pris au nom de l’Etat par le prince qui l’a précédé; qu’elle a trouvé son expression dans la maxime du droit français d’après laquelle le roi ne meurt pas; que Grotius l’a proclamée à son tour fcivitates esse immortales’) en enseignant que l’obligation des dettes contractées par l’Etat persiste indépendamment de tout changement dans la forme du Gouvernement du pays (Grotius II, cap. IX).”, Chile-France, arb., loc. cit. note 2 supra, p. 395.
“Que les jurisconsultes modernes ont parfois varié sur l’explication du principe en vertu duquel le pouvoir de représenter l’Etat se transmet d’un Gouvernement à un autre, les uns la cherchant dans l’idée d’une prescription qui s’établit au profit de l’usurpateur, d’autres dans la présomption, s’il s’agit d’un prince légitime déchu, d’une renonciation à l’exercice de ses droits en faveur des personnes qui lui ont succédé, d’autres dans l’hypothèse d’une consécration de l’autorité nouvelle par l’effet du consentement exprès ou tacite de la nation; mais que les plus considérables sont unanimes à professer le respect de ses conséauences, telles qu’elles ont été formulées pour la première fois d’une façon méthodique et complète, dans divers ouvrages, par le publiciste H. A. Zachariae, à l’occasion des contestations qui s’étaient élevées en Allemagne après la dissolution du Royaume de Westphalie sur la validité des actes accomplis par le roi Jérôme; qu’ils n’en restreignent pas l’application au cas où le régime nouveau s’est maintenu pendant un lapse de temps prolongé, mais considèrent uniquement le point de savoir si ce régime présentait des caractères de stabilité et d’autorité tels qu’on pût envisager ses organes comme détenant en fait le pouvoir vacant par la chute du pouvoir antérieur; qu’ainsi ils font dépendre la validité des actes d’un gouvernement, même transitoire et usurpateur, de conditions identiques à celles auxquelles les puissances étrangères subordonnent la reconnaissance d’un Chef d’Etat qui leur annonce son avènement.”, Chile-France, loc. cit. p. 395.
Cf. M. Oliva y Blay: Los servicios publicos, moderno concepto de los mismos, Revista de derecho internacional 28 (1935) — 210/39.
Traite de droit constitutionnel, third edition, vol.1 p. 61, 62.
Ibidem p. 74. Cf. Marc Réglade: Perspectives qu’ouvrent les doctrines objec-tivistes du Doyen Duguit pour un renouvellement de l’étude du droit international public, R.G.D.I.P. 37 (1930) — 381/419.
‘L’influence de Léon Duguit sur le droit administratif Français’, vol. 1/2, 1932, p. 149/50.
“Certes, un Etat, en vertu de sa souveraineté, peut régler en toute liberté sa vie intérieure, mais à condition de ne pas contrarier le droit des gens. Cette matière a donc trait à un des aspects des rapports entre le droit public interne et le droit international.”, Hungary-Czechoslovakia, M.A.T., 19–2-1934, diss. op. A. Alvarez, R.G.P.C. 1934–2-19.
Honduras-Salvador, Guatemala, 19–12-1908, A.J.I.L. 3 (1909) — 734, Survey App. No. III.*) My italics.
A.J.I.L. 22 (1928) — 875, Survey No. 366 (see p. 2). Cf. the P.C.I.J. Adv. Op. No. 5 concerning the status of Eastern Carelia, 23–7-1923, p. 27; Judgment No. 9, Lotus case, 7–9-1927, Series A. No. 10 p. 18; Adv. Op. No. 20 concerning customs régime between Germany and Austria, 5–9-1931, Series A/B No. 41 p. 45, 57/8 (diss. op. D. Anzilotti), 77 (diss. op. of seven judges).
Series A. No. 10 p. 18. Cf. in the same sense: Great Britain-U.S.A., P.C.A., 7–9-1910, A.J.I.L. 4 (1910) — 964, Survey No. 291; Commissioner of Controlled Revenues-Germany arb., 23–6-1926. A.J.I.L. 21 (1927) — 330. Survey No. 373; France-Switzerland, P.C.I.J., Judgment 7–6-1932, Series A/B No. 46, p. 167; Sweden-U.S.A., P.C.A., 18–7-1932, A.J.I.L. 26 (1932) — 846, Survey No. 395; China-Radio Corporation of America, arb., 13–4-1935, A.J.I.L. 30 (1936) — 540, Survey No. 386, etc.
U.S.A.-Venezuela, arb., 26–3-1895, diss. op. J. Andrade, Moore 2–1732, Survey No. 169; Great Britain-U.S.A., arb., C. 18–8-1910, Report Nielsen p. 530, Survey No. 303; Salvador-Nicaragua, C.A.C J., 9–3-1917, A.J.I.L. 11 (1917) — 719, Survey App. No. III; Norway-U.S.A., arb., 13–10-1922, A.J.I.L. 17 (1923)-392, Survey No.339, etc. “Every nation is in law and before law the equal of every other nation belonging to the society of nations, and all nations have the right to claim and, according to the Declaration of Independence of the United States, ‘to assume, among the Powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature’s God entitle them’.”, American Institute of International Law, Draft No. 7, article 3, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. Special Number October 1926, p. 312.
C. 26–3-1833, ed. Liestal, I p. 728, Survey No. 30; see p. 88.
5–9-1932, Series A/B No. 41 p. 59.
Moore 3–2317, Survey No. 65.
Ralston-D. p. 677, Survey No. 257.
9–3-1917, A.J.I.L. 11 (1917) — 718/9, Survey App. No. III.
Annuaire de l’Institut 1900 p. 227.
A. J.I L. Off. Doc. Special Number October 1926 p. 312.
“Self-preservation and self-defense are sacred rights of nations as well as of individuals, and nothing in a treaty should be taken to have impaired the right of a nation to make prudent preparations for them by husbanding its means of war, when that event seems probable, unless the terms of the stipulation will admit of no other construction.”, Great Britain-U.S.A., arb., C. 8–5-1871, diss. op. Frazert, Moore 4–4386, Survey No. 93. Cf. France-Nicaragua, arb., 29–7-1880, Moore 5–4871, Survey No. 115, and U.S.A.-Venezuela, arb., C. 5–12-1885, op. J. Andrade, Moore 3–2961, Survey No 142.
Moore 3–2746/7, Survey No. 142.
Judgment No. 1, 17–8-1923, Series A. p. 37.
Paul Fauchille: Traité de droit international public, Paris 1922, vol.1, 1–437 note.
It is clear that States may, by special (conventional) regulations, organize some public services in collaboration with each other, such as, for instance, with respect to international communications or in boundary zones, giving rise to mixed jurisdictions or to the creation of international institutions. Cf. Paul Negulesco: Principes du droit international administratif, Recueil des Cours 51 (1935) -583/690;
M. Dendrias: Les principaux services administratifs internationaux, Recueil des Cours 63 (1938) — 247/365;
J. Gascon ,Y. Marin; Les transformations du droit administratif international, Recueil des Cours 34 (1930) — 5;
A. Rapisardi Mirabelli: Il diritto internazionale amministrativo, Padova 1939; Karl Neumeyer: Internationales Verwaltungsrecht; Clyde Eagleton: International Government, etc.
L.N.O.J. Special Supplement No. 1, August 1920, p. 23.
Enclosure I to a letter, dated July 7, 1920, addressed to Sir Eric, loc. cit. p. 4/5.
Ibidem p. 13/4.’
L.N.O.J., July-August 1920, Number 5, p. 248/9.
Declaration by Mr. Balfour on behalf of the Council, loc. cit. p. 249.
See Survey App. No. VI.
L.N.O.J., Special Supplement No. 3, 1920, p. 4. See in the same sense, P.C.I.J., Adv. Op. No. 4, February 7, 1923, p. 25.
Loc. cit. p. 14.
Loc. cit. p. 5. “The principle recognizing the rights of peoples to determine their political fate may be applied in various ways; the most important of these are, on the one hand the formation of an independent State, and on the other hand the right of choice between two existing States. This principle, however, must be brought into line with that of the protection of minorities; both have a common object—to assure to some national group the maintenance and free development of its social, ethnical or religious characteristics. ... The fact must, however, not be lost sight of that the principle that nations must have the right of self-determination is not the only one to be taken into account. Even though it be regarded as the most important of the principles governing the formation of States, geographical, economic and other similar considerations may put obstacles in the way of its complete recognition. Under such ciroumstances, a solution in the nature of a compromise, based on an extensive grant of liberty to minorities, may appear necessary according to international legal conception and may even be dictated by the interests of peace.”, loc. cit. p. 6. 10) Loc. cit. p. 5.
Loc. cit. p. 5/6. “La formation des Etats nouveaux entraîne donc toujours une révolution dans le droit des gens.”, Th. Funck-Brentano et Albert Sorel: Précis du droit des gens, 2nd ed., Paris 1887, p.204/5.
Loc. cit. p. 9/10. “La naissance d’un nouvel Etat est toujours un fait historique qui ne dépend pas de certaines conditions juridiques. Les règles de droit ne sauraient régir l’évolution historique qui produit des transformations dans la vie des peuples. C’est là une thèse qui paraît être généralement adoptée par la doctrine du droit public. S’il en est ainsi, on ne peut pas annuler ou invalider l’existence d’un nouvel Etat pour cette raison qu’il doit cette existence à un acte ou à un événement contraire au droit.”, Rafaël Erich: La naissance et la reconnaissance des Etats, Recueil des Cours 13 (1926) — 442. In a comment on the Aaland Islands question, Prof. Fernand de Visscher said that the formation of a State is a historic process beginning on a territory whereupon a political organization either existed or did not exist, R.D.I.L.C. 48 (1921) — 52/4.
Loc. cit. p. 8.
“... un nouvel Etat désirant être reconnu doit être à même -de présenter une organisation stable bien que, peut-être, encore peu développée. Il doit prouver qu’il a vraiment obtenu ce degré de stabilité intérieure qui lui a permis d’établir des autorités reconnues par le peuple lui-même.”, Erich loc. cit. p. 476; “Un Etat est formé lorsqu’un ordre de contrainte relativement souverain, c’est-à-dire dépendant exclusivement du droit des gens, se crée et devient efficace sur un territoire donné et vis-à-vis d’une population donnée.” “C’est cette règle de l’éflectivité que consacre le droit international qui définit aussi la naissance d’un Etat nouveau.”, Hans Kelsen: La naissance de l’Etat et la formation de sa nationalité, R.D.I. 1929–2-614, 615.
“Il n’est pas toujours facile de déterminer avec certitude et exactitude la date de la naissance d’un nouvel Etat. Nous avons déjà fait observer que la proclamation d’indépendance ne constitue pas un critère infaillible pour la fixation de cette date puisque pareille proclamation peut avoir lieu bien qu’une ou quelques-unes des conditions de la reconnaissance fassent encore défaut.”, Erich loc. cit. p. 499; “Le processus ainsi caractérisé de l’activité d’un nouvel ordre, de l’efficacité du pouvoir étatique, ne peut naturellement se produire en un seul instant. ... Dès lors, on ne pourra indiquer le moment de la naissance d’un Etat nouveau comme de celle d’un homme, par un jour déterminé.”, Kelsen loc. cit. p. 616.
Loc. cit. p. 9.
Loc. cit. p. 8. “Recognition of any State must always be subject to the reservation that the State recognized will respect the obligations imposed upon it either by general international law or by definite international settlements relating to its territory.”, Report of the Commission, loc. cit. p. 18. See the reply of Sweden before the Council, p. 204.
Loc. cit. p. 14.
On June 24, 1921, the Council of the League of Nations adopted a Resolution, in conformity with an opinion given by a Commission of Rapporteurs (Baron Beyens (Belgium), Mr. Calonder (Switzerland), and Mr. Ferraris (Italy)), holding that “the sovereignty of the Aaland Islands is recognized to belong to Finland” (L.N.O.J., Special Supplement No. 5, July 1921. p. 24/6). The Report of this Commission, however, was based on political, not on juridical considerations (Cf. L.N.O.J. September 1921 p. 691, et seq.).
P.C.I.J., Series C., No.11, vol. I, p. 370/3.
Ibidem vol II, p. 622/3.
Ibidem p. 817/8, 820.
Ibidem p. 944/5, 950.
Ibidem vol. I, p. 126, 127, 129, 130/1, 132. See also p. 227.
Ibidem p. 176.
P.C.I.J. Series A No. 7, p. 27/9.
Ibidem p. 84.
P. 172.
Cf. Erich loc. cit. p. 500/2. Whereas the Court declared, in general, that “a treaty only creates law as between the States which are parties to it; in case of doubt, no rights can be deduced from it in favour of third States.”, Lord Finlay was of opinion that, in the case of the Armistice Convention, there was a pactum in favorem tertii, which did not yet exist, in analogy to private law. It may be doubted, however, whether an institution of private law may be transmitted, as such, into international law (cf. the Conclusions, infra). This question should not be confused with that of the retroactive effect of recognition, which question will be dealt with briefly later.
Recueil T.A.M., vol. 9, p. 338.
“Subject to any contrary stipulations which may be provided for in the present Treaty, the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to retain and liquidate all property, rights and interests belonging at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty to German nationals, or companies controlled by them, within their territories, colonies, possessions and protectorates, including territories ceded to them by the present Treaty. The liquidations shall be carried out in accordance with the laws of the Allied or Associated States concerned, and the German owner shall not be able to dispose of such property, rights or interests nor to subject them to any charge without the consent of that State. German nationals who acquire ipso facto the nationality of an Allied or Associated Power in accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty will not be considered as German nationals within the meaning of this paragraph.”, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc, 1919–306.
“In all the German territory transferred in accordance with the present Treaty and recognized as forming definitively part of Poland, the property, rights and interests of German nationals shall not be liquidated under Article 297 by the Polish Government except in accordance with the following provisions:...” (p. 201).
“Whenever a competent court has given or gives a decision in a case covered by Sections III, IV, V or VII, and such decision is inconsistent with the provisions of such Sections, the party who is prejudiced by the decision shall be entitled to obtain redress which shall be fixed by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. At the request of the national of an Allied or Associated Power, the redress may, whenever possible, be effected by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal directing the replacement of the parties in the position occupied by them before the judgment was given by the German Court.” (p. 328).
T.A.M. vol. 9, p. 339.
Loc. cit. p. 340.
Loc. cit. p. 341.
Loc. cit. p. 342.
Loc. cit. p. 342.
Z. f. a. ö. R. u.. V. 2 (1931) — 2–28/9.
T.A.M. vol. 9, p. 343/7.
The award was made, not on January 23, 1925, date of the conclusion of the special agreement, but on April 4, 1928; see Survey No. 366.
Z. f. a. ö. R. u, V. 2 (1931) — 2–30/40.
See § 9.
Cf. H. Herz: Le problème de la naissance de l’Etat et la décision du T.A.M. germano-polonais du 1er août 1929, R.D.I.L.C. 63 (1936) — 564/90, who uphelds also the decision of the majority of the Tribunal.
Cf. Fernand de Visscher: La question des Iles d’Aland, R.D.I.L.C. 48 (1921)-52.
Loc. cit. p. 618, 619/20.
Corso di diritto internazionale, Padova 1930, 1–109.
In other sense, see e.g. D. Anzilotti: Cours de droit international, Paris 1929, p. 347.
“A State, whether recognized or not, protects surrounding States from the anarchic pressures of unorganized humanity.”,
L. L. Jaffe: Judicial aspects of foreign relations, Harvard University Press, 1933 p. 95.
“The political existence of a nation is independent of any recognition. Consequently it has the enjoyment of the fundamental rights and it is bound by the fundamental obligations mentioned in the “Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations”.”, article 2 of Draft No. 6 of the American Institute of International Law, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. Special Number October 1926 p. 310.
Loc. cit. p. 617.
Règles générales du droit de la paix, Recueil des Cours 58 (1936) — 60.
“La reconnaissance d’un Etat nouveau est l’acte libre par lequel un ou plusieurs Etats constatent l’existence sur un territoire déterminé d’une société humaine politiquement organisée, indépendante de tout autre Etat existant, capable d’observer les prescriptions du droit international et manifestent en con-conséquence leur volonté de la considérer comme membre de la communauté internationale. La reconnaissance a un effet déclaratif. L’existence de l’Etal nouveau avec tous les effets juridiques qui s’attachent à cette existence n’est pas affectée par le refus de reconnaissance d’un ou plusieurs Etats.”, Resolution of the Institut de Droit international, article 1, Annuaire de l’Institut 1936–2-300; “Si nous admettons cette thèse que la naissance d’un nouvel Etat n’est pas soumise à certaines conditions juridiques, on peut en conclure, dès maintenant, que la reconnaissance internationale, acte essentiellement juridique, ne constitue pas un élément indispensable dans la naissance même d’un Etat. L’Etat prend naissance indépendamment de toute reconnaissance.”, R, Erich, loc. cit. p. 442; “Il ne s’en suit pas que la reconnaissance d’un Etat nouveau par les anciens Etats n’ait—comme on l’affirme parfois—qu’une valeur déclarative. Il est fort possible que cette reconnaissance produise des effets juridiques. ... Mais ce qu’on ne saurait lui reconnaître, c’est un rôle constitutif, quant à la formation juridique de l’Etat nouveau, pour fonder son existence juridique, son existence en droit international. ...En vertu du droit des gens, l’existence de l’Etat nouvellement né est, dès avant sa reconnaissance, une existence de iure.”, H. Kelsen loc. cit. p. 617. Cf. L. Buza: Die juristische Natur der Anerkennung im Völkerrecht, Z.f.ö.R. 1910 p.77.
“Il riconoscimento ... non è atto che riguarda la personalità degli Stati, nel senso vero delia parola, ma ha un ben diverso contenuto. ... In fatti, trattandosi di un atto che ha luogo solo nei rapporti di ogni singolo Stato per suo conto esclusivo verso un altro.”, S. Romano: Corso di diritto internazionale, Padova 1926 p. 51 (88); “Concludendo il riconoscimento non ha a mio avviso nè valore declaratorio, nè costitutivo, non constata nè crea la personalità internazionale dello Stato. Esso non ha, corne invece la dottrina quasi unanime ha pensato, alcun punto di intimo contatto con quest’ultima, la quale deve essere basata su principii completamente diversi. Il riconoscimento è un instituto generalissimo del diritto internazionale, che secondo la definizione di Erich è quell’atto unilaterale con cui uno Stato afferma, accetta o più generalmente si pronuncia in senso affermativo su uno stato di cose, sull’esistenza di un organismo, su uno statuto, su una modificazione che si è compiuta nei rapporti internazionali. Il riconoscimento di uno Stato nuovo non è che un particolare aspetto di questo generale instituto. Anche se esso sia tipico, anzi appunto per questo, non ha caratteri e valore diversi da quelli che sono propri delia generale figura del riconoscimento.”, P. Fedozzi, loc. cit. p. 107/8.
As to the retroactive effect of recognition, see e.g.: J. Mervyn Jones: The retroactive effect of the recognition of States and governments, British Yearbook 1935 p. 42/55; article 7 of the quoted Resolution of the Institut de Droit international, loc. cit. p. 302; Lapradelle-P. 1–21, 25, 11–195, 215/7. In other sense: “That it is not a principle accepted by the best recognized opinions of authors on international law, as is alleged, that the recognition of a new State relates back to a period prior to such recognition.”, Chile-U.S.A., arb., C. 7–8-1892, Moore 4–4332, Survey No. 173.
Cf. P. L. Bushe-Fox: The Court of Chancery and recognition, 1804–1831, British Yearbook 1931 p. 63/75; idem: Unrecognized States, Law cases 1805–1826, British Yearbook 1932 p. 39/48; R. Hall Sharp: Non-recognition as a legal obligation,’ Liège 1934; F. A. Middlebush: Non-recognition as a sanction of international law, Proceedings of the American Society of international law, 1933 p. 40/64. As to state-practice, cf. e.g. the Texas Message of President Jackson, December 21, 1836: “The acknowledgment of a new State as independent, and entitled to a place in the family of nations, is at all times an act of great delicacy and responsibility, but more especially so when such State has forcibly separated itself from another of which it had formed an integral part, and which still claims dominion over it. A premature recognition under these circumstances, if not looked upon as justifiable cause of war; is always liable to be regarded as a proof of an unfriendly spirit to one of the contending parties.”
“Who is the sovereign, de iure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial but a political question...”, Jones v. United States, U.S.S.C, 137 U.S. 202. See also Moore’s Digest vol. I § 27/79. “In truth, recognition practice to-day is so diverse and of such uncertain implication, the structure of the international system itself is of a natufe so shifting, that no dogmatic assertion of the exact legal effects of recognition should or could be made.”, L. L. Jaffe, loc. cit. p. 122.*) My italics.
Loc. cit. p. 468. “Et remarquez qu’il n’y a pas de milieu. Ou il (l’Etat nouveau) est membre de la communauté internationale et il a la jouissance et l’exercice des droits et prérogatives comme tel, ou il ne l’est pas et il ne possède aucune aptitude juridique.”, R. Le Normand: La reconnaissance internationale et ses diverses applications, Paris 1899, p. 40.
As to the formation of the Irish Republic in 1919, Justice Meredith held in a decision of the Free State Court that “the Irish Republic may not have attained to complete independence, it may not have obtained international recognition, it may not have become even a de facto government over all the territory that it claimed as its rightful heritage; but at the very least it had advanced to such a stage of self-realization as made it something more than a mere association for the promotion of a particular political ideal, and it had at all events attained such sovereign authority in its own concerns as enabled it to enter into a treaty with the Power from which it sought to shake itself free, and to assent to a modification of the Constitution which it had adopted.”, 1926 Ir. Rep. 531, 574; cf. A.J.I.L. 21 (1927) — 752.
Moore 4–3552, Survey No. 142.
Government of Republic of Spain v. S.S. Arantzazu Mendi and others, February 23, 1939, 55 The Times Law Reports 454, A.J.I.L. 33 (1939) — 583.
My italics.
Cf. Herbert W. Briggs: De facto and de iure recognition: the Arantzazu Mendi, A.J.I.L. 33 (1939) — 689/99.
Survey No. 172.
Descamps-R. 1901–393/8.
A. J.I.L. 16 (1922) — 482, Survey No. 317.
Survey No. 342.
A.J.I.L. 18 (1924) — 152, 153/4.
Loc. cit. p. 154.
Loc. cit. p. 155, 156/7.
Loc. cit, p. 159.
“It is put forward by the United States of America on behalf of George W. Hopkins, who was born and has ever remained an American national. The claim is based on six postal money orders aggregating 1,013.40 pesos alleged to have been purchased by the claimant from the Mexican Government at its post-offices of Mazatlan, Sinaloa, and Guaymas, Sonora, between April 27, 1914, and June 8, 1914, inclusive. It is alleged that all of these money orders were in due time presented to the Mexican authorities and payment was refused by them. The ground of the motion to dismiss is that these money orders were issued by the Huerta administration, which was illegal, that the acts of such administration did not bind Mexico, and that therefore these orders can not be made the basis of a claim before this Commission against the United Mexican States.”, introduction to the opinion of the Commission rendered March 31, 1926.
Survey No. 354.
G.P.O. 1927 p. 44/50.
H.M. Stat. Off. 1933, p. 218, Survey No. 376.
Moore 3–2974, Survey No. 82.
Loc. cit. p. 149/50. He quoted also Borchard, Kent, Wheaton, Hall, and Woolsey.
“La question de savoir si un gouvernement a été, ou non, un gouvernement de iure, est -du domaine exclusif du droit constitutionnel de l’Etat en question, notamment du droit constitutionnel étant en vigueur à l’époque des événements dont il s’agit de déterminer le caractère juridique, sans que puisse entrer en ligne de compte, en quoi que ce soit, ni la reconnaissance de iure dont il a pu bénéficier de la part d’un ou de plusieurs gouvernements étrangers, ni le refus éventuel, par des gouvernements postérieurs du pays, pour des motifs d’ordre politique, de la reconnaître comme gouvernement de iure/’, France-Mexico, arb.f C. 25–9-1924, ed. Paris p. 105, Survey No. 363.
“Par contre, la question de savoir si un gouvernement a été un gouvernement de facto, est une simple question de fait, qui ne dépend, ni du droit constitutionnel de l’Etat en question, ni du droit international, et qui, elle non plus, ne saurait être préjugée, ni par l’attitude que des gouvernements postérieurs ont prise envers un tel gouvernement, ni par la reconnaissance (ou éventuellement, le refus de reconnaissance), de facto ou même de iure, dont il a pu faire l’objet de la part d’un ou de plusieurs gouvernements étrangers, étant donné que c’est un fait notoire que la pratique internationale a souvent abusé de la reconnaissance internationale de facto, ou du refus de pareille reconnaissance, dans des buts politiques.”, France-Mexico, loc. cit. p. 106; “It is doubtless true that the question whether the Páez government was or was not the de facto government of Venezuela at the time the bonds were issued is one of fact. But the decision of the political department of the United States Government on November 19, 1862, that there was no such conclusive evidence that the Páez government was fully accepted and peacefully maintained by the people of Venezuela as to entitle it to recognition must be accorded great weight as to the fact, and is in any event conclusive upon its own citizens.”, U.S.A.-Venezuela, arb., C. 17–2-1903, Ralston-D. p. 150, Survey No. 258.
“Et quant aux actes des gouvernements de iure ou de facto, ou des forces révolutionnaires qui l’ont emporté dans la guerre civile, il ne peut non plus être question de responsabilité internationale de l’Etat des dommages causés par lesdits actes que dans les cas où il s’agit, soit d’actes de caractère purement contractuel tels que: prêts, achats, etc., soit de ceux qui appartiennent au domaine intermédiaire entre le droit privé et le droit public, ou d’actes juridiques émanant directement du pouvoir public de l’Etat, tels que: expropriations, réquisitions, prêts forcés, etc., soit d’actes qui rentrent dans la catégorie des délits internationaux, tels que: pillages de propriétés étrangères, destructions de biens étrangers sans nécessité militaire, confiscations de possessions étrangères, bombardements de villes non défendues, qui ont causé la mort d’étrangers, et d’autres actes délictueux, formellement qualifiés comme tels entre autres par le Règlement concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre de 1907. Au contraire, le simple fait que, pour supprimer des émeutes ou des révolutions, le Gouvernement légitime s’est trouvé dans la nécessité impérieuse de prendre des mesures militaires nuisibles à des ressortissants étrangers, n’engendre pas de reponsabilité internationale de ce chef.”, France-Mexico, loc. cit. p. 136/7.
“The law of nations recognizes, moreover, that those States, in which revolutions are frequent, and whose governments are therefore subject to frequent changes, are liable for the acts of revolutionists, provided that the revolutionists are, because of the means of their command, the government de facto, so far as the one against which they are exercising their forces is concerned.”, Germany-Venezuela, arb., C. 13–2-1903, op. Goetsch, Ralston-D. p. 527, Survey No. 256; “The revolution of 1899, led by General Cipriano Castro, proved successful, and its acts, under a well-established rule of international law, are to be regarded as the acts of a de facto government,”, U.S.A.-Venezuela, C. 17–2-1903, Ralston-D. p. 8, Survey No. 258.
“The so-called empire was not a government de facto; because, lacking the element of popular support or of habitual obedience from the mass of the people, it rested alone on the assistance of foreign force, which comtemplated and extended only a temporary interference, and because another government, disputing successfully its pretensions, bore rule in Mexico as a fact, in possession of much the largest part of the territory, and sustained by the mass of the people.”, Mexico-U.S.A., arb., C. 4–7-1868, Moore 3–2930, Survey No. 82; “Une responsabilité internationale du chef de dommages causés par des mouvements révolutionnaires ne saurait être reconnue, à mon avis, pour ce qui concerne les actes juridiques ou délits de forces révolutionnaires qui ont échoué, le droit international ne grevant pas, ou pas encore, l’Etat des effets juridiques de pareils actes ou délits.”, France-Mexico, loc. cit. p. 136.
The unrecognized government in American Courts, A. J.I.L. 26 (1932) — 262.
G.P.O. 1929 p, 307, Survey No. 354. See in the same sense: Special Claims Commission Mexico-U.S.A., under Convention of September 10, 1923, G.P.O, p. 82, Survey No. 355.
“A new régime or government may gain control of a country and be the de facto, and from the standpoint of international law therefore the de iure government, even though other governments may not choose to ‘recognize* it, as is often said, or as might probably better be said, to enter into diplomatic relations with it. And it seems to me that the same political situation may exist with respect to a state of belligerency, when the term is used to connote simply the fact of the existence of war.”, Mexico-U.S.A., arb., C. 8–9-1923, diss. op. Nielsen, G.P.O. 1929 p. 31, Survey No. 354. Cf. R. Hall Sharp: Non-recognition as a legal obligation, Liège 1934; P. Stierlin: Die Rechtsstellung der nichtanerkannten Regierung im Völkerrecht, Zürich 1940 (on p. 190, note 43a, the author contends that Prof. J. H. W. Verzijl represented the French interests in the Claims Commission France-Mexico, 1924: Verzijl was President of said Commission).
Mexico-U.S.A., arb., C. 4–7-1868, op. W. H. Wadsworth, Moore 3–2876/7, Survey No. 82.
“The recognition of the government of a nation has for its object merely to enter into diplomatic relations with the said nation, or to continue the relations existing.”, American Institute of International Law, Project No. 6, article 1,2, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc., Special Number October 1926 p. 310; “La reconnaissance du gouvernement nouveau d’un Etat déjà reconnu est l’acte libre par lequel un ou plusieurs Etats constatent qu’une personne ou un groupe de personnes sont en mesure d’engager l’Etat qu’elles prétendent représenter, et témoignent de leur volonté d’entretenir avec elles des relations.”, Resolution of the Institut de Droit international 1936, article 10, Annuaire de l’Institut 1936–2-303.
“Every abnormally constituted government may be recognized if it is capable of maintaining order and tranquillity and is disposed to fulfil the international obligations of the nation.”, American Institute of International Law, loc. cit. article 5. Cf. Moore 2–1595, 1716, 3–2873, 2938, 4–3548/64, 5–4579, etc. As to state-practice: “It has been the principle and the invariable practice of the United States to recognize that as the legal government of another nation which by its establishment in the actual exercise of political power might be supposed to have received the express or implied assent of people.”, Mr. Livingston, Secretary of State, to Sir Charles Vaughan, April 30, 1833; “The right of one independent power to recognize the fact of the existence of a new power about to assume a position among the nations of the earth is incontestable. It is founded upon another right, that which appertains to every sovereignty, to take care of its own interests by establishing and cultivating such commercial or other relations with the new power as may be deemed expedient. Its exercise gives no just ground of umbrage or cause of war. The policy which has hitherto guided the Government of the United States in respect to new powers, has been to act on the fact of their existence, without regard to their origin, whether that has been by the subversion of a pre-existing Government, or by the violent or voluntary separation of one from another part of a common nation. In cases where an old and established nation has thought proper to change the form of its Government, the United States, conforming to the rule which has ever governed their conduct, of strictly abstaining from all interference with the domestic concerns of other States, have not stopped to inquire whether the new Government has been rightfully adopted or not. It has been sufficient for them that it is, in fact, the Government of the country, in practical operation.”, Report of Mr. Clay, from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in respect to the recognition of the independence of Texas, June 8, 1836; “In its intercourse with foreign nations the Government of the United States has, from its origin, always recognized de facto governments. We recognize the right of all nations to create and re-form their political institutions according to their own will and pleasure. We do not go behind the existing government to involve ourselves in the question of legitimacy. It is sufficient for us to know that a government exists capable of maintaining itself; and then its recognition on our part inevitably follows.”, Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State, to Mr. Rush, March 31, 1848; “As a general rule of foreign policy, obtaining since the foundation of our Government, the recognition of a foreign Government by this is not dependent on right, but on fact.”, Mr. Hunter, Acting Secretary of State, to Mr. Baker, October 3, 1879, etc.
See § 1.
Article 10, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc., Special Number, October 1926 p. 351. It is clear, that such an approval can only take place between recognized Governments.
A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1932 p. 71.
Loc. cit. p. 71.
E. M. Borchard: The diplomatic protection of citizens abroad or the law of international claims, New York 1915 p. 435. See about diplomatic protection, § 6, p. 117.
Article 20 of the quoted Project No. 22 of the American Institute of International Law, loc. cit. p. 353.
Montell Ogdon: Juridical bases of diplomatic immunity, Washington 1936, p. 175.
Loe. cit. p. 26. See also article 17 of the Draft Convention and article 19 of the quoted Project No. 22. Cf. D. 50. 7. 17.
The fiction of ‘extraterritoriality’, and theories of ‘representative character’ cannot explain the character of diplomatic immunities; they are confusing terms. See Montell Ogdon, op. cit. passim.
In a Resolution of the Institut de Droit international, 1929, it was held in article 16, that “l’immunité de juridiction survit aux fonctions, mais seulement quant aux faits qui se rattachent à l’exercice de ces fonctions.”, Annuaire de l’Institut 1929–2-310.
G.P.O. p. 93, Survey No. 396.
Journal Clunet 35 (1908) — 152.
Niemeyers Zeitschrift für internationales Recht, 39 (1928) — 288. See also article 26 of the Harvard Draft Convention.
See article 20 of the Harvard Draft Convention.
In the Bases of Discussion drawn up for the Hague Conference 1930 for the Codification of International Law by the Preparatory Committee, with regard to the responsibility of States for damage caused in their territory to the person or property of foreigners, it was observed: “The Replies (to Point V, No. I (c)) show that a State incurs responsibility if the Government fails to exercise due diligence in protecting the foreigners. The following points emerge in the replies: the degree of diligence to be attained is such as may be expected from a civilized State; the diligence required varies with the circumstances; the standard cannot be the same in a territory which has barely been settled and in the home country; the standard varies according to the persons concerned in this sense that the State has a special duty of vigilance and has therefore a greater responsibility in respect of persons invested with a recognized public status. The protection which is due is mainly protection against crime.”. Basis of Discussion No. 10 held: “A State is responsible for damage suffered by a foreigner as the result of failure on the part of the executive power to show such diligence in the protection of foreigners as, having regard to the circumstances and to the status of the persons concerned, could be expected from a civilized State. The fact that a foreigner is invested with a recognized public status imposes upon the State a special duty of vigilance.”, League of Nations, vol. III, No. C. 75. M. 69. 1929. V., p. 67.
Comment to the Harvard Draft Convention, loc. cit. p. 97.
Harvard Draft Convention on the legal Position and Functions of Consuls, loc. cit. p. 205.
Mexico-U.S.A., arb., C. 4–7-1868, Rice case, Moore 4–3248, Survey No. 82.
Mexico-U.S.A., arb., 8–9-1923, Malién case, op. Nielsen, G.P.O. 1927 p. 264/5, Survey No. 354.
Idem op. Nielsen, Chapman case, G.P.O. 1931 p. 128. See also Chile-France, arb., 5–7-1901, ed. Lausanne p. 304, Survey No. 172; Germany-Great Britain, U.S.A., arb., 14–10-1902, Descamps-R. 1902 p. 642, Survey No. 229; Spain-Venezuela, arb., C. 2–4-1903, Ralston-D. p. 923, Survey No. 264; Great Britain-U.S.A., arb., C. 18–8-1910, Report Nielsen p. 622, Survey No. 303; Germany-Portugal, arb., 31–7-1928, R.D.I. 1929–1-272, Survey No. 325; France-Great Britain, P.C.A., 9–6-1931, A.J.I.L. 27 (1933) — 179, Survey No. 392; Egypt-U.S.A., arb., 8–6-1932, G.P.O. p. 63, Survey No. 396, etc.
Loc. cit. p. 214.
G.P.O. 1927 p. 257/8, Survey No. 354. It was held by the Mixed Claims Commission Great Britain-Mexico, under Convention of November 19, 1926, that “a consul is an official agent working under the control of his Government and responsible to that Government. He is as a rule in permanent touch with the colony of his compatriots who live in the country to which he is designed, and he is, by virtue of his post as Consul, in a position to make inquiries with respect to the origin and antecedents of any compatriot whom he registers.”, H. M. Stat. Off. 1931 p. 22, Survey No. 376. *) As no dispute concerning public aircraft abroad has been brought before an international tribunal, as it seems, this matter will not be dealt with here.
See § 6, B., p. 122, et seq.
Annuaire de l’Institut, 1928 p. 739/40.
Survey No. 382.
A.J.I.L. 23 (1929) — 675.
A Treatise on International Law, 8th ed., London 1924, § 78, p. 307.
November 29, 1902, U.S. For. Rel. 1902, App. I p. 456, Survey No. 236. See p. 126.
Report Nielsen p. 480, Survey No. 303.
Loc. cit. p. 411, 427, 452, 483. It must be added, that these collisions did not occur on the high seas.
A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. Special Number 1929, p. 295.
A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1930 p. 246/7. In other sense: Bases of discussion nos. 20 and 21.
Op. cit. p. 198, § 42.
The law of territorial waters and maritime jurisdiction, New York 1927, p. 120.
G. Gidel, op. cit. vol. III, La mer territoriale et la zone contiguë p. 284.
Les navires de guerre dans les eaux territoriales étrangères, Recueil des Cours 65 (1938) — 224/5.
Actes de la Conférence, vol. III, p. 59. In the same sense, Sir Maurice Gwyer, p. 63.
“Même si une réglementation formelle n’a pas été établie par l’Etat riverain à l’effet d’interdire aux bâtiments de guerre en passage de se livrer à des actes incompatibles avec le respect de la souveraineté ou de la sécurité de l’Etat riverain (sondages répétés, relevés de côtes, manoeuvres navales, exercices de tir, exécution de sentences capitales, etc.), on doit considérer comme engagée la responsabilité internationale de l’Etat dont les forces navales se livreraient à de tels actes, Ces actes altèrent profondément le caractère du passage; il peut y avoir encore passage au sens matériel du mot; il n’y a, à coup sur, plus passage au sens juridique et, en tout cas, il n’ a plus passage inoffensif.”, G. Gidel op. cit. p. 286.
Annuaire de l’Institut 1928 p. 740. Cf. the Règlement of 1898, article 10, Annuaire p. 276.
A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. Special Number 1926 p. 323.
Op. cit. p. 121.
Op. cit. vol. II, Les eaux intérieures p. 59.
Staatsschiffe und Staatsluftfahrzeuge im Völkerrecht, Berlin 1934, p. 27.
Article 13, Annuaire 1928 p. 740/1. Cf. the Règlement of 1898, article 11, Annuaire p. 276.
Loc. cit. p. 226.
Actes de la Conférence, vol. III, p. 59.
Cf. Th. Ortolan: Règles internationales et diplomatie de la mer, Paris 1864, 4th ed., vol. I, p. 190/1. See about national regulations governing the visits of men-of-war to foreign ports: A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1916 p. 121/78.
55 Times Law Reports 184, A.J.I.L. 33 (1939) — 376.
Loc. cit.
My italics.
Loc. cit. p. 328.
Loc. cit. p. 328/9.
“Le principe de la distinction entre ces deux sortes d’immunité n’est pas dans la distinction entre une chose—le navire—et des personnes: car l’immunité du navire comporte une série d’applications qui se répercutent sur les personnes; le principe de la distinction est avant tout dans la localisation des actes concernant les personnes intéressées par ces actes, cette localisation ayant lieu tantôt sur le navire et tantôt sur le territoire terrestre de l’Etat riverain.”, G. Gidel, op. cit., vol. II, p. 268.
But they should respect the local regulations concerning navigation, station, and sanitary police: “Les bâtiments militaires étrangers admis dans les ports doivent respecter les lois et les règlements locaux, notamment ceux qui concernent la navigation, le stationnement et la police sanitaire.”, Règlement of the Institut de Droit international, 1928, article 15, Annuaire 1928 p. 741.
“Les bâtiments militaires admis dans un port étranger restent soumis à l’action de la Puissance dont ils relèvent, sans que les pouvoirs locaux puissent faire d’actes d’autorité à bord de ces navires, ni exercer de juridiction sur les personnes qui s’y trouvent, sauf les cas expressément prévus dans le présent règlement.”. “Les agents des douanes doivent s’abstenir de visites à bord des bâtiments militaires étrangers et se borner à une surveillance extérieure.”, articles 16 and 17 of the above-quoted Règlement 1928.
“Les bâtiments militaires ne peuvent pas être l’objet de saisie, d’arrêt ou de détention par une mesure de justice quelconque ni d’aucune procédure judiciaire in rem. Toutefois, les intéressés ont le droit de porter leurs réclamations devant les tribunaux compétents de l’Etat dont ces bâtiments battent régulièrement pavillon, sans que cet Etat puisse se prévaloir de son immunité: 1) pour les actions du chef d’abordage ou d’autres accidents de navigation; 2) pour les actions du chef d’assistance, de sauvetage et d’avaries communes; 3) pour les actions du chef de réparations, fournitures et autres contrats relatifs au navire.”, article 26 of the Règlement 1928. Cf. article 6, § 3 of Draft No. 12 of the American Institute of International Law: “Ships of war shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the republic in which they are sojourning, but the said republic may, if it deem it convenient to the national interest, order or compel them to depart.”, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc., Special Number 1926, p. 324. See also the recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, dated January 31, 1938, in the case of the Compania Espanola de Navegación Maritima, S.A. v. the Spanish Steamship ‘Navemar’. The Court held inter alia: “Admittedly a vessel of a friendly Government in its possession and service is a public vessel, even though engaged in the carriage of merchandise for hire, and as such is immune from suit in the courts of admiralty of the United States. ... And in a case such as the present it is open to a friendly Government to assert that such is the public status of the vessel and to claim her immunity from suit, either through diplomatic channels or, if it chooses, as a claimant in the Courts of the United States. If the claim is recognized and allowed by the executive branch of the Government, it is then the duty of the courts to release the vessel upon appropriate suggestion by the Attorney General of the United States, or other officer acting under his direction. ... The foreign Government is also entitled as of right upon a proper showing, to appear in a pending suit, there to assert its claim to the vessel, and to raise the jurisdictional question in its own name or that of its accredited and recognized representative.”, A.J.I.L. 32 (1938) — 384. Cf. M. Mittelstein: Arrestirbarkeit und Arrestfreiheit der Schiffe, Zeitschrift für Internationales Privat- und Strafrecht, 2 (1892) — 241/75.
“Les différends susceptibles de surgir à l’occasion des obligations contractées à titre privé par des hommes du bord, peuvent être du ressort des juridictions compétentes de l’Etat du port, sans que, toutefois, les personnes régulièrement portées sur le rôle d’équipage puissent être atteintes par des exécutions personnelles, telles que la contrainte par corps, et être ainsi distraites du service du bord.”, article 25 of the Règlement 1928. See also article 26. Cf. the international Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to the immunity of state-owned vessels, Brussels, April 10, 1926, and Additional Protocol, May 24, 1934, L.N.T.S. vol.176 p. 199 (comment: R.D.I.L.C. 53 (1926) — 453/84), and, to compare, the Convention for the regulation of aerial navigation, Paris, October 13, 1919, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1923 p. 195, articles 30/3.
“Les crimes et délits commis à bord des bâtiments militaires, soit par les gens de l’équipage, soit par toutes autres personnes se trouvant à bord, sont soustraits à l’exercice de la compétence des tribunaux de l’Etat du port, aussi longtemps que le bâtiment s’y trouve, quelle que soit la nationalité des auteurs ou des victimes. Toutefois, si le commandant livre le delinquent à l’autorité territoriale, celle-ci, recouvre l’exercice de sa compétence normale.”, article 18 of the Règlement 1928. As to acts done as private persons, cf. the ‘Forte’ case: “Considérant que les officiers lors de leur arrestation n’étaient pas revêtus des insignes de leur grade, et que dans un port fréquenté par tant d’étrangers ils ne pouvaient prétendre à être crus sur parole lorsqu’ils se déclaraient appartenir à la Marine Britannique, tandis qu’aucun indice apparent de cette qualité ne venait à l’appui de leur déclaration; que, par conséquent, une fois arrêtés ils devaient se pouvaient prétendre à être crus sur parole lorsqu’ils se déclaraient appartenir à la un traitement différent de celui qui eût été appliqué dans les mêmes conditions à toutes autres personnes.”, Brazil-Great Britain, arb., 18–6-1863, de Martens N.R.G. 1–20-486, Survey No. 70. Cf. article 20, § 1 and 2 of the Règlement 1928.
As to the right of asylum, see articles 21 to 23 of the Règlement 1928. Cf. Moore 1–350/90.
It should be noted that the decision is one of a British court and that, according to the words of Lord Finlay in the Lotus case before the Permanent Court of International Justice, “international law, wherever applicable, is considered as part of the law of England, and our judges must apply it accordingly.”, p. 54.
“Mais il faut maintenir très énergiquement le principe que l’immunité du navire de guerre dans les eaux étrangères n’est jamais—même dans la mesure où le droit international la reconnaît—qu’une immunité conditionnelle, subordonnée à la correction de l’attitude du navire de guerre: ‘l’Etat riverain ne peut être condamné à tolérer toutes les infractions que les navires étrangers pourraient commettre contre son ordre juridique et ses intérêts’.”, G. Gidel, op. cit. vol. II, p. 265.
Cf. what has been said about the waiving of diplomatic immunities.
The Harvard Research Committee observed that “when a State enters into ordinary trade and commercial undertakings or makes no distinction between public and private property treatment, government owned or operated vessels in a foreign port may become a matter of policy. Manifestly if a state-owned vessel engaged in trade is to have all the exemptions of a vessel in the public service, many changes in the economics of maritime commerce would be introduced.”, comment on article 22 of the Draft Convention on Territorial Waters, loc. cit. p. 363.
See the above-quoted decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
The statement in the Alabama arbitration, that “the privilege of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been admitted into the law of nations, not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle of courtesy and mutual deference between different nations.”, is somewhat uncertain (Great Britain-U.S.A., 14–9-1872, Moore 1–655, Survey No. 94). Cf. the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of the “Santissima Trinidad”, 7 Wheaton 283.
In time of war, special privileges are attached to public vessels as regards their navigation.
A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1919 p. 174/5.
L.N.O.J. 1921, p. 861/2.
L.N.O.J. 1922, p. 1131.
L.N.O. J. 1923, p. 85.
L.N.O.J. 1923, p. 87/8. Cf. the Report by M. Tang Tsai-Fou, February 2, 1923, to the Council of the League of Nations, L.N.O.J. 1923, p. 361.
L.N.O.J. 1923, p. 147. See also p. 146/50, 230, and 361/8.
Military occupation of alien territory in time of peace, Transactions of the Grotius Society, 9 (1923) — 159.
“On peut même dire, avec plus d’exactitude encore, que, dans l’occupation pacifique, la législation de l’Etat occupé est seule appliquée, avec cette réserve toutefois que le corps d’occupation jouit du bénéfice de l’exterritorialité.”, R. Robin: Des occupations militaires en dehors des occupations de guerre, Paris 1913 p. 629.
May 22, 1919, A.J.I.L. 3 (1909) — 757, 758, Survey No. 289.
Dalloz 1923–1-124.
Dalloz 1923–1-122. Cf. Dalloz 1865–1-500, 501; 1866–1-46; 1866–5-84, 278, etc. See also L. Renault in R.D.I.L.C. 14 (1882) — 82.
“As a guarantee for the execution of the present Treaty by Germany, the German territory situated to the west of the Rhine, together with the bridgeheads, will be occupied by Allied and Associated troops for a period of fifteen years from the coming into force of the present Treaty.”, article 428; “All matters relating to the occupation and not provided for by the present Treaty shall be regulated by subsequent agreements, which Germany hereby undertakes to observe.”, article 432
A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1919, p. 404, 406.
A.J.I L. Off. Doc. 1919, p. 195/6.
A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1919, p. 197.
Ibidem p. 264. The Ruhr Basin was occupied by France in 1920; this occupation, says Paul Fauchille “a laissé les autorités allemandes et les services publics continuer à fonctionner, mais sous le contrôle des autorités militaires françaises.”, Traité de Droit International Public, vol. II (Guerre et Neutralité), p. 1052/3, No. 1709, 1.
E.g.: exepedition of troops of European Powers against a revolt of the Boxers in China, 1900, to safeguard the foreigners.
E.g.: the occupation of the port of Corinto, Nicaragua, by the British, 1896; occupation of a port of the island Mitylene, Turkey, by French mariners, 1901; occupation of Corfu, Greece, by the Italian, 1923, etc.
Quelques notions générales sur l’occupation pacifique, R.G.D.I.P. 31 (1924) -353/4.
A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1908, p. 112.
Cf. W. E. Hall: A Treatise on International Law, 8th ed., Oxford 1924, §§52, 54, 153/61. Occupation, he says, “is merely a phase in military operations” (§ 155).
Vide supra.
97 U.S. 509. See also the same Court in Dow v. Johnson, ) U.S. 158, Freeland v. Williams, 131 U.S. 405, etc. As to the relation between the occupying troops and the inhabitants of the occupied State, see e.g.: Dr. Graf Stauffenberg: Vertragliche Beziehungen des Okkupanten zu den Landeseinwohnern, Z.f.a.ö.R.u. V. II-1–86/119 (1931); Mewes: Die Rechtsverhältnisse zwischen den Angehörigen des Besatzungsheeres und den Landeseinwohnern, in: Protokolle der Tagung richterlichter Militärjustizbeamter in Brussel am 29/30 September 1916, samt einigen vorbereitenden Gutachten, zusammengestellt auf Anordnung Seiner Exzellenz des General-gouverneurs in Belgien, Herrn Generaloberst Freiherrn von Bissing. Durch Oberkriegsgerichtsrat K. A. Willeke, p. 58.
April 18, 1925, ed. Geneva 1925, p. 40, Survey No. 353. Cf. a decision of the M.A.T. Hungary-Kingdom of Serbians, Croatians and Slovenians, dated September 13, 1928, wherein it was held that “le Traité d’armistice n’a pas eu pour effet de transférer au Gouvernement des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes les droits de souveraineté appartenant au Gouvernement hongrois par rapport aux territoires occupés; que les autorités hongroises chargées de l’exercice de ces droits continuaient de fonctionner.”, M.A.T. vol. 8 p. 593. Belligerent occupation was also discussed before the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of the Lighthouses between France and Greece, but the Court did not pronounce an opinion thereon; Cf. Series C. No. 74, Greek Case p. 125 (“le pouvoir qu’il (i.e. the occupied State) possède en droit, il ne peut pas l’exercer en fait”), French Counter-Case p. 168, Greek Counter-Case p. 202, Speech of Prof. Basdevant, agent for France p. 250 (“L’occupation de guerre n’apporte aucune limite juridique à l’autorité du souverain légal. Le souverain légal rencontre toutes sortes d’obstacles de lait; ces obstacles de fait découlent de l’état de guerre; mais aucune limite juridique ne lui est imposé, spécialement par la Convention de La Haye’.’), Speech M. Politis, agent for Greece, p. 328, Speech Prof. Basdevant p. 354. Mr. Séfé-riadès, who filed a separate opinion, touched to this matter: Series A/B No. 62, p. 50/1,53 (March 17, 1934).
Plakkaat van Vlaanderen, III, 1, 105. This ordinance is quoted in H. van Houtte: Les occupations étrangères en Belgique sous l’ancien Régime, Gent 1930, vol. I, p. 272. He observes: “Le premier document que nous ayons rencontré, où le transfert immédiat de la souveraineté à l’occupant se trouve contesté, est une ordonnance du Gouvernement Espagnol des Pays-Bas des 26–29 juillet 1675, défendant aux habitants de la Province de Limbourg et des pays d’Outre-Meuse, après la prise de la ville de Limbourg par les Français, de reconnaître un autre souverain que le roi d’Espagne. Mais cette ordonnance est trop laconique pour pouvoir être considérée comme une affirmation de principe.”, p. 271. Cf. R.D.I.L.C. 58 (1931) — 364/74.
E. S. Roscoe: Reports of Prize Cases, 1745–1859, London 1905, vol. II p. 584/586, 589/90.
Pasicrisie belge 1915/6 p. 417.
Pasicrisie belge 1917, p. 281. See also two interesting decisions of the United States Supreme Court: United States v. Rice, 1819, 4 Wheaton 247, and Fleming v. Page, 1850, 9 Howard 603.
Loc. cit, p. 159.
Op. cit. p. 5/7, note p. 8.
A. Mechelynck: La Convention de La Haye concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre, Gand 1915, p. 342, 344, 393, 394.
Loc. cit. p. 41.
The legal relations between an occupying power and the inhabitants, Law Quarterly Review 33 (1917) — 368.
A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1908 p. 112.
Will man den Sinn der Haager Regel richtig fassen, so musz man sagen, <lasz nicht die gesetzmäszige Gewalt, sondern ihre Ausübung auf den Besetzenden übergeht, was das Haager Recht irrtümlich als tatsächlichen Uebergang dieser Gewalt konstruiert., S. Cybichowski: Das völkerrechtliche Okkupationsrecht, Z. f.V. 18 (1934) — 299.
Die Behauptung einiger Autoren, dasz der Besetzende die eigene und nicht eine fremde Staatsgewalt ausübt, ist unvereinbar mit der Vorschrift, dasz er grundsätzlich die fremden Landesgesetze zu beachten hat und ihm infolgedessen die in ihnen geregelten Kompetenzen des feindlichen Staates zustehen., Cybichowski, loc. cit.
“Attendu que les arrêtés de l’occupant ne sont pas des lois et ne valent pas comme lois, si l’on entend par là qu’ils auraient, en eux-mêmes, et par leur vertu propre, le même caractère et la même autorité que la législation nationale interne de l’Etat occupé dans laquelle ils viendraient s’incorporer sans avoir reçu la sanction de l’autorité légitime; qu’ils ne sauraient être autre chose que des ordres de l’autorité militaire de l’occupant.”, Cour de Cassation de Belgique, May 20, 1916, Pasicrisie 1915/6 p. 417 Cf. Dr. Schauer: Das Gesetzgebungsrecht des Okkupanten, in the quoted Protokolle (p. 286), p.. 42 et seq. See the same author in: Das Belgische Kassationshof zur Frage des Gesetzgebungsrechts des Okkupanten, Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung 1916 p. 658/62. In other sense: the same Court in a decision of July 12, 1844, Pasicrisie 1844 p. 213/4.
Journal Clunet 1917 p. 1809. In the same sense: Cour de Cassation de Belgique, 11–6-1903, Pasicrisie 1903 p. 301; 20–5-1916, Pasicrisie 1915/6 p. 418 (also in Journal Clunet 1920 p. 732), Cf. Stauffenberg loc. cit. p. 104. In other sense: XXX: L’occupation de guerre et les arrêtés du Pouvoir occupant en regard de la juridiction des cours et tribunaux du pays occupé, Brussels 1918. Cf. Dr. G. Wunderlich: Der belgische Justizstreik, Berlin 1930.
T.A.M. vol. 4 p. 45.
April 8, 1929, T.A.M. vol. 9 p. 78.
“L’occupant peut abuser de deux façons très différentes de son autorité matérielle pour modifier sans raison suffisante l’organisation intérieure du pays qu’il occupe. L’abus n’existe pas seulement quand, édictant des mesures qui excèdent sa compétence, l’occupant dépasse les limites objectives de ses attributions provisoires; il se présente également lorsque l’occupant use de ses pouvoirs dans un but et pour des motifs étrangers à l’objet véritable de sa mission en pays occupé. Tel est le cas lorsque, sous le couvert de mesures d’administration, l’occupant poursuit des fins politiques, lorqu’il s’attache, par exemple, à favoriser la diffusion d’une propagande antipatriotique ou d’un mouvement destiné à jeter la division parmi les populations. Les autorités du pays occupé refuseront de se prêter à de telles manoeuvres. Il y a là une limitation d’ordre subjectif qui rappelle la distinction établie par la juridiction administrative française entre l’excès de pouvoirs et le détournement de pouvoirs et qui offre dans les circonstances actuelles un intérêt particulier.”, Ch. de Vischer: L’occupation de guerre, Law Quarterly Review 34 (1918)-81.
A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1908 p. 90.
June 30, 1930, Z f.a.ö.R.u.V. III (1933) — 2 - 10, Survey No. 325. “Ne a confortare l’asserzione delia responsabilità territorialmente illimitata rispetto ai beni dei sudditi degli Stati alleati o associati puo valere l’argomentazione logica che lo Stato, anche sul territorio occupato, esercita una sovranità, sia pure di fatto, e che come esso risponde dei danni arrecati ai detti beni, quando siano situati nel suo territorio, ad opera di un provvedimento eccezionale che e esplicazione delia sovranità di diritto, cosi deve del pari rispondere dei danni agli averi nemici in territorio occupato quando siano cagionati da un provvedimento eccezionale di guerra, il quale e pure emanazione di una sovranità, essia delia sovranità di fatto. Invero, il fondamento delia responsabilità per i provvedimenti eccezionali di guerra non e da ricercare alla stregua degli astratti principi di logica ne del diritto commune, secondo il quale, anzi, l’esercizio delia sovranità non darebbe luogo a responsibilità alcuna da parte dello Stato: e, per contro, da considerare solo in rapporto alle concrete disposizioní del Trattato di pace, che orea questa responsabilità e ne pone i limiti; ed i limiti, sotto l’aspetto della localizzazione, consistono appunto nella situazione, sul territorio bulgaro, dei beni cui si nvolse il provvedimento pregiudizievole.”, Bulgaria-Italv, M.A.T., 13–11-1924, T.A.M. vol. 5 p 549/50.
After the war 1914–1918, the validity of many measures taken by Germany in occupied territories was contested bv national tribunals, see e.g. Cour de Douai May 15, 1919, Dalloz 1920–2-145, etc. Cf. R.G.D.I.P. 27 (1920) — 248/77.
Report Nielsen, p. 497, Survey No, 303. As to the right of usufruct (cf. article 55 of the Hague Regulations), see e.g.: Chile-France arb. 5–7-1901, Des-camps-R. 1901 p. 409/10, Survey No. 172; France-Greece, P C.I. J., 17–3-1934, diss. op. Séfériadès, Series A/B No. 62, p. 50. See also Cour de Nancy August 3, 1872, Dalloz 1872–2-230.
Domestic law demands obedience to the legitimate sovereign only: “The occupant is an enemy who enters the territory forcibly, drives out the legitimate Government, and puts the territory and its inhabitants under his military authority. ... In so far as the occupant conducts the administration of the country according to the existing laws, the inhabitants do not really render obedience to him but to their own laws and to their own Government. The fact that, while conducting the administration of the country according to the existing laws, the occupant is, so to say, the locum tenens of the legitimate Government, does not make the obedience to these laws on the part of the inhabitants appear to be an obedience rendered to the occupant personally/”, L. Oppenheim, loc. cit. p. 366/7.
“To the temporary right of administration acquired by the occupant corresponds, not the duty of the inhabitants to submit to such administration, but the duty of the legitimate Government to recognize, after the occupation has ceased, all the legitimate acts of administration carried out bv the occupant. The duty imposed upon the occupant by section 3 of the Hague Regulations is indeed imposed upon him in the interest of the inhabitants, but no international law relations are therebv created between him and the inhabitants. The duty imposed upon him creates international law relations between him and the legitimate Government. The correlative to this duty upon him is not a right of his to demand obedience from the inhabitants but a right of the legitimate Government to demand from the occupant that he carries out his administration of the territory in accordance with section 3 of the Hague Regulations. The legitimate Government can demand from the occupant that he complies with the duty concerned because he has actual authority over the territory, and therefore, according to international law, a temporary right of administration over it. He must re-establish and ensure public authority and safety by the authority which he actually possesses, namely, military authority.”, L. Oppenheim, loc. cit. p. 367/8.
As to reference, apart from the authors cited, see also J. E. Conner: The development of belligerent occupation, Iowa 1912.
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Stuyt, A.M. (1946). Governing Jurisdiction. In: The General Principles of Law as Applied by International Tribunals to Disputes on Attribution and Exercise of State Jurisdiction. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0955-8_3
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