Abstract
Territory is something which has not only a political significance for the existence of a State, but also a juridical one: it entitles a State to territorial jurisdiction, whereby it may exercise its legislative, executive, and judicial power over all persons and things within that territory. The following arbitration decisions prove this statement. The Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague gave an award on September 10, 1910,1) concerning questions between Great Britain and the United States of America about fisheries on the North Atlantic Coast wherein it was held that
the right to regulate the liberties conferred by the Treaty of 1818 is an attribute of sovereignty, and as such must be held to reside in the territorial sovereign, unless the contrary be provided; and considering that one of the essential elements of sovereignty is that it is to be exercised within territorial limits, and that, failing proof to the contrary, the territory is coterminous, with the sovereignty.2)
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References
) Survey No. 291.
) A.J.I.L. 4 (1910) — 956.
) “Is is certain that among the most widely recognized principles of international law are the principles that the jurisdiction of a State is territorial in character and that in respect of its nationals a State has preferential, if not sole jurisdiction.”, France-Turkey, P.C.I.J., Judgment No. 9, diss. op. Altamira, Series A No. 10, p. 95.
) “The principle of absolute and exclusive jurisdiction within the national territory applies to foreigners as well as to citizens or inhabitants of the country, and the foreigner can claim no exemption from the exercise of such jurisdiction, except so far as he may be able to show either: 1) that he is, by reason of some special immunity, not subject to the operation of the local law, or 2) that the local law is not in conformity with international law. No presumption of immunity arises from the fact that the person accused is a foreigner. ... It is evident that this claim is at variance not only with the principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of a State over its own territory, but also with the equally well-settled principle that a person visiting a foreign country, far from radiating for his protection the jurisdiction of his own country, falls under the dominion of the local law and, except so far as his government may diplomatically intervene in case of a denial of justice, must look to that law for his protection.”, France-Turkey, P.C.I.J., Judgment No. 9, diss. op. Moore, Series A. No. 10, p. 69, 92.
) Survey No. 366.
) A.J.I.L. 22 (1928) — 875.
) A.J.I.L. 22 (1928) — 876.
): My italics.
) “From these principles it results that no nation can be called upon, of ought, to permit the operation of foreign laws within its territory when those laws are contrary to its interests or its moral sentiments.”, Great Britain-U.S.A., arb., C. 8–2-1853, op. Hornby in the Enterprise case, Moore 4–4365, Survey No. 47.
) 19–2–1934, R.G.P.C. 1934–2-18.
) Moore 3–2432/3, Survey No. 82.
) Salvador-Nicaragua, 9–3-1917, A.J.I.L. 11 (1917)-718/9, Survey Appendix No. III.
) A.J.I.L. 4 (1910) — 968.
) “The criminal jurisdiction of a State therefore is based on and limited by the territorial area over which it exercises sovereignty. This is the principle, and it is an indisputable principle of international law.”, France-Turkey, P.C.I.J., Judgment No. 9, diss. op. Weiss, Series A. p. 45; “Two principles will be found to exist: the principle of sovereignty and the territorial principle, according to which each nation has dominion over its territory and—on the other hand—has no authority to interfere in any way in matters taking place on the territories of other nations.”, idem: diss. op. Nyholm, p. 59; “While no State can acquire jurisdiction over territory in another State by mere declarations on its own behalf.”, Guatemala-Honduras, arb., 23–1-1933, ed. Washington 1933, p. 13/4, Survey No. 393.
) Judgment No. 9, Series A. No. 10, p. 18, 19. “The laws of a country are uniformly in force, beyond the limits of its territory, over its vessels on the high seas, and continue in force in various respects within foreign ports, as we shall hereafter show. ... There are many laws of a foreign country, in reference to its own citizens or their obligations, that another nation may enforce or not, where the citizens of such a country voluntarily come within its borders in order to place themselves under its jurisdiction. But there are cases where persons are forced by the disasters of the sea upon a foreign coast, where, as I contend, a nation has fundamental and essential rights within the ordinary local limits of another country, of which it can not be deprived, and that are operative and binding by a sanction that is wholly above and beyond the mere assent of any such State or community. Such rights are defined by jurists as the absolute international rights of States. I might also add, it is not now a question whether the doctrines of international law shall prevail either in England or America.”, Great Britain-U.S.A., arb., C. 8–2-1853, Enterprise case, op. Upham, Moore 4–4351, Survey No. 47; “It is true that by what is termed the ‘comity of nations’ the laws of one country are in some cases, allowed by another to have operation; but in those cases the foreign law has its authority in the other country from the sanction, and to the extent only of the sanction, given to it there, and not from its original institution.” idem: op. Hornby, Moore 4–4365; “It is an admitted principle of international law that a nation possesses and exercises within its own territory an absolute and exclusive jurisdiction, and that any exception to this right must be traced to the consent of the nation, either express or implied. ... The benefit of this principle equally enures to all independent and sovereign States, and is attended with a corresponding responsibility for what takes place within the national territory.”, Lotus case, diss. op. Moore, loc. cit. p. 68.
) Reference, as to state jurisdictions: J. Basdevant: Règles générales du droit de la paix, Recueil des Cours 58 (1936) — 568, 591
) V. Bruns: Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, Z. f. a. ö. R. u. V. 1(1929)-1–1
) H. Kelsen: Théorie générale du droit international public, problèmes choisis, Recueil des Cours 42 (1932) — 182
) R. Monaco: Natura delia competenza dello Stato secondo il diritto internazionale, R.D.D.L 24 (1932) — 36, 161
) Ch. Rousseau: L’aménagement des compétences en droit international, R.G.D.I.P. 37 (1930) — 420.
As to state-territory: A. del Bon: Proprietà territoriale, Firenze 1867
L. Delbez: Du territoire dans ses rapports avec l’Etat, R.G.D.I P. 39 (1932) — 705
D. Donati: Stato e territorio, Roma 1924 (idem in: R.D.D.L 15 (1923) — 349 and 16 (1924) — 47)
F. Giese: Staatsrecht und Staatsgebiet, Z.f.V. 11 (1920) — 461
W. Hamel: Das Wesen des Staatsgebiets, Berlin 1933
W. Henrich: Kritik der Gebietstheorien, Z.f.V. 13 (1926) — 28, 194, 325
P. Mayer: Die rechtliche Bedeutung des Staatsgebiets für den Staatsbegriff historisch und dogmatisch dargestellt, Greifswald 1915
W. Peiser: Begriff und Wesen der Gebietshoheit, Greifswald 1919
J. van de Poll: De territorio, Lugd. Bat. 1804
A. Prager: Eigentum und Staatsgebiet, Z. f. ö. R. 14 (1934) — 611
E. Radnitzky: Die rechtliche Natur des Staatsgebiets, Archiv für öffentliches Recht 20 (1905) — 313
E. Radnitzky: Die rechtliche Natur des Staatsgebiets, Archiv für öffentliches Recht 22 (1907) — 416
E. Radnitzky: Die rechtliche Natur des Staatsgebiets, Archiv für öffentliches Recht 28 (1912) — 454
W. Schade: Wesen und Umfang des Staatsgebiets, Berlin 1934
A. F. Schnitzer: Staat und Gebietshoheit, Zürich 1935
W. Schönborn: La nature juridique du territoire, Recueil des Cours 30 (1929) — 85
P. Schou: Le rôle du territoire dans le droit international, Acta Scandinavica iuris gentium, 10 (1939) — 17
S. Tachi: La souveraineté et le droit territorial de l’Etat, R.G.D.I.P. 38 (1931) — 406
A. von Verdross: Staatsgebiet, Staatengemeinschaftsgebiet und Staat engebiet, Niem. Zeit. 37 (1927) — 293.
) Netherlands-Venezuela, arb., June 30, 1865, Lapradelle-P. 2–412, Survey No. 54.
) Great Britain-Portugal arb., April 21, 1870, Moore 2–1920, Survey No. 85.
) Great Britain-Portugal, arb., July 24, 1875, Moore 5–4984, Survey No. 100.
) Germany-Spain, mediation, October 22, 1885, Moore 5–5043, Survey No. 141.
) Brazil-Great Britain, arb., June 6, 1904, de Martens N.R.G. 2–32-485, Survey No. 240.
) Netherlands-U.S.A., arb., April 4, 1928, A.J.I.L. 22 (1928) — 867, Survey No. 366.
) France-Mexico, arb., January 28, 1931, A.J.I.L. 26 (1932) — 390, Survey No. 293.
) Denmark-Norway, P.C.I.J., Judgment April 5, 1933, Series A/B No. 53.
) It goes almost without saying that such disputes can have been settled also by treaty or agreement.
) De Martens N.R.G. 2–32-488.
) “On ne peut acquérir que les droits qu’on est susceptible d’exercer; or les Etats seuls peuvent exercer des droits souverains; eux seuls peuvent donc les acquérir; ils doivent dès lors être aussi les seuls à pouvoir réaliser une occupation, puisque l’effet de l’occupation est l’acquisition de la souveraineté.”, P. Fauchille: Le conflit de limites entre le Brésil et la Grande Bretagne..., Paris 1905, p. 33.
) Advisory Opinion No. 6, 10–9–1923, Series B p. 22.
) Cf. the Delagoa, Guyana, and Palmas cases.
) Cf. the Aves, Bulama, and Guiana cases.
) September 10, 1869, Moore 1–259, Survey No. 73.
) Moore 2–1919.
) A.J.I.L. 22 (1928) — 897.
) A.J.I.L. 26 (1932) — 393.
) Series A/B No. 53 p. 95.
) Moore 4–3359, Survey No. 142.
) See the Caroline case.
) See e.g. the Delagoa case, with the very extensive Portuguese Memoranda, the Caroline case, etc. “Such advances in good faith, followed by occupation and development, unquestionably creates equities which enterprises subsequently undertaken would be bound to consider. When it appears that the two Parties, seeking to extend their area of possession have come into conflict, the question of priority of occupation necessarily arises. Priority in settlement in good faith would appropriately establish priority of right.”, Guatemala-Honduras, arb., 23–1-1933, ed. Washington 1933, p. 84, Survey No. 393. Cf. A. S. Keller, C. J. Lissitzyn and F. J. Mann: Creation of rights of sovereignty through symbolic acts, 1400–1800, New York 1938.
) As to conventional law, cf. article 35 of the Congo Act, Berlin, February 26, 1885, de Martens N.R.G. 2–10-414 (R.D.I.L.C. 18 (1886)-113 and Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 1888/9 p. 201).
) Guiana case, de Martens N.R.G. 2–32-488.
) Palmas case, A.J.I.L. 22 (1928) — 884.
) Clipperton case, A.J.I.L. 26 (1932) — 393.
) Palmas case, A.J.I.L. 22 (1928) — 910. See also the Bulama and Delagoa cases. Cf. Survey No. 17, sub 2.
) Aves case, Lapradelle-P. 2–415.
) Bulama case, Moore 2–1921.
) Delagoa case, Moore 5–4984, 4985.
) Caroline case, Moore 5–5044.
) Guiana case, de Martens N.R.G. 2–32-488/9.
) Palmas case, A.J.I.L. 22 (1928) — 876.
) Idem p. 883.
) Idem p. 896.
) Clipperton case, A.J.I.L. 26 (1932) — 393/4.
) Greenland case, Series A/B No. 53, p. 45/6.
) Idem: p. 50/1.
) Idem: p. 52.
) “Considérant que, s’il est bien établi que les habitants de Saint-Eustache, possession néerlandaise, vont pêcher des tortues et cueillir des oeufs à l’île d’Aves, ce fait ne peut pas servir d’appui au droit de souveraineté, car il implique seulement une occupation temporaire et précaire de l’île, étant donné qu’il n’est pas, en l’espèce, la manifestation d’un droit exclusif, mais la conséquence de l’abandon de la pêche par les habitants des contrées voisines ou par son maître légitime.”, Avescase, Lapradelle-P. 2–414; “Attendu que, depuis la découverte, le Portugal a, en tout temps, revendiqué des droits de souveraineté sur la totalité de la baie et des territoires riverains, ainsi que le droit exclusif d’y faire le commerce.”, Delagoa case, Moore 5–4984; “This taking of possession consists in the act, or series of acts, by which the occupying State ... takes steps to exercise exclusive authority there.”, Clipperton case, A.J.I.L. 26 (1932) — 393.
) A.J.I.L. 22 (1928) — 877. See also the Delagoa case. About abandonment, see the Palmas case, the Greenland case, and the Clipperton case, wherein it was said: “There is no reason to suppose that France has subsequently lost her right by derelictio, since she never had the animus of abandoning the island, and the fact that she has not exercised her authority there in a positive manner does not imply the forfeiture of an acquisition already definitively perfected.”, A.J.I.L. 26 (1932) — 394.
) Also in connection with the development of technique (sailing vessels and steam-ships, railways, etc.).
) “If on the other hand the view is adopted thas discovery does not create a definitive title of sovereignty, but only an ‘inchoate’ title, such a title exists, it is true, without external manifestation. However, according to the view that has prevailed at any rate since the 19th century, an inchoate title of discovery must be completed within a reasonable period by the effective occupation of the region claimed to be discovered.”, Palmas case, A.J.I.L. 22 (1928) — 884.
) Gaius D. 41.13.
) Cf. article 38,3 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
) Dealing with these matters, H. Lauterpacht, in his Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, London 1927, p. 102, speaks of a “principle of private law”. His contention made on p. 103/4, that “even dogmatic positivists admit that the private law origin of a particular rule does not constitute an obstacle to its recognition as a part of international law, provided that its adoption has been sanctioned by custom and actual observance”, is not clear.
) Concrete rules, not abstract principles, are applied by international tribunals.
) “Il y a là des comparaisons dangereuses, et je dénonce sur ce point la confusion entre les règles techniques et les règles fondamentales. Il s’agit, en droit privé, d’une acquistion de propriété ou d’un droit réel, aboutissant nécessairement à un déplacement de droit. Il y a une injustice tolérée pour des raisons d’utilité publique: l’impossibilité, au bout d’un certain temps, de faire la preuve du droit et la nécessité de maintenir des situations acquises. En droit international, la question débattue est une question non de propriété, mais de souveraineté. Les raisons qui expliquent l’acquisition da la propriété privée ne sont pas valables. Il peut y en avoir d’autres, mais elles sont alors tirées du droit des gens. Je ne crois pas que l’on puisse utilement transposer ici les principes sur l’acquisition de la propriété, principes qui ne sauraient d’ailleurs être séparés d’une technique juridique assez compliquée.”, G. Ripert: Les règles du droit civil applicables aux rapports internationaux, Recueil des Cours 44 (1933) — 632/3.
) Reference: R. Ago: Il requisito dell’effettività dell’occupazione in diritto internazionale, Roma 1934; Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International, 1887/8–243, 1888/9–173, 1908–159
) T. W. Balch: The arctic and antarctic regions and the law of nations, A. J.I L. 4 (1910) — 265
) J. Basdevant: Etude comparée de l’occupation, Paris 1903
) F. Bleiber: Die Entdeckung im Völkerrecht, Greifswald 1933
) C. Boocke-steyn: De iuris gentium dominii acquirendi modo per occupationem, Lugd. Bat. 1742
) A. Decencière-Ferrandière: Essay historique et critique sur l’occupation comme mode d’acquérir les territoires en droit international, R.D.LL.C. 64 (1937) — 362, 624
) L. Deherpe: Essai sur le développement de l’occupation en droit international, Paris 1903
) K. Fiege: Der Gebietserwerb durch völkerrechtliche Okkupation, Leipzig 1908
) J. Fischer Williams: Sovereignty, seisin and the League, British Yearbook 1926, p. 24
) O. C. Galtier: Des conditions de l’occupation des territoires dans le droit international contemporain, Toulouse 1901
) R. Genet: Notes sur l’acquisition par occupation et le droit des gens traditionnel, R.D.I.L.C. 61 (1934) — 285, 416
) H. Gillmann: Die völkerrechtliche Okkupation, Wien 1915
) J. Goebel: The struggle for the Falkland Islands, New Haven 1927
) K. Heimburger: Der Erwerb der Gebietshoheit, 1888
) F. A. von der Heydte: Discovery, symbolic annexation and virtual effectiveness in international law, A.J.I.L. 29 (1935) — 448
) G. Jèze: Etude théorique et pratique sur l’occupation, Paris 1896
) A. S. Keller, O. J. Lissitzyn and F. J. Mann: Creation of rights of sovereignty through symbolic acts, 1400–1800, New York 1938
) W. Lakhtine: Rights over the Arctic, A.J.I.L. 24 (1930) — 703
) Lyndley: The acquisition and government of backward territory in international law, 1926
) M. de Martitz: Occupation des territoires, R.D.I.L.C. 19 (1887) — 371
) Occupation as a title to territory, The Law Times, April 22, 1933, vol. 175, No. 4699, p. 300
) A. Ribère: Les occupations fictives dans les rapports internationaux, Bordeaux 1897
) Ch. Salomon: L’occupation des territoires sans maître, Paris 1889
) W. Schultz: Der Gebietserwerb durch völkerrechtliche Okkupation, Leipzig 1909
) J. B. Scott: Arctic exploration and international law, A.J.I.L. 3 (1909) — 928
) W. Siebert: Begriff und Arten der Okkupation im Völkerrecht, Greifswald 1920
) G. Smedal: De l’acquisition de souveraineté sur les territoires polaires, 1932
) E. Tartarin: Traité de l’occupation, Paris 1873
) R. Waultrin: La question de la souveraineté des terres arctiques, R.G.D.I.P. 15 (1908) — 78, 185, 401
) E. Wolgast: Das Grönlandurteil des St. Int. Ger. vom 5. April 1932, Z. ö. R. 13 (1933) — 545, 751.
) “On the general principles of justice on which it is held in the civil law that prescription does not run against those who are unable to act, on which in English-speaking countries persons under disability are excepted from the operation of statutes of limitation, and on which English and American Courts of Equity refuse to impute laches to persons under disability, we must hold that dependent Indians, not free to act except through the appointed agencies of a sovereign which has a complete and exclusive protectorate over them, are not to lose their just claims through the laches of that sovereign, unless, at least there has been so complete and bona fide change of position in consequence of that iaches as to require such a result in equity.”, Great Britain-U.S.A., arb., C. 18–8-1910, Report Nielsen p. 330, Survey No. 303.
) M.A.T. vol 7, p. 51.
) Survey No. 257.
) Survey No. 245.
) A.J.I.L. 2 (1908) — 901.
) Ralston-D. p. 725/6. As to prescription of claims, two other decisions may be quoted: “On careful consideration of the authorities on the subject, much of whose discussion is only remotely applicable to the question as it is presented to us, we are of opinion that by their decided weight—we might say by very necessity—prescription has a place in the international system, and is to be regarded in these adjudications. True, but few of them make reference to individual claims or to debts by one State on account of transactions with citizens of another State. But the principles recognized are general. Founded in nature, their application is imperative and broad as human transactions. They reach to debts necessarily, as Domat shows.”, U.S.A.-Venezuela, arb., C. 5–12-1885, op. Little, Moore 4–4194/5, Survey No. 142; “Limitation will run against the Italian State as it ordains that prescription should run against an individual, and I do not see why these principles, which have been considered just in the internal civil law, should not be so considered in the life of nations, and why a claim of a civil nature only, and therefore essentially liable to prescription, must become unextinguishable thereby because it is converted into an international claim.”, Italy-Venezuela, arb., C. 13–2-1903, op. Zuloaga, Ralston-D. p. 723, Survey No. 257.
) Paris 1933, p. 178.
) Paris 1934, p. 55.
) Private law sources and analogies of international law, London 1927, p. 116, 117.
) A.J.I.L. 5 (1911) — 806, 807, Survey No. 300. The arbitrator in the Palmas case, cited above, alluded to prescription, without basing, however, his award on that invoked title. See in other sense: W. E. Beckett in Recueil des Cours 50 (1934) — 230.
) It is clear that a State may waive its jurisdictions by treaty or agreement. However, this waiving cannot be presumed. Cf. military occupation (§ 9), which does no more transfer jurisdictions of the occupied State to the occupying State, unless by the treaty of peace.
) Usucapio est adiectio dominii per continuationem possessionis temporis lege definiti, Modestinus D. 41.3.3.
) Likewise in the case of prescription of claims: “As it is a general rule that the term of a period of prescription does not commence to run until the day when the payment falls due and action for its recovery may be had, it would be necessary to prove (and the proof would always be difficult and uncertain) when these conditions occurred in the case of claims against governments. As there is not in international law an exact and generally accepted provision which establishes when and within what limits a credit becomes null and void through prescription, there cannot be a presumptive negligence on the part of the dilatory creditor, and the plea of prescription must be absolutely rejected.”, Italy-Venezuela, arb,, C. 13–2-1903, op. Agnoli, Ralston-D. p. 722, Survey No. 257; ‘The Umpire, while disallowing the claim, expresses no opinion as to the number of years constituting sufficient prescription to defeat claims against governments in an international court. Each must be decided according to its especial conditions.”, idem: Ralston, Ralston-D. p. 730: “A right unasserted for over forty-three years can hardly in justice be called a ‘claim’.”, U.S.A.-Venezuela, arb., C. 17–2–1903, Ralston-D. p. 162, Survey No. 258; “There is, of course, no rule of international law putting a limitation of time on diplomatic action or upon the presentation of an international claim to an international tribunal. Domestic statutes of limitation take away at the end of prescribed periods the remedy which a litigant has to enforce rights before domestic courts. ... From a conclusion to this effect it does not follow that international tribunals must always disregard all statutes of limitation prescribing reasonable periods within which remedies may be enforced before domestic tribunals.”, Mexico-U.S.A., arb., C. 8–9-1923, op. Nielsen, G.P.O. 1927 p,319, Survey No. 354.
In conventional law, no more unanimity exists on that point, cf. Honduras-Salvador, arb., C. 19–1-1895, La Fontaine p. 505, Survey No. 184, and Great Britain-Venezuela, arb., C. 2–2-1897, de Martens N R.G. 2–28-328, Survey No. 207.
) Rhode Island-Massachusetts, 1841, 15 Pet. 273.
) As to doctrine, see: G. Achenwall: Ius naturae, Gottingae 1781, vol.1, §241; D. Anzilotti: Cours de droit international, Paris 1929, p. 336/7; G. Ch. Bastineller: De eo, quod iustum et aequum videtur in praescriptione immunitatis ab oneribus publicis, Witt. 1740; A. von Bulmerincq: Das Völkerrecht oder das internationale Recht, Freiburg 1887, § 47, p. 286; A. Cavaglieri: Règles générales du droit de la paix, Recueil des Cours 26 (1929) — 405/7; P. Du Puy: Si la prescription a lieu entre les Princes souverains, Rouen 1670 (idem in: Traitez touchant les droits du roy tres-chrestien sur plusieurs estats et seigneuries possédées par divers Princes voisins, Paris 1655, p. 353/65)
) G. de Garden: Traité complet de diplomatie, Paris 1833, vol. 1, p. 397
) K. Gareis: Institutionen des Völkerrechts, Giessen 1901, p. 88
) J. E. Gunnerus: Praescriptionem non esse Iuris Naturalis, Jenae 1749
) A. W. Heffter; Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart, Berlin 1888, § 12
) K. Heimburger: Der Erwerb der Gebietshoheit, Karlsruhe 1888, p. 141
) D. F. Hoheisel: De fundamentis in doctrina de praescriptione et derelictione gentium tacita distinctius ponendis, Halae 1723
) J. L. Klüber: Europäisches Völkerrecht, Schaffhausen 1851, §§ 6 and 125
) J. M. Lampredi: Iuris publici universalis sive iuris naturae et gentium Theoremata, Florence 1793, vol. 3, § VIII, p. 146
) F. von Liszt: Das Völkerrecht systematisch dargestellt, Berlin 1925, p. 241
) T. Mamiani: D’un nuovo diritto Europeo, Turino 1859, p. 30
) G. F. de Martens: Precis du droit des gens moderne de l’Europe, Paris 1864, vol. 1, §70/1
) A. Mérignac: Traité de droit public international, Paris 1907, vol 2, p. 415/8
) P. J. Neyron: Principes du droit des gens européen conventionnel et coutumier, Bronswic, 1783, §§ 292/7
) E. Nys: Le droit international, Brussels 1912, vol 2, p. 38/44
) J. N. Pomeroy: Lectures on international law, Boston 1886, §§107/14
) G. de Rayneval: Institutions du droit de la nature et des gens, Paris 1853, p. 155/6
) A. Rivier: Principes du droit des gens, Paris 1896, vol, 1, p. 182/3\
) K. Strupp: Theorie und Praxis des Völkerrechts, Berlin 1925, p. 45
) K. Strupp: Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts und der Diplomatie, Berlin 1929, vol. 3, p. 29 (“Verjährung”)
) E. von Ullmann: Völkerrecht, Tübingen 1908, § 92, p. 309.
About the denial of prescription of claims, see, apart from the quoted decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration of 1902, the following cases: “I observe that a tribunal of equity cannot invoke prescription in order to evade obligations established by authentic documents, ... I affirm that prescription is not admitted in the juridical reports based on the ius gentium.”, Italy-Venezuela, arb., C. 13–2-1903, op. Agnoli, Ralston-D. p. 720, 721, Survey No. 257; “Attendu, en effet, que les dispositions des lois nationales touchant la prescription d’une action ne s’appliquent dans la jurisprudence internationale qu’en tant qu’elles sont en conformité avec les dispositions du droit international ou qu’elles y suppléent.”, Hungary-Kingdom of Serbians, Kroatians and Slovenians, M.A.T., 15–5-1929, vol 9, p. 197/8; As to doctrine, apart from general works, see e.g.: Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International, 1925, p. 1/49, 466/501, 1931 part I, p. 435, 441; A. Cavaglieri: Il decorso del tempo ed i suoi effetti sui rapporti giuridici internazionali, R.D D.I. 18 (1926) — 169; B. E. King: Prescription of claims in international law, British Yearbook 1934, p. 282.
) September 13, 1902, R.D.I.L.C. 38 (1906) — 207, Survey No. 205. “In Bouvier’s rights of the latter which form the ultimate object of international as well as of municipal law. We cannot reason always from the individual to the nation. Should we apply exactly the same rules to the nation which we apply to the citizen, we should often destroy, instead of conserve, the latter’s immunities and rights. International prescription would not prevent a single war or the shedding of a single drop of blood. It would generally be invoked in the interest of power against the weak, of oppression against the oppressed.”, J. N. Pomeroy: Lectures on international law in time of peace, Boston 1886, p. 131.
) September 13, 1902, R.D.LL.C. 38 (1906) — 207, Survey No. 206. “In Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (Rawle’s edition), title Prescription, we read: ‘The doctrine of Immemorial Prescription is indispensable in public law. The general consent of mankind has established the principle that long and uninterrupted possession by one nation excludes the claim of every other. All nations are bound by this consent since all are parties to it. None can safely disregard it without impugning its own title to its possessions. The period of time can not be fixed in public law as it can in private law; it must depend upon varying and variable circumstances.’ “, Italy-Venezuela, arb., C. 13–2-1903, Ralston, Ralston-D. p. 727, Survey No. 257r
“The teachings of publicists and of international practice agree in recognizing the necessity of immemorial usage consisting both of an uninterrupted recurrence of accomplished facts in the sphere of international relations and of ideas of justice common to the participating States and based upon the mutual conviction that the recurrence of these facts is the result of a compulsory rule. No international custom showing that Roumania had abandoned her right of jurisdiction over the Galatz-Braila sector in favour of the European Commission of the Danube has been able to develop; since neither a recurrence of facts from immemorial times nor ideas of justice held in common (French text: conscience juridique commune) can be shown to exist/’, P.C.I.J., Adv. Op. 8–12-1927, diss. op. Negulesco, Series B. No. 14, p. 105.
) Some decisions of the United States Supreme Court may be quoted whereby attention should be paid to the relation possession-exercise: “More than two centuries have passed since Massachusetts claimed and took possession of the territory up to the line established by Woodward and Saffrey. This possession has ever since been steadily maintained under an assertion of right. It would be difficult to disturb a claim thus sanctioned by time, however unfounded it might have been in its origin,”, Rhode Island-Massachusetts, 1846, 4 How. 638; “No human transactions are unaffected by time. ... For the security of rights, whether of States or individuals, long possession under a claim of title is protected. And there is no controversy in which this great principle may be involved with greater justice and propriety than in a case of disputed boundary.”, idem: 4 How. 639; “It is a principle of public law universally recognized, that long acquiescence in the possession of territory and in the exercise of dominion and sovereignty over it, is conclusive of the nation’s title and rightful authority.”, Indiana-Kentucky, 19–3-1890, 136 U.S. 479/519 (333); “The long acquiescence of Indiana in the claim of Kentucky, the rights of property of private parties which have grown up under grants from that State, the general understanding of the people of both States in the neighbourhood, forbid at this day, after a lapse of nearly a hundred years since the admission of Kentucky into the Union, any disturbance of that State in her possession of the island and jurisdiction over it.”, idem (336); “Independently of any effect due to the compact as such, a boundary line between States or, provinces, as between private persons, which has been run out, located, and marked upon the earth, and afterwards recognized and acquiesced in by the parties for a long course of years, is conclusive, even if it be ascertained that it varies somewhat from the courses given in the original grant; and the line so established takes effect, not as an alienation of territory, but as a definition of the true and ancient boundary.”, Virginia-Tennessee, 3–4–1893, 148 U.S. 522; “The effect to be given to such facts as long-continued possession ‘gradually ripening into that condition which is in conformity with international order’ depends upon the merit of individual cases as they arise.”, Maryland-West Virginia, 21–2–1910, 217 U.S. 44 (659); “The rule, long settled and never doubted by this court, is that long acquiescence by one State in the possession of territory by another and in the exercise of sovereignty and dominion over it is conclusive of the latter’s title and rightful authority.”, Michigan-Wisconsin, 1–3–1926, 270 U.S. 308; “Long acquiescence in the possession of territory and the exercise of dominion and sovereignty over it may have a controlling effect in the determination of a disputed boundary.”, Massachusetts-New York, 12–4-1926, 271 U.S. 95; “The general principle of public law that as between States long acquiescence in the possession of territory under a claim of right and in the exercise of dominion and sovereignty over it, is con-clusive of the rightful authority—a principle by which prescription founded on length of time is regarded as establishing an incontestable right—,...”, Oklahoma-Texas, 11–10-1926, 272 U.S. 47.
Cf. also the rule “uti possidetis” of 1810, especially applied in Latin America; Colombia-Venezuela, arb., 16–3-1891, Moore 5–4858, Survey No, 121; Honduras-Nicaragua, arb., 23–12-1906. Descamps-R. 1906–1028. Survey No. 180; Bolivia-Peru arb., 9–7-1909, A.J.I.L. 3 (1909) — 1029, Survey No. 249; Colombia-Venezuela, arb., 24–6-1918 and 24–3-1922, ed. P. Attinger, Neuchâtel 1918 en 1922, Survey No. 320;
Guatemala-Honduras, arb., 8–1-1932 and 23–1-1933, ed. Washington 1932 and 1933, Survey No. 393; Bolivia-Paraguay, arb., 10–10-1938, A.J.I.L. 33 (1939) — 180, Survey No. 407. See also: H. Accioly: Le Brésil et la doctrine de l’uti possidetis, RDI 1935–1-36/45
E. Ayala: Le principe de l’uti possidetis et le règlement des questions territoriales en Amérique, R.D.I. 1931–2-441/56
B. Checa Drouet: La doctrina Americana del uti possidetis de 1810, Lima 1936.
) Reference, general: Prescription in international law, Harvard Law Review 17 (1903/4) — 346
) J. C. Reigersman: Dissertatio iuridica inauguralis de praescriptione iuris gentium sive immemoriali, Lugd. Bat. 1749
) M. Soerensen: La prescription en droit international, Acta Scandinavica Iuris Gentium 1932, p. 145
) P. A. Verykios: La prescription en droit international public, Paris 1934.
) Cf. the “zone contiguë” between the marginal sea and the high seas. See also § 6.
) Treaty of peace, treaty of cession, treaty of separation, etc.
) It is rare that a boundary line be determined by a third party, apart from an arbitral decision in a boundary dispute. One example may be quoted: the boundary between Iraq and Turkey was fixed by decision of the Council of the League of Nations. In article 3,2 of the Treaty of Peace between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, of the one part, and Turkey, of the other part, signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923, it was stipulated that: “The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months. In the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.”, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1924, p. 6. No agreement being reached, the dispute was referred to the Council, which asked the Permanent Court of International Justice an advisory opinion on the question: “What is the character of the decision to be taken by the Council in virtue of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne—is it an arbitral award, a recommendation or a simple mediation?” In its Advisory Opinion No. 12, given on November 21, 1925, the Court held, inter alia: “The Court is of opinion that in signing Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne, the intention of the Parties was, by means of recourse to the Council, to insure a definitive and binding solution of the dispute which might arise between them, namely, the final determination of the frontier.” (p. 19). “If the word ‘arbitration’ is taken in a wide sense, characterized simply by the binding force of the pronouncement made by a third Party to whom the interested Parties have had recourse, it may well be said that the decision in question is an ‘arbitral’ award.” (p. 26). “But the fact that the ‘decision to be reached’ by the Council under Article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne cannot be described as a recommendation within the meaning of Article 15 of the Covenant, does not imply that the applicability of the latter article in the present case is excluded. For the various and more extensive powers conferred by the Parties in this case on the Council merely complete the functions which it normally possesses under Article 15.” (p. 28). “For these reasons, The Court is of opinion: 1) that the ‘decision to be taken’ by the Council of the League of Nations in virtue of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne, will be binding on the Parties and will constitute a definitive determination of the frontier between Turkey and Iraq.” (p. 33). The Council delivered a decision on December 16, 1925, fixing the boundary (L.N.O.J, 1926, p. 191/2). See also the Resolution of the Council of March 11, 1926 (L.N.O.J. 1926, p. 503), and the Treaty between the United Kingdom and Iraq and Turkey regarding the settlement of the frontier between Turkey and Iraq, signed at Angora, June 5, 1926 (L.N.T.S. vol.64, p. 379). See about this question: P. E. J. Bomli: L’affaire de Mossoul, Amsterdam 1929
) H. W. Briggs: L’avis consultatif no. 12 de la C P. J.I. dans l’affaire de Mossoul, R.D.I.L.C. 54 (1927) — 626/55
) Foreign Affairs, “The Iraq dispute”, 3 (1924/5) — 687
) L. Le Fur: L’affaire de Mossoul, R.G.D.I.P. 33 (1926) — 60/103, 209/45
) J. H. W. Verzijl: La classification des différends internationaux et la nature du litige anglo-turc relatif au vilayet de Mossoul, R.D.I.L.C. 52 (1925) — 732/59
) J. B. Whitton: L’avis consultatif de la C.P.J.I. du 21 novembre 1925, R.G.D.I.P. 32 (1925) — 403/22
) Q. Wright: The Mosul dispute, A.J.I.L. 20 (1926) — 153/64.
) See Paul de Lapradelle: La frontière, Paris 1928. The different phases of fixation, description, and demarcation of a boundary were not clearly taken into account by Prof. Huber when he said in the Palmas case that: “Territorial sovereignty is, in general, a situation recognised and delimited in space, either by so-called natural frontiers as recognised by international law or by outward signs of delimitation that are undisputed, or else by legal engagements entered into between interested neighbours, such as frontier conventions, or by acts of recognition of States within fixed boundaries.”, A. J.I.L. 22 (1928) — 875.
) It may be remembered that when a State addressed a demand to the League of Nations in order to become a member of the League, the Assembly, deliberating on such an admittance, examined the following points: “1) La demande d’admission dans la Société des Nations est-elle régulière? 2) Le pays est-il reconnu de iure ou de facto et par quels Etats? 3) Possède-t-il un gouvernement stable et des frontières définies? 4) Se gouverne-t-il librement? 5) Quels ont été ses actes et ses déclarations en ce qui concerne: a) ses engagements internationaux; b) les prescriptions de la Société relative aux armements?”, J. H. W. Verzijl Volkenbondsverdrag, 1925, Zwolle, p. 8. The Mixed Arbitral Tribunal Germany-Poland observed in a decision given on August 1, 1929: “Pour qu’un Etat existe et puisse être reconnu comme tel avec un territoire sans lequel il ne pourrait ni exister, ni être reconnu, il suffit que ce territoire ait une consistance suffisamment certaine (alors même que les frontières n’en seraient pas encore exactement délimitées) et que, sur ce territoire, il exerce en réalité la puissance publique nationale de façon indépendante. Nombreux sont les exemples de cas dans lesquels des Etats ont existé sans contestation, ont été reconnus et se sont reconnus mutuellement à une époque où la frontière entre eux n’était pas encore exactement fixée.”, M.A.T. vol. 9, p. 346.
) “The very nature of a frontier and of any convention designed to establish frontiers between two countries imports that a frontier must constitute a definite boundary line throughout its length.”, Great Britain-Turkey, P.C.I.J., Adv. Op. 21–11-1925, Series B no. 12, p. 20.
) “The locality of that line is a matter of fact, and, when ascertained, separates the territory of one from the other, for neither State can have any right beyond its territorial boundary. It follows that when a place is within the boundary, it is a part of the territory of a State; title, jurisdiction, and sovereignty, are inseparable incidents, and remain so till the State makes some cession.”, Rhode Island-Massachusetts, U.S.S.C., 1838, 12 Pet. 733.
) Florida-Georgia, 6–3-1855, 58 U.S. 478 (190). “We consider, therefore, the established doctrine of this court to be, that is has jurisdiction of questions of boundary between two States of this Union, and that this jurisdiction is not defeated, because in deciding that question it becomes necessary to examine into and construe compacts or agreements between those States, or because the decree which the court may render, affects the territorial limits of the political jurisdiction and sovereignty of the States which are parties to the proceeding.”, Virginia-West Virginia, U.S.S.C., 6–3-1871, 78 U.S. 39 (71); “When a dispute arises about boundaries, this court must determine the line; and, in doing so, must be governed by rules explicitly or implicitly recognized (Rhode Island-Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657). It must follow and apply those rules, even if legislation of one or both of the States seems to stand in the way. But the words of the Constitution would be a narrow ground upon which to construct and apply to the relations between States the same system of municipal law in all its details which would be applied between individuals. ... The reasons on which prescription for a public nuisance is denied or may be granted to an individual as against the sovereign power to which he is subject have no application to an idependent State. See 1 Oppenheim, International Law, 293, §§ 242, 243. It would be contradicting a fundamental principle of human nature to allow no effect to the lapse of time, however long,..., yet the fixing of a definite time usually belongs to the legislature rather than the courts.”, Missouri-Illinois, U.S.S.C., 19–2-1906, 200 U.S. 519/20.
) Paris 1928, p. 142.
) De l’influence sur la procédure arbitrale de la cession de droits litigieux, R.G.D.I.P. 13 (1906) — 319, 320.
) See the boundary arbitrations collected in my Survey (index; Boundary) under No. 2.
) Survey under No. 4. b. It is interesting to compare this “law to be applied”. Some examples may be quoted: “Il est entendu qu’en traçant cette frontière et en se conformant, autant que possible, à la description de cette ligne dans le présent Protocole, ainsi qu’aux points marqués sur les cartes ci-annexées, les dits Commissaires tiendront dûment compte des localités et des nécessités et du bien-être des populations locales.”, No. 140; “Whenever the royal acts and dispositions do not define the dominion of a territory in clear terms, the arbitrator shall decide the question according to equity, keeping as near as possible to the meaning of those documents and to the spirit which inspired them.”, No. 249; “Les Gouvernements du Pérou et de la Colombie soumettent sans appel à la décision de Sa Majesté le Roi d’Espagne la question de frontières pendante entre eux, laquelle sera résolue en ayant égard, non seulement aux titres et arguments de droit qui ont été ou seront présentés, mais aussi aux convenances des Hautes Parties Contractantes et en les conciliant de manière que la ligne frontière soit établie en droit et en équité.”, No. 271; “The arbitrators shall determine the dividing line in accordance with existing treaties and the modifications established by the present Convention; but they may, leaving to one side strict law, adopt an equitable line in accordance with the necessities and convenience of the two countries.”, No. 285; “The Court of Arbitration shall have power to determine how far the boundary line shall be considered to be, either wholly or in part, determined by the Boundary Treaty of 1661, together with the charts appertaining to the same, and how such boundary line is to be drawn, and also, in so far as the boundary line can be considered as undetermined by the Treaty and chart in question, shall have power to determine the same, having regard to actual conditions and the principles of international law.”, No. 288; “In arriving at their decision the Commission will take into account ethnographical and historical principles and the state-political interests of each party (military, strategical, economical and communicational) and the interests of the local population.”, No. 331; “The arbitrators will pronounce, having heard the Parties and according to their loyal knowledge and understanding, taking into consideration the experience accumulated by the Peace Conference and the advice of the military advisers to that organization.”, No. 407, etc.
) A curious statement was made by an arbitral tribunal in a conflict between Austria and Hungary. In its award given on September 13, 1902, the tribunal held: “L’opinion de l’expert, partagée aussi par le tribunal, s’appuie sur les dispositions du droit des gens qui ne reconnaît pas aux fleuves la qualité de frontière, mais l’accorde plutôt aux crêtes de montagnes.”, R.D.I.L.C. 38 (1906) — 210, Survey No. 206. In a note, the tribunal referred to A. Rivier: Principes du droit des gens, Paris 1896, vol. 1, p. 166. It would be misleading, however, to hold Rivier responsible for such a statement. On page 166 he does not speak of natural frontiers in the juridical, but in the political sense. He writes: “On emploie aussi l’expression de frontières naturelles dans un autre sens, non juridique, mais politique, pour marquer l’extension qu’au gré de certains partis ou de certaines personnes un pays devrait prendre aux dépens d’autres pays. On a représenté, par exemple, les Alpes comme la frontière naturelle de l’Italie, le Rhin comme celle de la France, Appliquée à des chaines de montagnes, cette acceptation se rattache à une idée juste, à l’idée de défense, la frontière naturelle étant d’ordinaire la frontière militaire ou stratégique. Appliquée à des cours d’eau, elle n’a guère de valeur; si les fleuves et les grandes rivières séparent quelquefois les populations des rives opposées, ce sont surtout, cependant, des voies de communication, et d’autre part leur instabilité, leurs changements continuels en font souvent des frontières plutôt mauvaises.” So, the statement of the tribunal must be considered as erroneous: ‘dispositions du droit des gens’ and political considerations are different things. It is also curious that J. H. Ralston in his The law and procedure of international tribunals (Stanford University Press 1926), p. 319, No. 567, reproduces this statement without any comment.
) One arbitral award dealt with the question of a boundary as border line. It was held by General E. P. Alexander in the boundary dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua that: “En verdad, la palabra ‘margen’ con frecuencia se aplica en conversacion vagamente al primer terreno seco que se levanta sobre el agua; pero la impropiedad de tal uso viene a ser aparente si nosotros consideramos los casos por donde los rios inundan sus márgenes por muchas millas, ó donde sus lechos se secan totalmente. Tal uso indefinido de la palabra no es licito en la interpretaciôn de un Tratado que define una línea divisoria. El objeto de todo limite es asegurar la paz evitando los conflictos de jurisdicción. ... Ciaramente, pues, donde quiera que un Tratado designe, que la margen de un río será tomado como un límite, lo que es entendido no es la orilla temporal de tierra firme dis-cubierta en estados extraordinarios de las aguas altas ó bajas, sino la margen en el estado ordinario de las aguas. Y cuando sea una vez definida per Convenio vendrá á ser permanente como la superficie del suelo en donde ella corre. Si la margen se retira, retrocede; si la margen aumenta hacia la corriente, avanza. Las llenas y vaciantes periôdicas de las aguas no la afectan. Y esto es enteramente de acuerdo con el precepto de don Carlos Calvo... : ‘Las fronteras marcadas por corrientes de aguas están sujetas â variar cuando sus lechos reciben cambios.’ ‘En otras palabras es el lecho el que gobierna y no el nivel del agua en el, sobre él, ó bajo él.”, award March 22, 1898, La Fontaine p. 534, Survey No. 197. Thus, such a boundary does not change by effect of inundation (cf. Inst. II.1.24: “Neque enim inundatio speciem fundi commutat et ob id, si recesserit aqua, palam est eum fundum eius manere, cuius et fuit.”; see also Dutch Civil Code article 648),. but well if the bed of the river itself changes.
Iowa-Illinois, U.S.S.C., 3–1-1893, 147 U.S. 7/8, 10.
Brazil-France, arb., 1–12-1900, La Fontaine p. 578, Survey No. 209.
Louisiana-Mississippi, U.S.S.C., 5–3-1906, 202 U.S. 49/50.
Norway-Sweden, P.C.A., 23–10-1909, A.J.I.L. 4 (1910) — 232, Survey No. 288.
Arkansas-Mississippi, U.S.S.C., 19–5-1919, 250 U.S. 43.
Georgia-South Carolina, U.S.S.C., 30–1-1922, 257 U.S. 521.
Mexico-U.S.A., arb., C. 8–9–1923, G.P.O. 1929 p. 240, Survey No. 354.
In a boundary dispute between Great Britain and Portugal, the arbitrator, P. H. Vigliani, late Chief President of the Court of Cassation of Florence, observed in his award given on January 30, 1897: “But apart from the question whether the expression ‘to follow a river upstream’ be rigorously accurate from a philological point of view, it is certain that in the diplomatic and technical language of the delimitation convention, to follow a river, or stream, is made use of with the meaning to follow upstream as well as to follow downstream.”, Moore 5–5014, Survey No. 183.
New Jersey-Delaware, U.S.S.C., 5–2-1934, 291 U.S. 378/85; A.J.I.L. 29(1935)-341/5.
Wisconsin-Michigan, U.S.S.C., 20–5-1935, 295 U.S. 461.
Arkansas-Tennessee, U.S.S.C., 3–6-1940, A.J.I.L. 35 (1941) — 158.
“It is equally well-settled, that where a stream, which is a boundary, from any cause suddenly abandons its old and seeks a new bed, such change of channel works no change of boundary; and that the boundary remains as it was, in the centre of the old channel, although no water may be flowing therein. This sudden and rapid change of channel is termed, in the law, avulsion. ... These propositions, which are universally recognized as correct where the boundaries of private property touch on streams, are in like manner recognized where the boundaries between States or nations are, by prescription or treaty, found in running water. Accretion, no matter to which side it adds ground, leaves the boundary still the centre ot the channel. Avulsion has no effect on boundary, but leaves it in the centre of the old channel”, Nebraska-Iowa, U.S.S.C., 29–2-1892, 143 U.S. 359/70; in New Orleans v. United States the Court held: “The question is well-settled at common law, that the person whose land is bounded by a stream of water, which changes its course gradually by alluvial formations, shall still hold by the same boundary, including the accumulated soil. No other rule can be applied on just principles. Every proprietor whose land is thus bounded is subject to loss by the same means which may add to his territory; and as he is without remedy for his loss, in this way, he cannot be held accountable for his gain. ... This rule is no less just when applied to public than to private rights.”, 10 Pet. 662. “The middle of the channel of the Missouri river, according to its course as it was prior to the avulsion of July 5th, 1867, is the true boundary line between Missouri and Nebraska.”, Missouri-Nebraska, U.S.S.C., 19–12-1904, 196 U.S. 34/5, 37; “It is conceded, on both sides, that if this provision stood alone it would undoubtedly constitute a natural, or arcifinious, boundary between the two nations and that according to well-known principles of international law, this fluvial boundary would continue, notwithstanding modifications of the course of the river caused by gradual accretion on the one bank or degradation of the other bank; whereas, if the river deserted its original bed and forced for itself a new channel in another direction the boundary would remain in the middle of the deserted river bed.”, Mexico-U S.A., arb., 15–6–1911, A.J.I.L. 5 (1911) — 793/4, Survey No. 300; “It is settled beyond the possibility of dispute that where running streams are the boundaries between States, the same rule applies as between private proprietors; namely, that when the bed and channel are changed by the natural and gradual processes known as erosion and accretion, the boundary follows the varying course of the stream; while, if the stream from any cause, natural or artificial, suddenly leaves its old bed and forms a new one, by the process known as an avulsion, the resulting change of channel works no change of boundary, which remains in the middle of the old channel, although no water may be flowing in it, and irrespective of subsequent changes in the new channel.”, Arkansas-Tennessee, U.S.S.C., 4–3-1918, 246 U.S. 173 (A.J.I.L. 12 (1918) — 654).
A.J.I.L. 22 (1928) — 876, Survey No. 366. Cf. the following decisions: “Independently of any effect due to the compact as such, a boundary line between States or provinces, as between private persons, which has been run out, located, and marked upon the earth, and afterwards recognized and acquiesced in by the parties for a long course of years, is conclusive, even if it be ascertained that it varies somewhat from the courses given in the original grant; and the line so established takes effect, not as an alienation of territory, but as a definition of the true and ancient boundary.”, Virginia-Tennessee, U.S.S.C., 3–4-1893, 148 U.S. 522; “The question is one of boundary, and this court has many times held that, as between the States of the Union, long acquiescence in the assertion of a particular boundary and the exercise of dominion and sovereignty over the territory within it, should be accepted as conclusive, whatever the international rule might be in respect of the acquisition by prescription of large tracts of country claimed by both.”, Louisiana-Mississippi, U.S.S.C., 5–3-1906, 202 U.S. 53/4; “It is well settled that governments as well as private persons, are bound by the practical line that has been recognized and adopted as their boundary. ... and that a boundary line between two governments which has been run out, located, and marked upon the earth, and afterwards recognized and acquiesced in by them for a long course of years, is conclusive, even if it be ascertained that it varies somewhat from the correct course; the line so established taking effect, in such case, as a definition of the true and ancient boundary.”, Oklahoma-Texas, U.S.S.C., 11–10-1926, 272 U.S. 44; “For the concept of possession cannot be deemed to require a pedis possessio of every tract of land, and it is manifestly possible to have a recognition of a boundary, up to which it is assumed that administrative authority will be exercised as the opening up and development of territory within the boundary may reauire.”. Guatemala-Honduras, arb., 23–1-1933, ed. Washington 1933 p. 37, Survey No. 393; “The truth indeed is that almost from the beginning of statehood Delaware and New Yersey have been engaged in a dispute as to the boundary between them. There is no room in such circumstances for the application of the principle that long acquiescence may establish a boundary otherwise uncertain .. Acquiescence is not compatible with a century of conflict.”, New Jersey-Delaware, U.S.S.C., 5–2-1934, 291 U.S. 376/7.
Moore 2–2028, Survey No. 107. The question submitted to the Arbitral Tribunal was formulated as follows: “Ought the frontier line above mentioned (which divides the Italian territory from the territory of the Swiss Confederation) to follow, according to the opinion of Switzerland, the summit of the principal chain by passing by the Crown of Groppo, Peak of the Croselli, Peak Pioda, Peak of the Furnace, Peak of the Monastery; or ought it, according to the opinion of Italy, to leave the principal chain at the specified summit of Sonnenhorn 2788 m in order to descend towards the stream of the valley of Campo by following the secondary ridge called Creta Tremolina (or Mosso del Lodano 2556 m on the Swiss map), to meet the principal chain at the Peak of the Frozen Lake?”
Moore 2–2030.
Moore 2–2033/4.
Moore 2–2038.
Moore 2–2042.
Moore 2–2045.
Cf. Argentina-Brazil, arb., 5–2-1895, Moore 2–2020, Survey No. 157: “That the boundary line between the Argentine Republic and the United States of Brazil in that part submitted to me for arbitration and decision, is constituted and shall be established by and upon the rivers Pepiri (also called Pepiri-Guazu) and San Antonia, to wit, the rivers which Brazil has designated in the argument and documents submitted to me as constituting the boundary.” (Moore 2–2022).
Survey No. 209.
La Fontaine p. 564.
La Fontaine p. 571.
La Fontaine p. 578.
La Fontaine p. 571.
La Fontaine p. 578.
La Fontaine p. 578.
Descamps-R. 1902 p. 372/3, Survey No. 198. The Report of the Tribunal to His Majesty held, inter alia: “The Argentine Government contended that the boundary comtemplated was to be essentially an orographical frontier determined by the highest summits of the Cordillera of the Andes; while the Chilean Government maintained that the definition found in the Treaty and Protocols could only be satisfied by a hydrographical line forming the water-parting between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, leaving the basins of all rivers discharging into the former within the coast-line of Argentina, to Argentina; and the basins of all rivers discharging into the Pacific within the Chilean coast-line, to Chile. We recognized at an early stage of our investigations that, in the abstract, a cardinal difference existed between these two contentions. An orographical boundary may be indeterminate if the individual summits along which it passes are not fully specified; whereas a hydrographical line, from the moment that the basins are indicated, admits of delimitation upon the ground.” (Descamps-R. 1902 p. 377). “In short, the orographical and hydrographical lines are frequently irreconciliable; neither fully conforms to the spirit of the Agreements which we are called upon to interpret. It has been made clear by the investigation carried out by our Technical Commission that the terms of the Treaty and Protocols are inapplicable to the geographical conditions of the country to which they refer. We are unanimous in considering the wording of the Agreements as ambiguous, and susceptible of the diverse and antagonistic interpretations placed upon them by the Representatives of the two Republics. Confronted by these divergent contentions we have, after the most careful consideration, concluded that the question submitted to us is not simply that of deciding which of the two alternative lines is right or wrong, but rather to determine—within the limits defined by the extreme claims on both sides—the precise boundary-line which, in our opinion, would best interpret the intention of the diplomatic instruments submitted to our consideration. We have abstained, therefore, from pronouncing judgment upon the respective contentions which have been laid before us with so much skill and earnestness, and we confine ourselves to the pronouncement of our opinions and recommendations on the delimitation of the boundary.”, loc. cit. p. 378/9. These opinions and recommendations as to a third line were not in conformity with the arbitral agreement, which stipulated that: “should disagreements occur between the experts in fixing in the Cordillera of the Andes the dividing boundary-marks to the south of the 26° 52’ 45”, and should they be unable to settle the points in dispute by agreement between the two Governments they will be submitted for the adjudication of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government, whom the Contracting Parties now appoint as Arbitrator to apply strictly in such cases the dispositions of the above Treaty and Protocol, after previous examination of the locality by a Commission to be named by the Arbitrator.” Mr. A. Alvarez has criticized this award—which was accepted by both Parties—saying that 1) it was null and void owing to ‘excès de pouvoir’; 2) it was not motivated, and 3) it accorded value, for the fixation of the boundary-line, to the territorial occupations by one of the contesting States during the dispute, R.G.D.I.P. 10 (1903) — 651/90.
September 12, 1914, A.J.I.L. 8 (1914) — 913, Survey No. 298. The arbitral Agreement stipulated: “The Republic of Costa Rica and the Republic of Panama, although they consider that the boundary between their respective territories designated by the arbitral award of His Excellency the President of the French Republic the 11th of September 1900 (award by E. Loubet, de Martens N.R.G. 2–32-411, Survey No. 118), is clear and indisputable in the region of the Pacific... have not been able to reach an agreement in respect to the interpretation which ought to be given to the arbitral award as to the rest of the boundary line; and for the purpose of settling their said disagreements agree to submit to the decision of the Honorable the Chief Justice of the United States, who will determine, in the capacity of arbitrator, the question: What is the boundary between Costa Rica and Panama under and most in accordance with the correct interpretation and true intention of the award of the President of the French Republic made the 11th of September 1900?”, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1912 p. 1.
A. J.I.L. 8 (1914) — 932.
A.J.I.L. 8 (1914) — 935/6.
A.J.I.L. 8 (1914) — 939/40. Panama refused to accept the award, which fixed as the boundary the dividing line between the disputed and undisputed territory, on the ground that the arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction in fixing a. new line, which did not conform to their interpretation of the Loubet award. See Survey No. 298.
Cf. the Cravairola case and the French Guiana case, first question.
Cf. the French Guiana case, second question, and the White award.
“The duty which Your Majesty has been pleased to undertake is one of pronouncing an award which shall do substantial justice between the parties without attaching too great an importance to the technical points which may be raised on either side. This is what we conceive to be the function of an ‘amiable compositeur’.”, Chile-U.S.A., arb., 5–7-1911, A.J.I.L. 5 (1911) — 1081, Survey No. 297.
Cf. the award of King Edward VII. See also some other cases, e.g.: Great Britain-U.S.A., arb., 10–1-1831, Moore 1–119, Survey No. 27. The arbitrator, King William I of the Netherlands, held: “Considérant que, d’après ce qui précède, les arguments allégués de part et d’autre, et les pièces exhibées à l’appui, ne peuvent être estimés assez prépondérants pour déterminer la préférence en faveur d’une des deux lignes, respectivement réclamées ... et que la nature du différend, et les stipulations vagues, et non suffisamment déterminées du traité de 1783 n’admettent pas d’adjuger l’une ou l’autre de ces lignes à l’une des dites parties, sans blesser les principes du droit, et de l’équité envers l’autre; considérant que la question se réduit, comme il a été exprimé ci-dessus, à un choix à faire du terrain... et que, dès lors, les circonstances, dont dépend cette décision, ne sauraient être éclaircies davantage, au moyen de nouvelles recherches topographiques, ni par la production de pièces nouvelles; nous sommes d’avis qu’il conviendra d’adopter pour limite des deux Etats une ligne...” (Moore 1–125). U.S.A. refused to accept the award. Honduras-Nicaragua, arb., 23–12–1906, Descamps-R. 1906 p. 1028, Survey No. 180. The arbitrator, King Alphons XIII of Spain, held inter alia: “Considérant que, de tout cet exposé, il résulte que le point qui répond le mieux au point de vue du droit historique, de l’équité et du caractère géographique pour servir de limite commune entre les deux Etats limitrophes sur la côte de l’Atlantique est le Cap de Gracias a Dios.” (Descamps-R 1906–1035). Nicaragua refused to accept the award. King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy, arbitrator in the quoted British Guiana case, held: “That not even the limit of the zone of territory over which the right of sovereignty of one or of the other of the two Parties may be held to be established can be fixed with precision; That it cannot either be decided with certainty whether the right of Brazil or of Great Britain is the stronger; In this condition of affairs, since it is our duty to fix the line of frontier between the dominions of the two Powers, We have come to the conclusion that, in the present state of the geographical knowledge of the region, it is not possible to divide the contested territory into two parts equal as regards extent and value, but that it is necessary that it should be divided in accordance with the lines traced by nature, and that the preference should be given to a frontier which, while clearly defined throughout its whole course, the better lends itself to a fair division of the disputed territory.” (De Martens N.R.G. 2–32-489, Survey No. 240). The award, accepted by both Parties, was severely criticized. A good method was followed by Alexander III, Emperor of Russia, who, as arbitrator in a boundary dispute between France and the Netherlands, declined to arbitrate because the terms of the arbitral agreement were too narrow Then a new agreement was signed giving him larger powers, which, however, the Czaar dit not use. See Survey No. 153.
‘Régime des frontaliers’, custom, police, etc. See Paul de Lapradelle, La Frontière, Paris 1928, Part II, ‘Le voisinage’.
A.J.I.L. 22 (1928) — 877. It may be remembered that, in this case, the agent for the Netherlands was Prof. C. van Vollenhoven, of Leiden University, and for the U.S.A. Mr. F. K. Nielsen. Cf. the Cravairola case and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
Norway-Sweden, 23–10-1909, A.J.I.L. 4 (1910) — 233, Survey No. 288.
Virginia-Tennessee, 3–4-1893, 148 U.S. 524.
“Chaque Etat riverain conserve ses droits souverains sur les parties des fleuves internationaux soumises à sa souveraineté, dans les limites établies par les stipulations de ce règlement et les traités ou conventions.”, article 28 of the Projet de règlement international de navigation fluviale, adopted by the Institut de Droit international in its session at Heidelberg, September 1887, Annuaire de l’Institut 1887/8 p. 186. It goes almost without saying that such conventions of navigation (and commerce) have but a declarative character when they enunciate this principle: “For the convenient use of navigable rivers by nations bordering upon them, treaties have been usually made, specifying rules and regulations in reference to their use; but it is well settled that such treaties recognize and sustain the right of use, and do not originate it.”, Great Britain-U.S.A., arb., C. 8–2-1853, Op. N. G. Upham (Enterprise case), Moore 4–4358, Survey No. 47. Cf. the United States Supreme Court in U.S.A. v. Utah: “As the court said, in Packer v. Bird (137 U.S. 661, 667): ‘It is, indeed, the susceptibility, to use as highways of commerce which gives sanction to the public right of control over navigation upon them, and consequently to the exclusion of private ownership, either of the waters or soils under them’.”, 13–4-1931, 283 U.S. 82/3.
“And whereas the right to open and close, as a sovereign on its own territory, certain harbors, ports, and rivers in order to prevent the trespassing of fiscal laws is not and could not be denied to the Venezuelan Government, much less this right can be denied when used in defence not only of some fiscal rights, but in defence of the very existence of the Government; and whereas the temporary closing of the Orinoco River (the so-called ‘blockade’) in reality was only a prohibition to navigate that river in order to prevent communication with the revolutionists in Ciudad Bolivar and on the shores of the river, this lawful act by itself could never give a right to claims for damages to the ships that used to navigate the river.”, U.S.A.-Venezuela, arb., C. 17–2-1903, Barge, Ralston-D. p. 95/6, Survey No. 258; “... an internal and national navigable waterway, the use of which by the vessels of States other than the riparian State is left entirely to the discretion of that State.”, P.C.I.J., Judg. no. 1, p. 22.
As to the German Empire, Mr. Schulze observed at the quoted Heidelberg session of the Institut de Droit international, with respect to the river Weser (see about that river: P. Morgan Ogilvie: International waterways, New York 1920, p. 256/7): “Ici, il faut distinguer: c’est un fleuve commun vis-à-vis de l’empire et des autres Etats étrangers, parce que, selon la constitution allemande, la législation et l’inspection suprêmes sont de la compétence de l’empire. Un Etat particulier ne peut conclure une convention par rapport à un tel fleuve. Pour des Etats confédérés, il faut donc toujours tenir compte des deux souverainetés, et non seulement de celle de l’Etat particulier.”, Annuaire 1887/8 p. 168. As to Switzerland,. cf. Max Huber: Ein Beitrag zur Lehre von der Gebietshoheit an Grenzflüssen, Z.f.V. 1 (1907) — 29/55, 159/217. As to the U.S.A., cf. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 86; U.S.A. v. Utah, 283 U.S. 75; U.S.A. v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 14.
“Roumania exercises power as territorial sovereign over the maritime Danube in all respects not incompatible with the powers possessed by the European Commission under the Definitive Statute. When in one and the same area there are two independent authorities, the only way in which it is possible to differentiate between their respective jurisdictions is by defining the functions allotted to them. As the European Commission is not a State, but an international institution with a special purpose, it only has the functions bestowed upon it by the Definitive Statute with a view to the fulfilment of that purpose, but it has power to exercise these functions to their full extent, in so far as the Statute does not impose restrictions upon it.”, P.C.I.J., Adv. Op. No. 14, 8–12-1927, concerning the jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube between Galatz and Braila, Series B, p. 63/4. See also Judgment No. 16 (Series A No. 23, 10–9-1929) of the same Court in the case relating to the territorial jurisdiction of the international Commission of the river Oder.
Advisory Opinion No. 14, Series B p. 64, 65. About navigability, the United States Supreme Court held: “In the Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563, the court said: ‘Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water/ (And in another case) ... and further that navigability does not depend on the particular mode in which such use is or may be had—whether by steamboats, sailing vessels or flatboats—nor on an absence of occasional difficulties in navigation, but on the fact, if it be a fact, that the stream in its natural and ordinary condition affords a channel for useful commerce. “, U.S.A.-Utah, 13–4-1931, 283 U.S. 76; “It is true that whether a stream is navigable in law depends upon whether it is navigable in fact. ... But a court may take judicial notice that a river within its jurisdiction is navigable.”, Arizona-California, 18–5-1931, 283 U.S. 452. Cf. Germany-Venezuela, arb., C. 13–2-1903, Op. Zuloaga, Ralston-D. p. 611, Survey No. 256.
P. 65.
12–12-1934, Series A/B No. 63, p. 83.
“In conformity with the provisions of the first Peace of Paris of May 30th, 1814, the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna of June 9th, 1815, provided that the Powers whose territories were separated or traversed by the same navigable river should regulate all that regarded its navigation by common consent, and should for this purpose name commissioners who should adopt as the basis of their proceedings certain principles laid down in the Act itself. The first of these was the principle that the navigation of such rivers along their whole course, from the point where each of them became navigable to its mouth, should be entirely free, and should not, in respect of commerce, be prohibited to any one, subject to uniform regulations of police. The rest of the principles mainly related to uniformity of navigation dues, and the establishment of a special service for the collection of such dues, the exclusion of national customs houses from interfering in the matter of navigation dues or from throwing obstacles in the way of navigation, the maintenance of navigable channels, and the keeping of towing paths in good repair, and the establishment of regulations of police alike for all, and as favourable as possible to the commerce of all nations. The arrangements, once settled, were not to be subject to change, except with the consent of all riparian States.”, P.C.I.J., Adv. Op. No. 14, p. 38, This freedom of navigation has been expressed in many treaties and conventions (see the very extensive report of Mr. James Valloton on the Régime de la navigation fluviale en droit international, Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit international, 1929–1-228/383), and in draft conventions (see the same Annuaire 1887/8 p. 182, article 3, 1934 p. 714, article 2, A.J.I.L., Off. Doc., Spec. Number, 1926 p. 339, article 2).
G.P.O. 1929 p. 240/1, Survey No. 354.
“Il est impossible, en présence des faits cités, de prétendre qu’à présent les principes de droit international sur cette matière (i. e.: navigation fluviale) soient reconnus et pratiqués uniformément sur tous les fleuves internationaux. Au contraire, il faut reconnaître qu’il existe jusqu’à ce jour une divergence assez essentielle parmi les hommes d’Etat et les jurisconsultes les plus compétents, sur la portée de ces principes et le mode de leur application. Il y a des fleuves à l’égard desquels ils n’ont reçu aucune application; il y a d’autres qui, étant juridiquement dans les mêmes conditions, sont néanmoins soumis à des régimes essentiellement différents”, Mr. de Martens in Annuaire de l’Institut, 1885/6 p. 279.
“River police... essentially comprises ... the regulation of navigation as far as the movement of ships on the river is concerned.”, P.C.I.J., Adv. Op, No. 14, p. 49.
Series A No. 23, p. 26/7. “It is apparent that the standard which clearly determines the legitimate needs of the riverain countries...”, Allied Powers-Central Powers, arb., 2–8-1921, Ed. Paris 1921 p. 40, Survey No. 324.
Annuaire 1932 p. 108/10.
“If the common legal right is based on the existence of a navigable waterway separating or traversing several States, it is evident that this common right extends to the whole navigable course of the river and does not stop short at the last frontier.”, P.C.I.J., Judgment 16, Series A No. 23 p. 27/8; “The principle that freedom of navigation upon a river must include navigation as far as (jusque dans) the zone to be reached, was made clear by the Act of the Rhine (1831) which lays down that freedom of navigation jusqu’à la mer (as far as the sea), as enunciated by the Treaty of Peace of Paris of May 30th, 1814, and the articles concerning the navigation of the Rhine annexed to the Final Act of the Congress; of Vienna (1815), means jusque dans la pleine mer (as far as the sea and into the high sea) et vice versa/’, the same Court, Adv. Op. No. 14 p. 57.
Judge Story said in the Apollon case: “St. Mary’s River formed, at this period, the boundary between the United States and the Spanish territory. ... The only access from the ocean to the Spanish waters running into the St. Mary s, as well as to the adjacent Spanish territories, was through this river. So that, upon the general principles of the law of nations, the waters of the whole river must be considered as common to both nations, for all purposes of navigation, as a common highway, necessary for the advantageous use of its own territorial rights and possessions.”, Instance Court, 1824, 9 Wheaton 369.
P.C.I.J., Adv. Op. No. 14, p. 48.
22–3–1888, Moore 2–1965/6, Survey No. 147. It seems that this is the only arbitration dealing with these matters.
London 1931, p. 104 et seq. Prof. Smith omitted, however, the Cleveland award.
Cf. also the case of the diversion of water from the Meuse, P.C.I.J., Judgment June 28, 1937, Series A/B No. 70.
“Les Etats riverains d’un même cours d’eau sont, les uns vis-à-vis des autres, dans une dépendance physique permanente qui exclut l’idée d’une entière autonomie de chacun d’eux sur la section de la voie naturelle relevant de sa souveraineté. Le droit international s’étant déjà occupé du droit de navigation quant aux fleuves internationaux, l’exploitation de l’eau à l’usage de l’industrie, de l’agriculture, etc., est restée en dehors des prévisions de ce droit. Il paraît donc opportun de combler cette lacune en constatant les règles de droit (my italics) qui découlent de l’interdépendance incontestablement existant entre Etats riverains du même cours d’eau et entre Etats dont les territoires sont traversés par le même cours d’eau. Le droit de navigation, en tant qu’il est réglé déjà, ou sera réglé en Droit international, restant réservé: L’Institut de Droit international est d’avis que les règles suivantes doivent être observées au point de vue de l’exploitation (quelconque) des cours d’eau internationaux.”, Annuaire 1911 p. 365.
Prof. Smith wrote, not wholly correctly, that he offered certain comments “upon these suggested (my italics) rules.” (op. cit. p. 155). Those rules were not suggested by the Institute but only ascertained as deduced from the interdependence of riparian States.
Annuaire 1911 p. 365/7. See also the quoted articles of Prof. Max Huber in Z.f.V. (p. 46, note 3).
Op. cit. p. 158: “Questions of law will be closely involved with questions of history, geography, strategy, economics, and politics. In most cases the statesman will also be compelled to rely very largely upon the guidance of engeneers and other technical experts.” (ibidem).
L.N.T.S. 36–81.
L.N.T.S. 36–83.
Cf. Moore 1–426/94, 703/53.
“Ces intérêts de la communauté internationale exigent qu’une législation et une police fluviale uniformes dominent sur les fleuves internationaux et garantissent l’application des mêmes principes aux navires et marchandises. Ils imposent aux Etats riverains l’obligation d’entreprendre des travaux nécessaires pour la navigation et d’établir un régime fluvial qui soit conforme au principe de la liberté de la navigation proclamé par la conscience juridique des nations modernes. Pour atteindre ce but, il est tout naturel que les Etats riverains se concertent, afin que le même régime s’établisse sur un fleuve et que toutes les mesures nécessaires pour la navigation soient prises d’un commun accord.”, Mr. de Martens in Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit international, 1885/6 p. 288.
Principes généraux du droit fluvial international, Recueil des Cours 45 (1933) — 81.
About Roman law, see Winiarski p. 107 et seq.; A. Ossig: Römisches Wasserrecht, Leipzig 1898; J. Spiropoulos: Die allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsätze im Völkerrecht, Kiel 1928, p. 53, note 24; etc. Mr. N. G. Upham said in the Enterprise case: “It is holden also in civil law that the use of the shores of navigable rivers and of the ocean is incident to the use of the water (Inst. 2.1.1/5).”, Great Britain-U.S.A., arb., C. 8–2-1853, Moore 4–4358, Survey No. 47.
See §2, p. 14.
Connecticut-Massachusetts, 24–2-1931, 282 U.S. 670, A.J.I.L. 26 (1932) — 169.
Cf. the Cleveland award: “The Republic of Costa Rica has the right to demand indemnification for any places belonging to her on the right bank of the River San Juan which may be occupied without her consent, and for any lands on the same bank which may be flooded or damaged in any other way in consequence of works of improvement.”, Moore 2–1966.
“Dans toutes les questions de navigation fluviale se trouvent engagés deux intérêts: ceux des Etats riverains et ceux de toutes les autres nations non riveraines, c’est-à-dire la communauté internationale.”, Mr. de Martens in Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit international 1885/6 p. 283.
See Chapter II, p. 122.
As to the governing jurisdiction over public vessels (see Chapter III) on international rivers, it was held in the Cleveland award: “The Republic of Costa Rica under said Treaty (April 15, 1858) and the stipulations contained in the sixth article thereof, has not the right of navigation of the River San Juan with vessels of war; but she may navigate said river with such vessels of the Revenue Service as may be related to and connected with her enjoyment of the ‘purposes of commerce’ accorded to her in said article, or as may be necessary to the protection of said enjoyment.”, Moore 2–1965. Cf. also the Wimbledon case, P.C.I.J., Judgment No. 1, and article 17 of the Statute on the Régime of navigable waterways of international concern, Barcelona April 20, 1921, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1924 p. 163.
“Les fleuves et canaux internationaux”, Bibliotheca Visseriana, vol. II, p. 123/57.
Loc. cit. p. 144. The same statement with reference to that award was made by G. Kaeckenbeeck: International rivers, London 1918, p. 24.
De Martens N.R.G. 2–28-328, Survey No. 207. See the rules of procedure, Survey under 4.b.
De Martens N.R.G. 2–29-587.
Cf. article 109 of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, June 9, 1815: “The navigation of the rivers referred to in the preceding article, along their whole course, from the point where each of them becomes navigable, to its mouth, shall be entirely free, and shall not, as far as commerce is concerned, be prohibited to anyone; due regard, however, being had to the regulations to be established with respect to its police, which regulations shall be alike for all and as favourable as possible to the commerce of all nations.”, Hertslet, Map of Europe, 1–208.
Rules of procedure, Survey sub 4.b. (b). 42) Rules of procedure, Survey sub 4.b. (a).
§ 314: “Les fleuves et rivières navigables qui sont en communication avec une mer libre, sont ouverts en temps de paix aux navires de toutes les nations. Le droit de libre navigation ne peut être ni abrogé ni restreint au détriment de certaines nations.”
Traité de droit international public européen et américain, vol. II, No. 730, p. 278, Paris 1885.
Manuel de droit international public et privé, 3rd ed., Paris 1892, § 101, p. 135.
Other theories, such as of inchoate or imperfect right, innocent passage, Servitute, etc., are found in diverse handbooks on international law,
Cf. J. Kosters: Les fondements du droit des gens, Leiden 1925, passim.
See Winiarski, loc. cit. p. 138 et seq.
Cf. article 3 of the Projet de règlement international de navigation fluviale, Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit international 1887/8 p. 182; article 2 of the Règlement pour la navigation des fleuves internationaux, same Annuaire 1934 p. 713.
J. Basdevant: Règles générales du droit de la paix, Recueil des Cours 58 (1936) — 493.
C. 13–2–1903, Ralston-D. p. 600 et seq., Survey No. 256.
“The Catatumbo River rises in Colombia a short distance from the Venezuelan boundary”, loc. cit. p. 623.
Loc. cit. p. 603/20.
Loc. cit. p. 626/30.
Series A/B No. 63.
Decision of the Minister of the Cplonies, June 20, 1931; refusal of the Belgian Government, which ensued and which was maintained until October 3, 1932, to extend the benefit of the measures to fluvial transport enterprises other than Unatra; payments made by the Exchequer of the Colony to that Company.
Between U.S.A., Belgium, British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and Portugal,, revising the General Act of Berlin, February 26, 1885 (see A.J.I L. Off. Doc. 1909 p. 7), and the General Act and Declaration of Brussels, July 2, 1890 (ibidem p. 29), signed at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, September 10, 1919, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1921, p. 314. “The Signatory Powers undertake to maintain between their respective nationals and those of States, Members of the League of Nations, which may adhere to the present Convention a complete commercial equality in the territories under their authority within the area defined by Article 1 of the General Act of Berlin of February 26th, 1885, set out in the Annex hereto, but subject to the reservation specified in the final paragraph of that Article.” (Article 1); “Subject to the provisions of the present Chapter, the navigation of the Niger, of its branches and outlets, and of all the rivers, and of their branches and outlets, within the territories specified in Article 1, as well as of the lakes situated within those territories, shall be entirely free for merchant vessels and for the transport of goods and passengers. Craft of every kind belonging to the nationals of the Signatory Powers and of States, Members of the League of Nations, which may adhere to the present Convention, shall be treated in all respects on a footing of perfect equality.” (Article 5).
Loc. cit. p. 83.
Loc. cit. p. 83.
Loc. cit. p. 84.
Loc. cit. p. 85.
Loc. cit. p. 86. Regarding the conception of the Belgian Government with respect to ‘the management of national shipping’, the Court observed: “However legitimate and unfettered governmental action in connection with the management and subsidizing of national shipping may be, it is clear that this does not authorize a State to evade on this account its international obligations.”, loc. cit. p. 86.
Loc. cit. p. 88.
Judges Guerrero, Rolin-Jaecquemyns, Rostworowski, Fromageot, Urrutia and Negulesco.
Judges Hurst. Altamira, Anzilotti, Schücking, van Eysinga, 67) Loc. cit. p. 126.
Loc. cit. p. 128.
“Article 3 provides that nationals of the territorial Power and of other Powers shall enjoy without distinction equal treatment and the same rights as regards protection of persons and effects and as regards property and professions. Clearly this is an article which guarantees individual equality.”, loc. cit. p. 128.
Loc. cit. p. 129.
No comment on the Faber case seems to be available, whereas on the Chinn case only some annotations have been published: H. L.: The Chinn case, British Yearbook 1935 p. 162/6; Prof. B. M. Telders: De vrijheid der scheepvaart op internationale rivieren, Economisch-Statistische Berichten 20 (1935) — 44/5; Prof. J. H. W. Verzijl: Het nieuwe Congo Recht, Weekblad van het Recht 1935 Nos. 12849 (p. 2/4) and 12850 (p. 1/2); Nederlandsch Juristenblad 1935 p. 33/9; R.G.P.C. 2 (1935) — 15/27; Z. f. ö. R. 15 (1935) — 296/9.
As it was said in the Judgment, the Government of the United Kingdom “has never contended that the impugned measures constituted an obstacle to the movement of vessels” (p. 83).
The validity of the Convention of Saint-Germain has been contested, moreover, by the dissenting judges and in the annotations quoted.
As to this governing jurisdiction, judge Altamira was of opinion that Unatra could only be regarded “in the light of its commercial character and of its Belgian nationality, and not in its capacity as a controlled or an uncontrolled Company— a point which is immaterial for the legal issue in the present case” (p. )). Judge Anzilotti said: “The position of Unatra, as a Company which has been under governmental control from the time of its foundation in 1925, and which is responsible for certain public services, has no bearing on the issue: that position in no way precluded competition by other enterprises.” (p. 113). On the same page, he made a mistake by saying that: “necessity may excuse the non-observance of international obligations”. (!)
Judges Anzilotti and van Eysinga laid stress on ‘effective’ freedom of navigation: “The freedom of navigation which article 5 seeks to protect is not an abstract and academic freedom, but a tangible and effective freedom: the freedom to engage in a business in order to reap its profits.” (Anzilotti p. 112); “In fact, it is not sufficient that the riparian States of an international river should abstain from acts which impede the free movement of shipping to such an extent that the shipping firm has to abandon its fluvial transport business. The impediment comes under the prohibition at an earlier stage, namely as soon as freedom of navigation ceases to be effective. It is purely a question of fact whether, in a given case, the effective freedom of navigation has, or has not, been annihilated.” (van Eysinga p. 141/2).
Especially W. E. Hall: A treatise on international law, Oxford 1924 (8th ed.), § 39, p. 172/3.
Notes on rivers and navigation in international law, A. J.I.L. 4 (1910) — 151, and the same in his International Law, Boston 1922, vol. I, § 165, p. 290 (“No treaty has declared it to be a principle of international law that international navigable rivers are generally open to navigation by vessels of foreign riparian or non-riparian States”).
Loc. cit. p. 153 (“D’après les règles de droit international en vigueur, la base du droit de naviguer en territoire étranger est constitutée par le consentement de l’Etat territorialement intéressé, qu’il s’agisse des fleuves communs, dits internationaux, ou qu’il s’agisse des fleuves nationaux; en d’autres termes, par la volonté expresse ou tacite du maître du territoire”).
“... tandis que l’ouverture du fleuve aux Etats tiers est toujours considérée comme une concession que l’on fait volontairement ou comme une imposition que l’on subit, la possibilité pour tous les riverains de profiter du fleuve en tant que voie navigable est considérée comme une exigence à laquelle aucun Etat ne saurait se soustraire “, Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit international, 1932, p. 109.
Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit international 1929–1-417.
A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1924 p. 157.
A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. Special Number 1926 p. 339.
“... though it would be as wrong in a moral sense as it would generally be foolish to use these powers needlessly or in an arbitrary manner...”, Hall, op. cit. p. 173.
Cf. Chapter III, p. 179.
State succession occurring by means of an unilateral act is considered, in international law, as a mere fact, since no State can be deprived from its jurisdictions without its own will; hence, it shall not be dealt with here. It should be observed, moreover, that a contested territory can be awarded to one of the contesting Parties in pursuance of an arbitral award.
“Den auch bei den Annexionen und Gebietszessionen handelt es sich, wie bei dem internat. Privatrecht, um eine Zuständigkeitsordnung; nicht um eine Rechtsnachfolge, sondern um die Frage der örtlichen Kompetenz zur Betätigung irgendwelcher rechtlich geordneter Macht in Bezug auf ein bestimmtes Objekt, eine bestimmte Sphäre (Schönborn S. 9). Auch bei unserem Problem kollidieren zwei Rechtsordnungen: die des alten Staats und die des Nachfolgers deshalb, weil ein Rechtsverhältnis seine Wurzeln unter der einen Rechtsordnung geschlagen hat und seine Aeste und Früchte unter einer anderen Rechtsordnung auswirken soll”, J. Hatschek: Völkerrecht als System rechtlich bedeutsamer Staatsakte, Leipzig 1923 p. 173. W. Schönborn: Staatensukzessionen (Stuttgart 1913), to whom Hatschek referred, wrote: “Immerhin lassen sich auch die Ausdrücke “Sukzession”. “Rechtsnachfolge” rechtfertigen, wenn man sich nur gegenwärtig hält, dasz es nicht das materielle Recht, sondern blosz die Kompetenz zur Betätigung irgendwie rechtlich geordneter Macht in Bezug auf ein bestimmtes Objekt oder innerhalb einer bestimmten Sphäre ist, die hier wirklich auf den Nachfolger übergeht... Erkennt man nun aber, dasz das Territorium nicht Obiekt, sondern nur seitens der anderen Staaten anerkannte räumliche Sphäre, örtliche Kompetenzsphäre der staatlichen Herrschaft (über Menschen) ist, so kann von einer Rechtsnachfolge nur mehr in beschränktem Sinne die Rede sein. Was hier wirklich übertragen werden kann und übertragen wird, ist nur der Anspruch gegen dritte Staaten auf Anerkennung der Zugehörigkeit eines bestimmten Gebietes zur eigenen Kompetenzsphäre. ... Nach dieser Auffassung wird also durch eine Zession lediglich die örtliche Kompetenzsphäre des Zessionars erweitert, ohne dasz ihm irgendwie innerhalb des neuen Gebietes in spezifisches materielles Recht neu zuwüchse, das er nicht erst durch seine eigene Gesetzgebung sich beilegen müszte. Mit Recht wird darum bei Gebietszessionen juristisch zwischen der völkerrechtlichen Abtretung und der staatsrechtlichen Einverleibung unterschieden. Das abgetretene Gebiet selbst, das räumliche Substrat der Staatsgewalt ist freilich vor und nach dem Sukzessionsfall identisch, nicht aber das innerhalb des Gebietes ausgeübte Imperium. ... Die auch rechtliche Möglichkeit der Uebertragung der örtlichen Kompetenz von einem Staat auf den anderen ist dagegen... auch von der heutigen völkerrechtlichen Praxis noch anerkannt. ... Die eigentlich interessierende Frage wird dann aber: Verpflichtet oder berechtigt der Uebergang der örtlichen Zuständigkeit von einem Staat auf den anderen als solcher den letzteren nach Völkerrecht zur Uebernahme von Ansprüchen oder Leistungen, die dem Vorgänger-Staat zustanden bezw. oblagen?”, p. 9/11. See also A. von Verdross: Völkerrecht, Berlin 1937, § 69/74, p. 238/48.
In § 83 of his book: The diplomatic protection of citizens abroad, New York 1915, dealing with succession of States and apportionment of debts, Prof. E. M. Borchard observes in a note: “The details of this exceedingly interesting subject, which may become of renewed importance at the conclusion of the present European War, can hardly be discussed here. It is a very complicated subject, and precedents depend so largely upon the special facts and circumstances of each case, that conclusions of principle are not easily deducible.” (p. 202, note 2).
Questions of domestic law arising from state succession shall not be considered here. The Central American Court of Justice observed, in a case between Salvador and Nicaragua, decided on March 9, 1917: “... it is unquestionable that under the principles of public law there is an alteration of constitutional order —in perhaps its most serious and transcendental form—when a State supplants, in all or part of the national territory, its own sovereignty by that of a foreign country and thereby, from that moment, overthrows its own laws in order that those of the concessionary State may govern therein. In the sphere of principles the exercise of the public auctoritas, of imperium or of jurisdictio, on the part of the foreign sovereignty fundamentally alters the normal life of the nation, because national territory and its exclusive possession are indispensable elements of sovereignty.”, A.J.I.L. 11 (1917) — 726, Survey Appendix No. III.
Appeal from a judgment of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, Judgment Series A/B No. 61, December 15, 1933, p. 237.
Judgment Series A No. 7, May 25, 1926, p. 41.
Survey No. 30. Cf. P. Pradier-Fodéré: Traité de droit international public européen et américain, Paris 1885, vol. I, § 147, p. 251.
Gesetze, Verordnungen und Beschlüsse für den Kanton Basel Landschaft, Liestal 1838, Erster Band p. 357/8.
Cf. in other sense: P. Pradier-Fodéré, op. cit., vol. I, p. 278/9.
Loc. cit. p. 435/8.
Loc. cit. p. 581.
Loc. cit. p. 582/3.
Series A/B No. 61, p. 209/10.
Loc. cit. p. 229. 99) Loc. cit. p. 230/1.
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 232 and the annex to Section IV the property, rights and interests of Hungarian nationals or companies controlled by them situated in the territories which formed part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy shall not be subject to retention or liquidation in accordance with these provisions. Such property, rights and interests shall be restored to their owners freed from any measure of this kind, or from any other measure of transfer, compulsory administration or sequestration. ...”, article 250 of the Treaty of Trianon, A.J.I.L. Off. Doc. 1921 p. 115. The Court observed: “Clearly, therefore, in determining the treatment of Hungarian property, the Treaty of Trianon takes two factors into account: to person to whom the property belongs, and the territory in which it is situated; its alleged public or private character is of no account. ... The Treaty contains no general rule, like articles 191 and 232 (or, so far as concerns territories transferred from Hungary to Czechoslovakia, like article 250), to determine the treatment of this so-called public property.”, loc. cit. p. 238.
Cf. the decision of the French-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, dated July 15, 1925: “Attendu que les départements, communes et autres circonscriptions administratives existent comme personnes juridiques en vertu de la législation de l’Etat dont ils font partie; Att. que cette personnalité, une fois acquise, en vertu de ladite législation, subsiste même dans les cas où le territoire, qui comprend lesdites circonscriptions, serait cédé à un autre Etat, à moins que ce dernier Etat par une nouvelle législation ne les fasse disparaître en les remplaçant par d’autres organismes; Att, que le système du défendeur aurait pour conséquence que toutes personnes morales même celles du droit privé, comme les sociétés anonymes, les associations, les sociétés coopératives et autres, qui existent comme telles en vertu de la législation de l’Etat dont ils relèvent, devraient cesser d’exister aussitôt que le territoire où elles ont leur siège légal serait cédé à un autre Etat, thèse qu’on ne saurait que difficilement soutenir; Att. que le fait des modifications apportées à l’administration des départements et communes par la législation de l’Etat cessionnaire n’entraîne pas un changement de personnalité. ...”, Recueil des décisions des T.A.M., Paris, vol. VI, p. 172.
“... qu’en effet, la convention intervenue entre deux Etats, consistant à remettre au sort d’un plébiscite le rattachement à l’un d’eux d’un territoire quelconque et dont les frontières seront fixées d’après les voeux dégagés des votes exprimés par la population dudit territoire, même si cette convention comporte renonciation anticipée à tous ses droits par l’Etat auquel ledit territoire est présentement rattaché, une telle convention ne saurait ipso facto exercer d’influence sur la nationalité et du territoire visé et de ses habitants; que le fait juridique qui conditionne un changement quelconque est le plébiscite lui-même; qu’il n’emporte, d’ailleurs, dans ses résultats que des modifications affectant la souveraineté des Etats intéressés; mais que pendant la période transitoire qui commence à la date de la mise en vigueur du Traité contenant une pareille convention et qui se termine à celle où la population se prononce plébiscitairement, la souveraineté de l’Etat possesseur subsiste sur le territoire disputé; que la renonciation anticipée à ses droits par l’un des deux Etats intéressés est simplement suspendue jusqu’au moment où les résultats du plébiscite sont acquis; que ceux-ci conditionnent et déterminent la réalité et l’étendue de ladite renonciation.”, French-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 9–4–1926, Recueil vol. VI, p. 280/1. Cf. vol. II, p. 621 and vol. IV, p. 849.
Amtliche Sammlung, Berlin 1930/7, vol.1, p. 54, Survey No. 345.
Ibidem vol. 1, p. 132.
Ibidem vol. I, p. 158. “Aus diesem Grunde kann auch keine allgemeinvölkerrechtliche Pflicht des Gebietsnachfolgers bestehen, ein vom Gebietsvorgänger begründetes öffentlich-rechtliches Dienstverhältnis seinerseits fortzusetzen. Solche Pflichten können nur entweder durch Staatsverträge oder durch das innerstaatliche Recht des Nachfolgestaats geschaffen werden.”, A. von Verdross: Völkerrecht, Berlin 1937 p. 243.
Loc. cit. p. 617, decision of January 27, 1834.
See Chapter II.
“Beaucoup plus intéressante et plus pertinente à l’égard de la preuve à faire se trouve être naturellement la jurisprudence des tribunaux internationaux, étant données leur autorité et leurs origines. Si cette jurisprudence, par une pratique prolongée, était définitivement fixée sur le principe du respect international des droits acquis, l’existence positive de ce principe en retirerait une confirmation très importante, voire même décisive. Il ne semble pas cependant qu’une pareille conclusion soit jusqu’à présent autorisée.”, A. Cavaglieri: La notion des droits acquis et son application en droit international public, R.G.D.I.P. 38 (1931) — 269. 109) Amtliche Sammlung vol. II, p. 168, 170.
Ibidem, vol. III, p. 136, 138, 140. 111) Ibidem, vol. III, p. 140, 142.
Series B No. 6, p. 36, 38.
Case concerning certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Series A. No. 7, p. 42.
Recueil T.A.M. vol. VII, p. 871, See also vol VIII, p. 582, 587.
A.J.I.L. 24 (1930) — 167, Survey No. 328.
Ibidem p. 167/8.
Ibidem p. 169/70.
A.J.I.L. 28 (1934) — 765, Survey No. 330.
Ibidem p. 771. 120) Ibidem p. 787.
R.G.P.C. 1934–11-16.
R.G.D.I.P. 41 (1934) — 713, Survey No. 329. 123) 12 Pet. 749.
Proposition dated October 22, 1885, Moore 5–5044, Survey No. 141. 125) May 13/25, 1891, Moore 5–4870, Survey No. 153. Cf. also the Cravairola case, Moore 2–2028, Survey No. 107.
“Attendu qu’il s’agit donc d’une mesure qui affecte la propriété d’un bien ex-ennemi en l’enlevant dans sa totalité au propriétaire, sans son consentement et sans aucune indemnité, mesure qui constitue une violation du principe général du respect des droits acquis et, par conséquent, dépasse les limites du droit international commun.”, Rumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, decision of January 10, 1927, Recueil T.A.M, vol VII, p, 135. In its judgment No, 7, the Permanent Court of International Justice held, moreover: “It should first of all be observed that whereas Head II (of the Convention of Geneva, May 15, 1922) is general in scope and confirms the obligation of Germany and Poland in their respective portions of the Upper Silesian territory to recognize and respect rights of every kind acquired before the transfer of sovereignty, by private individuals, companies or juristic persons, Head III only refers to Polish Upper Silesia and establishes in favour of Poland a right of expropriation which constitutes an exception to the general principle of respect for vested rights.” (Series A No. 7, p. 21). “Further, there can be no doubt that the expropriation allowed under Head III of the Convention is a derogation from the rules generally applied in regard to the treatment of foreigners and the principle of respect for vested rights. As this derogation itself is strictly in the nature of an exception, it is permissible to conclude that no further derogation is allowed. ... It follows from these same principles that the only measures prohibited are those which generally accepted international law does not sanction in respect of foreigners; expropriation for reasons of public utility, judicial liquidation and similar measures are not affected by the Convention.” (Ibidem p. 22). “Expropriation without indemnity is certainly contrary to Head III of the Convention; and a measure prohibited by the Convention cannot become lawful under this instrument by reason of the fact that the State applies it to its own nationals.” (Ibidem p. 33). And in its advisory Opinion No. 6, the Court observed: “The general question whether and under what circumstances a State may modify or cancel private rights by its sovereign legislative power, requires no consideration here,” (Series B No. 6, September 10, 1923, p. 36).
Report of Fred. K. Nielsen, Washington G.P.O. 1926, p. 201, Survey No. 303. See also p. 162/202.
Ibidem p. 160/1. See also p. 85/161.
State succession in matters of tort, British Yearbook 1924 p. 165, 177/8.
Final Report of Commissioner (E. B. Parker) and decisions and opinions, Washington G.P.O. 1933, p. 11, 12/3, Survey No. 365,
Decision of September 15, 1834, loc. cit. p. 728/9.
Decision of April 21, 1834, loc. cit. p. 823, 824.
“La succession aux dettes est admise en droit privé; quand une personne recueille tout un patrimoine, le passif doit être payé sur l’actif Cette question a en droit international une importance considérable. L’Etat successeur doit-il payer une partie des dettes de l’Etat auquel il succède? Je ne crois pas que les principes du droit civil puissent donner grande ressource pour la solution de cette question. On ne peut, en effet, comparer les successions de souveraineté entre les Etats aux successions de patrimoine entre les particuliers. C’est dans les conventions internationales ou dans la coutume que l’on peut trouver des solutions; il n’y a pas sur ce point de principe général commun aux nations civilisées.”, G. Ripert: Les règles du droit civil applicables aux rapports internationaux, Recueil des Cours 44 (1933) — 640. Cf. H. Appleton: Des effets des annexions de territoires sur les dettes de l’Etat démembré ou annexé et sur celles des provinces, départements, etc. annexés, Paris 1895; Th. Baty: Division of States, its effect on obligations, Transactions of the Grotius Society, 9 (1923) — 119/29; idem: The obligations of extinct States, Yale Law Journal, 1926 p. 434; E. H. Feilchenfeld: Public debts and State succession, New York 1931; G. Jèze: Le partage des dettes publiques au cas de démembrement du territoire, Revue de science et de législation financières, 19 (1921) — 59;
A. N. Sack: Les effets des transformations des Etats sur leurs dettes publiques, Paris 1927; idem: La succession aux dettes publiques d’Etat, Recueil des Cours 23 (1928) — 145/326; G. Sauser-Hall: La succession aux dettes publiques en cas d’annexion, Schweizerische Juristen-Zeitung 35 (1938) — 161/5;
F. Schmidt: Der Uebergang der Staatsschulden bei Gebietsabtretungen, Berlin 1913.
Edition Geneva 1925, p. 60, 62, Survey No. 353. Cf. Survey Nos. 5, 20 and 253, and Moore 4–3524/44 and 3571/90.
See article 15, Malloy vol II, p. 1645.
Moore 3–3223/5, 3226/7, Survey No. 68. Cf. Lapradelle-P. 2–436/40 and Moore 2–1574.
Moore 3–3212/3, Survey No 142.
Cf. the Basel arbitration with respect to the public domain.
“The very act of sending out privateers to prey upon Spanish commerce was at once a determination that the Spanish prize law, with its conventional modifications as to the United States (if before in force), was not adaped to her circumstances, and at the same time a decree ‘varying it by her power’, in conformity with international law.”
L.N.O. J., Special Supplement No. 3, October 1920, p. 19, Survey Appendix No. VI.
Ibidem p. 19. Cf. Permanent Court of International Justice, Judgment of June 7, 1932, Series A/B No. 46 (case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the district of Gex).
De Clercq 4–13.
Ibidem p. 15. Cf. C. C. Hyde: The termination of the treaties of a State in consequence of its absorption by another—the position of the United States, A.J.I.L. 26 (1932) — 133/6; S. Kiatibian: Conséquences juridiques de la transformation des Etats sur les traités, Paris 1892; Larivière: Des conséquences des transformations territoriales des Etats sur les traités antérieurs, Paris 1892; L. von Rogister: Zur Lehre von der Staatennachfolge: Gibt es stillschweigenden Eintritt in Staatsverträge? Berlin 1902.
Therefore, the statement of Mr. Lauterpacht that “the problem of succession, so far as it is treated as a problem of law, is identical in private and international law” is dangerous and leads to confusion (Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, London 1927, p. 125). See the Hawaiian Claims case, and the quoted opinions of Sir Cecil Hurst and Georges Ripert, and G. Gidel: Des effets; de l’annexion sur les concessions, Paris 1904 p. 12.
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Stuyt, A.M. (1946). Territorial Jurisdiction. In: The General Principles of Law as Applied by International Tribunals to Disputes on Attribution and Exercise of State Jurisdiction. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0955-8_1
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