Abstract
The two notions according to which the subject of logic has been found to be defined are rationate being and intentions. The first of these has just been examined. It now remains to inquire into the second, namely, intentions. An examination of the texts reveals that Aquinas uses the term intention in various senses. It sometimes designates an operation or act of a faculty; sometimes it means the intelligible species of intellectual cognition; again it means the conceived term of the intellective operation; and finally it is used in the sense of “second” or logical intention. Each of these uses of the term must be investigated in turn in order that the subject of logic may be seen to lie in the last. This procedure will not, however, be a mere process of elimination since the meaning of the logical intention depends upon the other meanings of the term.
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© 1966 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Schmidt, R.W. (1966). Intentions. In: The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0939-8_5
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