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The Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community pp 6–33Cite as

The Ratification Debates

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Abstract

In seeking a method of analysing the ratification debates and the statements of the six Governments upon the Schuman Plan Treaty, it had to be decided whether it would be better to proceed country by country, or to set side by side the views of the different countries on the topics that were discussed. The latter procedure has been adopted because it is felt that in such a Community as has been set up, the variety of views of the member States concerning particular points is more important than the particular country expressing them.

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Reference

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  50. In assessing this statement, it is perhaps useful to record that Prof. Rohn

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  118. What meaning the Netherlands’ Government attaches to the term “negative decision” is not clear, as by Art. 37, par. 3 the Court may annul decisions of the High Authority attempting to end the disturbance as well as explicit or implicit refusals to recognise the existence of the situation. It is suggested that these cannot all be classed as negative decisions.

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  120. en apprécier le bien—fondé.

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  135. Idem.

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  143. No legislation has, however, been introduced to give this express compe¬tence, so that it may be inferred that none was required.

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  145. By this article, member States undertake not to submit disputes on the interpretation or application of the Treaty to a mode of decision other than that provided by the Treaty.

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  1. Saltwood, Kent, England

    Donald Graham Valentine

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  1. Donald Graham Valentine
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Valentine, D.G. (1954). The Ratification Debates. In: The Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0925-1_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0925-1_2

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  • Print ISBN: 978-94-015-0360-0

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