Is the Term Soul Analogous?

Abstract

At the outset of the De anima, Aristotle asks whether all souls are of the same species or, if not, whether they are specifically or generically different. That is, if souls are specifically different, are they or are they not contained in a common genus.¹ Obviously the answers to these questions will determine whether the term “soul” signifies univocally or not. If there is a common genus, there will be a common notion or logos and the term signifying it will be predicated univocally of the various species of soul.² If there are generically different notions, the common term will be a “homonym,” that is, an equivocal term.³ Moreover, we must ask if the definition of the soul is common in the way the definition of animal is common or if it is different for every species of soul, as the definitions of horse, dog and man differ. Since these specific definitions do differ, the generic definition is either nothing or it is posterior—something true of any common predicate. Aristotle points out that such questions arise when our intention is to define, not just human soul, but to arrive at knowledge of all kinds of soul.