The ‘Ratio Communis’ of the Analogous Name

Abstract

Since the analogous name is one which signifies in a manner midway between that of pure equivocation and univocation,¹ it will participate something of the modes of these extremes. Things are said to be named equivocally which have a common name but the notions signified by the name are diverse; things are said to be named univocally which have a common name which signifies the same notion in each case. The affinity of the analogous name with the equivocal as well as with the univocal name is brought out by saying that the notions signified by the analogous name partim sunt diversae et partim non diversae.² This “in between” character of the analogous name has been responsible for difficulties which arise again and again in the minds of students of St. Thomas. If there is something the same in the many notions signified by the analogous name, can’t we extract that common note and say that, insofar as the term is taken to signify it, the term is univocal? Thus, while the ratio substantiae differs from the ratio accidentis, it is argued that there must be something common to both, a ratio communis and, if “being” is taken as signifying the latter, it is univocal; if taken to signify the diverse rationes of substance and accident, it is analogous. It is this thought that seems to have suggested the teaching of Duns Scotus that “being” is univocal insofar as it signifies a ratio communis.³ He takes as a sign of our recognition of such a common notion of “being” the fact that we can know that a thing is without being sure that it is a substance or that it is an accident.