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Abstract

Anyone having set himself some three quarters of a century ago the task of devoting a treatise to the rights of the performing artist, would certainly not have undertaken an arduous one.

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References

  1. Homburg, p. 97.

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  2. So as to avoid needless complications we shall assume throughout this chapter that we have not to do with any acts infringing the author’s exclusive right of exploitation.

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  3. Bollecker, p. 102: „Alors que jusqu’à présent une interprétation, donnée devant un cercle plus ou moins limité de spectateurs, s’évanouissait au moment même, la science moderne a permis de l’étendre indéfiniment dans le temps et dans l’espace”.

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  4. Bollecker, p. 102: „On a besoin de son chant, de sa parole et de ses gestes; une fois qu’il les a donnés, on le rejette, on n’a plus besoin de lui; le disque, le film et la radio le remplacent en tous lieux.”

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  5. Homburg, p. 21: „La machine est un instrument docile entre les mains de l’homme; elle en est aussi la concurrente. En le remplaçant, elle provoque le chômage.”

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  6. Escholier, p. 154; Homburg, p. 23.

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  7. Id.: Escholier, p. 154; Saudemont, p. 160.

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  8. On the other hand, there will be others who feel the need of actually possessing a record which they have heard on the radio. (Saudemont, p. 161).

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  9. p. 111/112. Translation: The great progress made by acoustic technics with the result that music, singing and declamation can be radiographically transmitted and registered on gramophone records or sound-films, has deprived singers, actors and performing musicians of the factual control of their achievements, to such a degree that — without their agency and maybe against their will — their singing and their performance can be heard in thousands of places.

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  10. With the object of obtaining such protection the International Federation of Musicians was founded in Zurich in the year 1948, whose principal task is to obtain protection for the musicians against the frequent use of gramophone records for the purpose of broadcasting, opposing at the same time the replacement of live musicians by mechanical music.

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  11. Idem Saudemont who, on p. 167, remarks: „11 y a là une utilisation de l’exécution qui n’est pas la conséquence régulière du contrat.”

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  12. Id.: Homburg, p. 20.

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  13. Id.: Homburg, p. 56.

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  14. Audinet, p. 29; de Beaufort, p. 113; Becker-Bender, p. 21/22; Olagnier, I, p. 18 all deny, like us, the creative character of the performance, whereas Bollecker, p. 102/103; Desbois, p. 236; Homburg, pp. 11 and 76; de Leusse, p. 16 esteem the performing artist’s activity to be actually creative.

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  15. Id.: Giannini, p. 116; Olagnier, I, p. 28.

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  16. We think here, for instance, of the French singer Charles Trenet.

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  17. Cf. Olagnier, I, pp. 28 and 42–45 incl.

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  18. As far as we know, the only act that brackets the performing artist with the author, was the former Mexican Act: „Código Civil” of 1928, artt. 1183 and 1191.

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  19. Id.: Bollecker, p. 103/104; Desbois, p. 236.

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  20. Escholier, p. 137. Translation: The performing artist impresses his personality on every groove of the disc. Therefore, the interpretation seems to hold the necessary characteristics for it to merit the name of “adaptation”, that is to say, “arrangement” of a work. It deserves to be made the object of a special protection, viz. of a secondary copyright.

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  21. De Beaufort, p. 113.

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  22. Audinet, p. 30; de Beaufort, pp. 113 and 115; Homburg, p. 90; Olagnier, I, pp. 176–1791 ncl. all take a similar view

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  23. Goldbaum, I, p. 50: „Der zweite Absatz wirft einen der tragenden Gedanken des Gesetzes einfach um. Während das Gesetz sonst die schöpferische Tätigkeit schützt, die an Inhalt oder Form ein neues bringt, werden hier Werkexemplare, Vervielfältigungen als Werk, nämlich als Bearbeitung bezeichnet.... Das körperlich greifbare, mechanische Produkt einer Tätigkeit als eine Bearbeitung zu bezeichnen, ist ein bedauerlicher Fehler, der bei einer Revision des Gesetzes wieder ausgemertzt werden musz.” Rinecker, p. 26: „Sowohl der urheberrechtliche Schutz einer solchen” Bearbeitung” als die Einreihung des Vortragenden unter die Bearbeiter ist vom rechtlichen Standpunkt aus unhaltbar; eine solche Vorschrift im musikalischen Urheberrecht wirkt geradezu wie ein Hohn. Aus Grund welcher Tätigkeit erlangt denn der Tonkünstler ein Urheberrecht an seinem Vortrag? Seine Tätigkeit ist doch nur eine nachbildende, er reproduziert ein Werk unter möglichster Erfassung des Geistes, den der Autor in dasselbe gelegt hat.” Steinberg; p. 18: „.... hat er (der Gesetzgeber) die tragenden Gedanken des Urheberrechtsgesetzes einfach umgeworfen und eine recht bedenkliche Konstruktion geschaffen.”

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  24. Freiesleben, p. 16.

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  25. Cf. Bollecker, p. 101; Homburg, pp. 39 and 84–88 incl.; Olagnier, I, p. 172.

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  26. Olagnier, I, p. 18: „Il n’y a pas collaboration puisque l’oeuvre est terminée au moment où elle est interprétée.”

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  27. Idem: De Beaufort, p. 114; Giannini, p. 115; Homburg, p. 83: „Si différentes sont les activités de l’auteur et de l’artiste qu’une distinction de leurs droits s’impose.”

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  28. Idem: Audinet, p. 146; Goldbaum, II p. 66.

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  29. Translation: If a musical work is adapted to mechanical instruments with the aid of performing artists, the latter shall also come under the protection afforded to that adaptation.

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  30. Cf. Raestad, p. 244.

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  31. In this connection Bollecker, p. 105, makes a notable statement: „Certes, il y a quelque chose d’un peu forcé à vouloir assurer aux interprètes le bénéfice d’une convention internationale faite pour les auteurs. Mais le faire eut été le seul moyen, rapide et efficace, de créer une protection nécessaire depuis longtemps.” We are only too glad that this is admitted so openly and we are thus all the more fortified in our conviction that the performing artist as such holds no title to copyright.

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  32. Translation: The Conference expresses the wish that the Governments that had taken part in the work of the Conference might consider the possibility of measures for the protection of performing artists.

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  33. Translation: The interpretation of a work, whether or not fallen into the public domain, is protected under conditions to be stipulated by the internal legislation of each country of the Union.

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  34. De Beaufort, p. 111; Frank, p. 635; v. Geldern, p. 4; Pfeffer, p. 36. The exception is Wijnstroom/Peremans, pp. 42–44 incl., who, however, offers no reasons for his point of view.

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  35. Translation: If a literary or musical work is transmitted by a personal performance on appliances belonging to instruments serving for the mechanical rendering of sound, the so obtained contrivance is to be considered an adaptation.... In such a case the performing artist is deemed to be the adapter.

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  36. Cf. Freiesleben, p. 17; Homburg, p. 89.

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  37. P. 18. Translation: Legal protection in an artistically produced mechanical contrivance is realized also in the event of the performance being thus recorded without the consent of the performer, for example by means of a secretly placed phonograph or by other mechanical means. Therefore it is not necessary that the performer himself had the intention of realizing such a contrivance.

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  38. Audinet, p. 80; Bollecker, p. 152; Steinberg, p. 17/18; Straschnov, I, p. 111/112.

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  39. Idem: Straschnov, I, p. 138.

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  40. Translation: When a literary or musical work is, with the personal intervention of performing artists, adapted to instruments serving for its mechanical reproduction, this adaptation constitutes a legally protected reproduction.... In all these cases the title of the copyright owner in respect of the original work is reserved.

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  41. p. 15.

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  42. Moser/Lavine, p. 129/130.

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  43. Waring vs W.D.A.S. Broadcasting Station, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 8–10–1937; Vide Copyright Cases, Decisions of the U.S. Courts involving copyright Bulletin 21, pp. 319 ssqq.

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  44. Socolow, p. 961.

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  45. Id.: Straschnov, I, p. 125.

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  46. Id.: Homburg, p. 95: „Pour nous, le droit d’interprétation apparaît avant tout comme un droit attaché à la personne de l’artiste et non comme un droit de propriété.”

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  47. Homburg, p. 96: „L’Oeuvre, représentée par l’interprétation, est l’expression et le prolongement de la personnalité de l’artiste.”

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  48. In the case of vocalists, the voice also plays a very important part, beside the temperament.

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  49. In order to make our argument not too complicated we assume that, as regards their technical skill, all performing artists are of the same standard of proficiency.

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  50. Socolow, p. 965; Idem: Evans, p. 137.

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  51. An identical view as regards the deference of personality as a basic element of the performing artist’s protection, is taken by: de Beaufort, p. 114; Bollecker, p. 153; Homburg, p. 95/96; de Leusse, p. 16. Vide also Socolow, p. 837/838. Saudemont, p. 160, is of opinion that there exist no grounds for that view, at any rate as regards the broadcasting of gramophone records.

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  52. Straschnov II, pp. 53–56 incl. opposes the grant of any exclusive right to the performing artist. If the performance is recorded, he wishes to go no further than granting a remuneration. In such a case the artist would not be able to resist being deprived of the control over his performance. We cannot therefore agree on this point with the view taken by this writer.

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  53. The only copyright act which — as far as we know — grants to the performing artist an exclusive right to record his performance, make copies thereof and put these into circulation is the Austrian one of 1936.

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  54. Cf. Homburg, p. 10 t.

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  55. Vide Saudemont, p. 160/161. 2) Cf. Straschnov, II, p. 7.

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  56. It is not beyond the range of possibilities that, as far as the Netherlands is concerned, protection of the performing artist could be acquired in the above-described way. A certain ground for this supposition may be found in a judgment given by the High Court of the Netherlands, dated 11–11–1937 (N.J. 1937, no.1096). This, however, does not affect our conviction that, speaking in general, very few positive results are to be expected from these attempts to obtain protection for the performing artist.

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  57. Id.: Homburg, p. 101; Olagnier, I, p. 207; Straschnov, I, p. 60; differently: Straschnov, II, p. 57. 2) I, p. 182.

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  58. See earlier p. 66.

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  59. Or, as Homburg, p. 121 puts it: „A la différence de l’auteur, dont seule l’oeuvre est reproduite, l’artiste peut faire l’objet même de la reproduction.”

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  60. Of course, it goes without saying that the share of the performing artist may not be deducted from the author’s! These two remunerations are entirely independent.

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  61. Cf. Audinet, p. 65.

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  62. Not so: Straschnov, I, pp. 45/46 and 53/54.

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  63. Straschnov who in the event of a recording being made, only admits a right to remuneration, is willing to likewise make an exception in this case (II, p. 70).

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  64. II, p. 56/57.

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  65. p. 111.

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  66. Id.: Straschnov, II, p. 52.

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  67. In this way, for instance, have many recordings of Louis Davids been newly pressed and put on sale in the Netherlands after that artist’s death. 2) p. 128. 3) I, p. 207. 4) Idem more or less: Homburg, p. 122; Olagnier, I, p. 202/203.

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  68. The authorization to put the record into circulation includes the recording so that only one payment is due. The artist’s consent will, however, again be required for a second edition.

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  69. The two last-named rights fall under what is called in French “droit de suite”. Vide Bollecker, p. 104; Escholier, p. 138; Homburg, p. 103.

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  70. Translation: If such an adaptation has been realized with the aid of performing artists, the authorization in respect of the right to reproduce and to perform that adaptation in public is also dependent on these artists.

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  71. Translation: In the absence of an authorization by the artists performing a musical work, the production of contrivances serving to mechanically reproduce their performance shall be deemed a counterfeit. Without prejudicing the rights of the author of the original work, the performing artists shall have the right of bringing an action against such a counterfeit before the Tribunals. Without prejudicing the rights of the author of the original work, the instruments produced in infringement of this provision can be seized at the request of the performing artists in all the Countries of the Union.

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  72. P. 168. Translation: of authorizing the “adaptation” of their interpretations to musical contrivances or to demand a remuneration for every time an instrument to which the same have been adapted, should be put into circulation.

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  73. Homburg, P. 56/57: „Le problème du droit d’artiste est international et demande une solution pareille dans tous les pays, pour que celle-ci soit efficace. La radiophonie, le disque, le film transportent la voix et l’image par delà des frontières. L’art est objet d’exportation et d’importation; son exploitation n’a pas de patrie. A quoi servirait à un artiste de se voir protégé dans son pays contre la diffusion de ses disques si, de la frontière voisine, une poste étrange peut les reproduire impunément? Une protection juridique internationale gagnera en force, non seulement parce qu’elle sera plus étendue, mais encore parce qu’elle sera unifiée et que chacun sera ainsi à même d’être renseigné facilement sur ses droits. Cette unification nécessaire ne pourra être réalisée que dans le cadre d’une Convention internationale.”

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  74. Straschnov, II, ch. III, pp. 39–71 incl. writes in detail on such an international convention.

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  75. The case of Alfieri vs Société du Gramophone; Cf. Escholier, p. 73/74; Olagnier, I, p. 186/187.

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  76. See p. 47.

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  77. Translation: that the reproduction of sound solely belongs to the performing artist who lent it his individual voice and accent, and — so to speak — his very personality.

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  78. Inter alia: Tribunal Civil de la Seine, 9–12–1937; Cf. Audinet, p. 30.

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  79. Audinet, p. 30; Bollecker, p. 151; Straschnov, I, p. 138.

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  80. Id.: Straschnov, I, p. 144.

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  81. Bollecker, p. 152; Homburg, p. 21.

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  82. Translation: Artists who are actors or interpreters of dramatic or literary works or compositions, as well as those who execute musical works or compositions — even though the above-indicated works or compositions are in public domain — are entitled, irrespectively of any remuneration being their due for the recitation, performance or execution, to an equitable remuneration from anyone broadcasting or transmitting by wireless, telephony or any other similar means or who incises, registers or otherwise reproduces the recitation, performance or execution in question on gramophone records, cinematograph films or other similar instruments. They are likewise entitled to a similar right as regards anyone subsequently diffusing or reproducing by the same means the already broadcast, transmitted, incised, registered or reproduced work in the sense of the previous paragraph. They are not entitled to this right in the event of the recitation, performance or execution being given for wireless transmission, telephony, cinematography, incision or registration on the above-mentioned mechanical instruments and for a similar remunerated purpose. Neither is remuneration due for registration on discs, metal bands or other similar contrivances as indicated in artt. 55 and 59.

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  83. Translation: As regards the application of the preceding provisions the term artists-actors or interpreters and performers comprises:

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  84. those who have à part of some considerable artistic importance in the dramatic, literary or musical work or composition....

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  85. the conductors of the choir or the orchestra;

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  86. the orchestral or choral societies provided that the part taken by the orchestra or the choir be an independent one and not possess merely an accompanying artistic value.

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  87. Translation: The right to remuneration for reproductions of the recitation, performance or execution extends over a period of twenty years commencing with the recitation, performance or execution in question.

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  88. Straschnov, II, p. 57 declares himself opposed to any right of the performing artist in respect of the broadcasting of commercial records. This Italian article is therefore entirely in keeping with his views.

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  89. A similar protection as provided in Italian art. 80 is also found in the copyright acts of Argentina (1933); Colombia (1946) and Uruguay (1937).

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  90. Example taken from Olagnier, I, p. 28. 2) Olagnier, I, p. 50.

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  91. Like ourselves the following writers all plead in favour of a moral right for the performing artist: Audinet, p. 31; Giannini, p. 116; Homburg, p. 104; Olagnier, I, p. 207; Straschnov, I, p. 60 and II, p. 59. Each of them mentions one or more of the competencies of the performing artist based on this moral right, as dealt with by us.

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  92. P. 51. Translation: We are of opinion that the right of the author must take precedence of that of the artist because, in general, the author is yet more morally interested in the quality of the public performance of his work, and therefore he must — by virtue of his “droit moral” — be in last instance its judge. To sum up the matter, we may say that, generally speaking, the author’s moral right is absolute whereas that of the artist is subordinate to the author’s “droit moral”.

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  93. I, p. 50. Translation: the artist’s “droit moral” to his interpretation must prevail over the pecuniary right of the author which only applies to the product of the interpretation, not to the interpretation itself;.... the prejudice caused to the author by the suppression of the record is only material whereas that caused to the artist by a faulty performance is material as well as moral.

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  94. I, p. 53.

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  95. Translation: Artists-actors or interpreters as also performing artists have a right to oppose the diffusion, transmission or reproduction of their recitation, performance or execution which might prejudice their honour or reputation.

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  96. Translation: Artists-actors or interpreters, as also performing artists taking the principal part in the dramatic, literary or musical work or composition, have a right to have their name mentioned in the diffusion or transmission of their interpretation, performance or execution and permanently attached to the disc, the cinematograph film or any similar instrument.

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  97. Similar provisions are to be found in the copyright acts of Argentina, Colombia and Uruguay.

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  98. Giannini, p. 121. Translation: Even with these restrictions the list may become long but everyone knows how lengthy the lists are that often precede the performance of films.

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  99. Conseil d’Etat, 20–11–1931; Cf. Audinet, pp. 32–34 incl.; Olagnier, I, p. 191/192.

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  100. An important document on the problems discussed in this chapter was very recently published by the International Labour Office (Rights of Performers in Broadcasting, Television and the Mechanical Reproduction of Sound, Geneva, 1951). Unfortunately it was, by reason of time, not possible to refer to it yet in the preceding pages.

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© 1952 Springer Science + Business Media B.V.

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Mak, W. (1952). The Legal Status of the Performing Artist. In: Rights Affecting the Manufacture and Use of Gramophone Records. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0841-4_5

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