Prolegomenon to a Realistic Philosophy of Science

Abstract

The theoretical path from natural science to the philosophy of science proceeds along the outlines of the logic of science. But the “philosophy of science” is something more than the “logic of science.” We have attempted to explicate some aspects of the logical structure of science, especially with reference to its methodological and epistemological rationale, in the two preceding chapters. And in that context it was noted that our theoretical analyses contained certain logical consequences for the philosophy of science in general. Generally speaking, two things point toward a reconstruction in the philosophy of science: One of these factors consists of the interpretation of the phenomena of gestalt psychology and genetic psychology (as well as functional psychology); and the other factor consists of the synthetic integration of the ramifications of the epistomological conceptions which we have discerned at the foundation of empirical psychology. The objective of this last chapter, then, will be to sketch the prolegomenon to a reconstruction in the philosophy of science from the standpoint of phenomenological realism.