The Tradition of the Concept of Metaphysics

Abstract

Metaphysics was defined by Aristotle in three different ways, firstly as the science which deals with being as being, secondly, as the science of immovable substance without matter, i.e. of God, thirdly, as the science of first principles.¹ Of these three definitions, the last mentioned gives the essence of science rather than of metaphysics.² The first and second definitions are both concerned with metaphysics in the proper sense, but there is a remarkable difference between them. This difference was taken seriously by Natorp ³ and it also became the basis of Jaeger’s⁴ theory which postulated a development of Aristotle’s thought during his lifetime. The question of the vaUdity of Jaeger’s theory may be dismissed for the moment. We may accept, if necessary, Jaeger’s view, and assume that the theological definition represents the thought of Aristotle’s early period, when he was under Plato’s influence, while the ontological definition represents his later thought. Even with this assumption we cannot suppose that he simply changed his view of metaphysics. For, as we have already said, Aristotle himself argued that these two definitions were in conformity with each other, for both defined the first science. We found that his argument was fallacious, as it turned on an ambiguity in the term ‘the first,’ but that it was none the less completely in accordance with his teleological system.