Introduction

Abstract

No science is subject to such contrary evaluations as metaphysics. Sometimes it is called the queen of all the sciences, sometimes it is outcast and forsaken like Hecuba. ¹ The evaluation has changed several times even since Kant. In the present situation, the number of its admirers is matched by the number of its denigrators, and the final outcome hardly seems to be predictable. Such instability is admittedly natural to a position of great honour. But the problem is not, as Kant considered it, just a matter of the ability of metaphysics to perform its task. What is most perplexing is that we cannot find any single definition of metaphysics common to both its admirers and its denigrators. This, I think, is the most important reason why there has been no correct evaluation of metaphysics. The neglect of definition which, as Socrates maintained, should be the primary subject of philosophy, has resulted in many of the disputes of contemporary philosophy. So as to shed some light on this confusion, the present inquiry aims at a concise survey of the usage of the term metaphysics. Metaphysics must not be defined a priori; we must reach a definition inductively from the history of metaphysics. For we have without doubt a history of thought which is called metaphysics. An a priori concept, which ignores this history, cannot claim universal validity.