Abstract
At the beginning of Chapter IV it was noted that the term “responsibility” in ordinary language is often used as a synonym for “obligation” or “duty,” and the discussion of this sense of “responsibility” was postponed till later. Now we must turn to this topic. It was also suggested that the word “obligation” would be usually employed in our discussions for this sense of “responsibility” in order to avoid possible confusions with “responsible” as a causal concept. Ordinarily, to say that the soldier has a responsibility to guard his post is to say that he ought to guard his post or that he has a duty to do so; or to say that the father has a responsibility to support his wife and children is to say that he ought to do so or that he has a duty to do so. This chapter will be concerned primarily with moral obligations and with the question whether an ethics based upon common sense must presuppose that a man must be a free agent before he can have moral obligations.
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References
This is at least one of the important points driven home in the following article: Joseph Margolis, “One Last Time: ‘Ought’ implies ‘Can’,” The Personalist, XLVIII, No. 1, (1967), pp. 33–41.
See for example: J. L. Austin, “Ifs and Cans,” in his Philosophical Papers (London, Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 153–180
and P. H. Nowell-Smith, “Ifs and Cans,” Theoria, XXVI, Part 2, (1960), pp. 85–101.
Critics such as: W. A. Picard-Cambridge, “Two Problems about Duty,” Mind, XLI, (1932), pp. 72–96; 145-172; 310-340.
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© 1969 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Edwards, R.B. (1969). Responsibility and Obligation. In: Freedom, Responsibility and Obligation. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0643-4_6
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