Abstract
In this chapter, I shall have two main objectives. First, I will try to state and explain a libertarian theory of free agency. Next, I will try to defend this theory of freedom against a number of objections. The objections which are to be discussed in this chapter are those which arise out of psychological and metaphysical considerations, and no attempt will be made yet to deal with those objections of an ethical nature which might arise. Such ethical objections will be discussed in the next chapter and those following.
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References
J. M. E. McTaggert, Some Dogmas of Religion (London, E. Arnold Co., 1906), pp. 141–142.
C. A. Campbell, Skepticism and Construction (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1931), p. 120.
P. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1954), p. 285.
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© 1969 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Edwards, R.B. (1969). Freedom Without a Substantive Self. In: Freedom, Responsibility and Obligation. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0643-4_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0643-4_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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